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Space is rapidly changing. Every year, more numerous 
and more diverse actors embark on increasingly novel, 
innovative, and disruptive ventures in outer space. They are 
joining the more than 70 states, commercial companies, 
and international organizations currently operating over 
1,500 satellites in Earth orbit. 
The prospects are bright; accessing and exploring outer 
space now require less capital investment, less time, and 
fewer people than ever before. However, this rapid pace of 
growth and change exists in a complex landscape of legal, 
regulatory, political, technical, and administrative issues. 
New actors in space face a steep learning curve and will 
stress existing institutions and governance frameworks. 
Additionally, the inherently difficult and fragile nature of 
the space environment means that accidents or mistakes in 
space might affect us all. 
In considering the great possibilities for growth and 
innovation, and in light of the myriad and interlinked 
challenges new space activities will confront, the Secure 
World Foundation offers this Handbook for New Actors 
in Space in the hopes that it will assist all aspiring new 
entrants—whether governmental or non-governmental— 
in planning and conducting space activities in a safe and 
sustainable manner.
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        FOREWORD
Driven by Cold War tensions between the US and the Soviet Union, the space race began almost 60 years ago. Each power was racing to accomplish new feats in space and 
demonstrate its superiority. In 2017, while much remains the same, 
much has changed. Space actors comprise a wide variety of national 
and non-governmental entities comprising diverse rationales, 
goals, and activities. More than 70 states, commercial companies, 
and international organizations currently operate more than 1,500 
satellites in Earth orbit. Driven largely by the commoditization of 
space technology and the lowering of barriers to participation, the 
number of space actors is growing. 
This broadening of space has both advantages and disadvantages. 
On the positive side, it is leading to greatly increased technological 
innovations, lower costs, and greater access to the beneficial 
capabilities and services offered by satellites. However, the 
accelerated growth in space activities and the influx of new actors 
has the potential to exacerbate many of the current threats to 
the long-term sustainable use of space. These threats include 
on-orbit crowding, radio-frequency interference, and the chances 
of an incident in space sparking or escalating geopolitical tensions 
on Earth. 
Michael K. Simpson, PhD
Executive Director
Secure World Foundation
Will the growing number of new actors in space destabilize the space environment, 
creating new tensions between nations? Can the peaceful broadening of space 
allow a flourishing of inventiveness and industry? As new actors “join the club,” 
they should consider the following questions:
What is the international and national legal framework that governs their 
space activities?
What governmental authorities will be regulating them?
What rights and responsibilities do they have in space?
What potential liabilities do they risk for their space activities?
How do governments provide oversight of private-sector  
space activities?
What is the purpose and the value of national space policy?
What mechanisms are there for coordinating national space activities 
among different agencies and entities?
What are the standard operating procedures for owners and operators in 
their chosen orbits?
The Secure World Foundation is proud to present this Handbook for New 
Actors in Space. It is intended to reach two categories of new actors: national 
governments beginning to develop national space policies and regulations, 
and start-up companies, universities, and all other non-governmental entities 
beginning their first forays into space activities. 
The goal of this handbook is to provide new actors with a broad overview of the 
fundamental principles, laws, norms, and best practices for peaceful, safe, and 
responsible activities in space. Only a pragmatic and cooperative approach to 
space can ensure that all countries and peoples can derive the many benefits 
that space activities have to offer.
  |  ix
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This handbook is structured in three main chapters. Though meant to complement 
each other for a broad understanding of the entire scope of concern to new actors, 
certain chapters and sections will be of heightened interest to readers depending 
on their own expected space activity and the role that they will be playing in 
that activity. 
Chapter One deals with the international legal and political order applicable to 
space activities, and gives an introduction to the most important and relevant 
topics in international space law and how they apply to states. 
Chapter Two discusses how national space policy and national regulation apply 
to space, beginning with rationales for developing space policy and discussing in 
particular how to broadcast goals internationally and give guidance domestically. 
The chapter also includes a discussion of the common aspects of national space 
legislation. Because national governments are directly responsible for their 
national space activities, including the activities of non-governmental entities 
such as corporations and universities, national space policy and regulation are 
very important for both governments and individual space projects to understand. 
Governments initiating their space capabilities or drafting their space policies 
would be well served with an understanding of Chapter Two. 
Chapter Three addresses responsible space operations, and provides an overview 
of the process from pre-launch frequency selections and coordination to payload 
review, launch services agreements between launch providers and operators, and 
mission and post-mission concerns. More technical than Chapters One or Two, 
this final chapter explores the operational side of space activities, and may be 
the chapter most consulted by new operators in space once they’ve familiarized 
themselves with the preceding chapters on international and national space law 
and policy. 
Last, while textbooks on any of the various topics discussed in this book run into 
many hundreds of pages, this book aims to be both concise and readable. Rather 
than an exhaustive compendium of every facet and nuance of this incredibly rich 
field, this commentary is broad and comprehensive but contains only the most 
fundamental principles and topics.
HOW TO USE THIS BOOK

Space is changing. The barriers to access to space are decreasing. Shrinking costs, less infrastructure, and lower technological hurdles all make space activities available to 
more people. Meanwhile, smaller programs with fewer necessary 
personnel enable more states and entities to participate in space 
projects. Nevertheless, regardless of a space project’s size, the 
existing international legal and regulatory framework underpins and 
permits space activities. This regime is decades old, and was created 
in a different geopolitical context. Some feel it is ill-suited for the 
next half-century of space activities—either too restrictive, or not 
sufficiently clear in its requirements. 
Undoubtedly, the legal order will change in the coming years and 
decades, and hopefully in ways that permit space activities to grow 
and advance. For the time being, an understanding of the existing 
international framework—consisting of general international 
law, treaties specifically applicable to space activities, and various 
resolutions from the United Nations and from working groups such 
as the International Organization for Standardization is essential to 
understanding how any space project can proceed. All new actors 
in space, whether they are sovereign states expanding their space 
capabilities, new private ventures with commercial interests in 
space, or academic and research projects, should be aware of the 
international framework as examined in this chapter.
Tanja Masson-Zwaan
President Emerita
International Institute  
of Space Law
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The focus of Chapter One is the international legal and regulatory framework, beginning with the rights and obligations of the Outer Space Treaty (OST) and the subsequent space treaties which expand and 
elaborate upon it, and especially the treaty’s obligations in terms of international 
state responsibility and international registration of space objects. International 
frequency management is then discussed, as well as remote sensing, broadcasting 
standards, and international export control measures. Discussion of state liability 
and the various dispute settlement avenues follows.
 
Various international environmental concerns are then explored, including 
protection of the Earth environment, back-contamination of the Earth from space 
missions, nuclear power sources in space, space debris, and the protection of 
celestial bodies. To conclude the chapter, more advanced issues are explored, 
including the unresolved issues related to the lack of a legal definition of where 
outer space begins, the legal status and protections of humans in space, and the 
use of space resources. 
This international framework for the conduct of space activities should be 
explored and understood by new state actors seeking to begin or expand their 
space competencies and by new non-state actors as a general due-diligence to 
better understand the licensing and regulatory process.
FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY
Three core principles lie at the heart of the international framework for space 
activities: freedom of exploration and use of space, peaceful purposes, and state 
responsibility. These principles, as contained in the five core treaties form the 
foundation of international space law, and are reflected in many of the other legal 
and political mechanisms that make up the international framework for space 
activities. The following sections provide an overview of each principle.
Freedom of Exploration and Use of Space 
Outer space is free to be explored, and no nation or state can restrict another 
ONE THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKFOR SPACE ACTIVITIES 
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state’s legitimate access to space for peaceful purposes. This freedom is enshrined 
in the most important source of space law, the Treaty on Principles Governing 
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including 
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, more commonly referred to as the Outer 
Space Treaty.
Like all treaties, the Outer Space Treaty balances rights with obligations. The 
freedoms to use and explore space are balanced with the obligations listed 
throughout the treaty. Those obligations can be considered positive obligations 
requiring a state to perform certain actions, or negative obligations that prohibit 
actions. Article I of the Outer Space Treaty lists these all-important freedoms, 
explaining that: 
Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for 
exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a 
basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be 
free access to all areas of celestial bodies. 
This free access means that emerging actors in space have just as much right to 
explore and use space for peaceful purposes as the established space actors. The 
Figure 1 – Signing of the Outer Space Treaty. Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin,  
UK Ambassador Sir Patrick Dean, US Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, US President 
Lyndon B. Johnson and others observe as US Secretary of State Dean Rusk signs the  
Outer Space Treaty on January 27, 1967 in Washington, DC   
Source: UNOOSA.
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preceding clause of Article I also directly states that the activity of exploring and 
using outer space is the “province of all mankind.”
The Outer Space Treaty then requires that “[t]here shall be freedom of scientific 
investigation in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, 
and States shall facilitate and encourage international cooperation in such 
investigation.” Indeed, the very nature of the Outer Space Treaty encourages 
international cooperation and scientific investigations as ways to promote peace 
and stability among the nations of the world.
Like most international treaties, the preamble to the Outer Space Treaty does 
not contain legally operative language establishing rights, obligations, or 
prohibitions. Rather, it contains the object and purpose of the treaty—the 
subject matter being addressed, the reason the treaty is being drafted, and 
what the treaty is intended to establish. The preamble to the Outer Space 
Treaty explains the motives and aspirations behind the creation of the 
treaty, formalizing the reasons that states decided to create it; these being 
because they:
• recognize the common interest of all humankind in the progress of the 
exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes;
• believe that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out 
for the benefit of all peoples, irrespective of their degree of economic or 
scientific development;
• desire to contribute to broad international development of both the 
scientific and legal aspects of space exploration and use; and
• believe that this international cooperation will drive mutual understanding 
and strengthen friendly relations among states and peoples.
These beliefs in the preamble to the Outer Space Treaty reflect the intentions of 
the drafters for creating this new international legal instrument. All international 
space law should be read with the understanding that these are the intentions 
and aspirations behind the Outer Space Treaty. No interpretation of space law 
(whether that law is international or national) should circumvent, subvert, or 
defeat the motives and purposes listed above. In fact, any valid interpretation of 
any of the articles of the Outer Space Treaty must reflect, conform, and serve these 
purposes. These aspirations, contained in the preamble but forming an integral 
part of the treaty, should always be remembered when considering the freedom 
to access space, explore space, or partake in any other activity or use of space.
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Additionally, it should be noted that the words “exploration” and “use” are in the 
very title of the Outer Space Treaty. The use of outer space, including the use of 
the moon and the use of any celestial bodies, was contemplated by the drafters and 
negotiators of the treaty, and is part of the freedom of access, exploration, and use 
as codified in Article I. It is important to remember that the freedom to explore 
outer space is held by all states, and through them, by all peoples of the world. 
No state can lawfully prevent or restrict any new entrant to the field of peaceful 
space activities.
While many treaties may address space activities in a tangential fashion, there are 
five core treaties, listed in Table 1, that address space activities specifically.
The Core Treaties 
The core space treaties were negotiated and drafted by the United Nations  (UN)
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), a standing body 
Treaty
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities 
of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, including the moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies  (Outer Space Treaty)
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, 
the Return of Astronauts and the Return of 
Objects Launched into Outer Space 
(Astronaut Agreement) 
Convention on International Liability for 
Damage Caused by Space Objects  
(Liability Convention)
Convention on Registration of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space 
(Registration Convention)
Agreement Governing the Activities of States 
on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 
(Moon Agreement)
Table 1 – The Core Treaties on Space
Adoption 
by
General  
Assembly
1966
1967
1971
1974
1979
Entered 
into
Force
1967
1968
1972
 
1976
1984
Number of  
Ratifying  
States as  
of January  
2017
104
94
92
 
63
17
The Core Treaties on Space
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of member states of the United Nations that has considered the political, legal, 
and scientific aspects of space activities since the beginning of the space age. 
The titles of the treaties in Table 1 illustrate their basic subject matter, and they 
largely elaborate upon and refine provisions of the foundational Outer Space 
Treaty. The 1968 Astronaut Rescue and Return Agreement refines and expands on 
the protection given to astronauts, while the 1972 Liability Convention similarly 
expands the provisions for liability for damage incurred in the launching and 
operation of space objects. The Liability Convention establishes absolute liability 
for physical damage suffered on the surface of the Earth, or to aircraft in flight, 
and establishes a fault-based liability regime for space objects in outer space. The 
1975 Registration Convention makes mandatory both international registration 
and the establishment of national registries of space objects.
Figure 2 shows the growth in the number of states that are party to the core treaties, 
along with the relative success of these treaties in relation to one another. As they 
were all drafted from the mid-1960s until the late 1970s, this era of broad treaty-
making by the United Nations is now over, and subsequent decades have seen the 
United Nations use General Assembly resolutions to communicate principles on a 
number of subsequent space-related topics.
Article III of the Outer Space Treaty incorporates space law into the larger body 
of international law. Consequently, other sources of public international law, 
including the UN Charter, impact the law of outer space. The practices of states, 
along with general principles of law, are also valid and often applicable. For 
Figure 2 – Growth in the Number of States Party to the Space Law Treaties 
 Source: Secure World Foundation.
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example, one principle of general international law can be summarized as “that 
which is not explicitly prohibited is otherwise permitted.” The consequence of 
these explicit freedoms, and their context in the larger body of international law, 
is the creation of a wide scope of state freedom in outer space with only certain 
particular and explicitly codified legal prohibitions.
For states looking to begin their first forays into space, signing and ratifying 
the core treaties sends a signal to the world that the rights and obligations of 
international space law are understood and accepted, and underlies their 
serious approach to beginning space activities. It shows that they intend to be a 
responsible and law-abiding actor in space, and that they have “joined the club” of 
spacefaring nations. 
Peaceful Purposes 
Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty 
requires that states refrain from placing 
nuclear weapons or other weapons of 
mass destruction into Earth orbit or 
installing or stationing them on celestial 
bodies. It further requires that the moon 
and other celestial bodies be used for 
exclusively peaceful purposes. Next, 
it forbids the establishment of military 
bases, installations, or fortifications 
on celestial bodies, and also forbids 
testing weapons and conducting military 
maneuvers on celestial bodies. A 
previous international treaty, the Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty of 1963, also prohibits 
states from testing nuclear weapons or 
performing nuclear explosions beyond 
the limits of the atmosphere, including 
in outer space.
There have always been military and 
security aspects to space activities. As a 
foundational security treaty negotiated 
between Cold War powers, the Outer 
Space Treaty addresses this dual-
There has 
always been a 
debate about 
the definition of 
peaceful purposes, 
with two main 
interpretations 
arising: one says  
that peaceful 
purposes means 
“non-military” in  
any regard; the 
other holds that 
peaceful merely 
means  
“non-aggressive.”
 |    9
use nature of space capabilities. Since the treaty entered into force, there has 
always been a debate about the definition of peaceful purposes, with two main 
interpretations arising: one says that peaceful purposes means “non-military” in 
any regard; the other holds that peaceful merely means “non-aggressive.” The 
latter interpretation has gradually gained broader acceptance. However, the clear 
prohibitions mentioned above remain.
As other sources of international law are also applicable to space activities through 
their inclusion in Article III of the Outer Space Treaty, the general prohibition on 
the threat of, or use of, force between UN Member States is therefore applicable 
to outer space. Article 2.4 of the UN Charter requires that:
[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations. 
Additionally, Articles 39 to 51 address threats and breaches of the peace, acts 
of aggression, and the inherent right of self-defense. This general regime of 
public international law between states underpins the special regime of space law, 
and creates the same prohibitions and restrictions for military conflict in space 
as on Earth. However, there is a lack of consensus on the specific applications 
of international law to conflict in space as exists in the maritime, air, and 
land domains.
International State Responsibility 
In the usual affairs of humankind, governments are not generally responsible for 
the actions of their citizens. If a citizen of Country A goes abroad to Country 
B, and someone in Country B wants to bring a claim against them, they don’t 
often also name Country A’s government as a defendant. In the usual dealings 
between people and foreign governments, people are not the responsibility of their 
governments. This is not the case in outer space activities. In fact, in activities 
dealing with outer space, the situation is reversed.
Under Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, states are directly responsible for 
all their national space activities, whether that activity is conducted by the 
government itself or by any of its citizens or companies, and whether launching 
domestically or possibly even when its nationals are conducting space activities 
abroad. The direct responsibility of national governments is relatively unique in 
international law. Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty reads:
T
H
E
 I
N
T
E
R
N
A
T
IO
N
A
L 
FR
A
M
E
W
O
R
K
10    |  Handbook for New Actors in Space
States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for 
national activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial 
bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or 
by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are 
carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty.
The second sentence continues:
The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the 
Moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing 
supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.  
Because the direct responsibility and potential international liability for all 
national activities is relatively unique and quite broad, this duty should always 
be taken into account when considering space activities. The requirement that 
activities be carried out in conformity with the treaty act as a limiting provision to 
Article I’s freedoms of access, exploration, and use. When space activities cause 
physical damage on the ground, to aircraft in flight, or to space objects in space, 
then mere international responsibility expands to international liability, a separate 
but related issue expanded upon in Chapter One: International Liability. 
Today, many space activities are international in nature, and in any multinational 
space project, all states are under these obligations. This expansive international 
state responsibility is the incentive for national space policy and space legislation, 
the subject of Chapter Two.
REGISTRATION OF SPACE OBJECTS
Along with international responsibility for national activities, and potential 
international liability for damage caused to other states, registration is an obligation 
placed upon states for their space activities. The tracking of which states are 
responsible for which activities is aided by registration in both international and 
national registries of space objects.
International registration of space objects was first called for in United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 1721 B (XVI), adopted by the UN at the 
dawn of the space age in 1961. This resolution calls upon states launching space 
objects to promptly provide the UN with launch information for a UN-maintained 
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public registry. This international registry was intended to aid other states in 
determining which activities in space are being conducted by whom. While 
the original intention of this resolution was to help prevent collisions in space, 
today this voluntary notification to the UN would be called a transparency and 
confidence-building measure (TCBM), as notifying the rest of the world about 
launches also helps show that a state is open about its activities.
While UNGA Res. 1721 B (XVI) is not legally binding and imposes no mandatory 
obligations on states, international registration of launched space objects was 
made mandatory in 1975 with the Registration Convention – at least as regards 
to those states which are a party to that convention. As of 2017, 63 states are 
party to the Registration Convention, including all the major and historical space 
powers (albeit quite a few less than the number of states that are party to the Outer 
Space Treaty).
Articles III and IV of the Registration Convention require that the UN Secretary-
General establish a registry of space objects with open access to all. Article IV 
requires that any launching state placing its launched space object on a national 
registry shall also communicate to the Secretary-General certain information for 
the international registry. That information is:
• The name of the launching state (or states) 
• An appropriate designator of the space object or its registration number
• Date and territory or location of launch
• Basic orbital parameters, including:
 - Nodal period
 - Inclination
 - Apogee
 - Perigee
• General function of the space object
The remaining requirements include updating the UN with additional information, 
along with including information on objects that are no longer in Earth orbit. On 
behalf of the Secretary-General, the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs 
(OOSA) is the keeper of this international registry established by the Registration 
Convention, as well as the registry of objects registered pursuant to UNGA Res. 
1721 B (XVI). For states not party to the Registration Convention, international 
registration can be made pursuant to UNGA Res. 1721 B (XVI). 
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OOSA maintains a standard form for both registries which it recommends 
that states use (see Figure 3). The required registration information is not 
overly detailed.
UNGA Resolution 62/101
The registry form (Figure 3) also references UNGA Res. 62/101 from 2007 
entitled “Recommendations on enhancing the practice of States and international 
intergovernmental organizations in registering space objects.” The resolution 
expresses a desire for states to proffer additional information regarding space 
objects, including updated circumstances such as a change of function, non-
functional status, change of orbital position, or removal to a disposal orbit, along 
with the change in status of their owner, operator, or of the space object itself. This 
ability to update information to the UN is a key advancement and has implications 
for more advanced or complex space activities such as launches with multiple 
launching states, and for satellite servicing or debris removal in the future.
National Registration
Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty does not address international registration. 
Rather, it discusses national registration, stating that a   
State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer 
space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and 
over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body. 
Ownership of objects launched into outer space, including objects landed or 
constructed on a celestial body, and of their component parts, is not affected 
by their presence in outer space or on a celestial body or by their return to 
the Earth. 
In an area where state sovereignty is absent, the effect of this article is to provide 
a crucial component of state sovereignty, namely jurisdiction. The right of a 
state to exercise jurisdiction over space objects depends upon that state listing its 
launched objects on a national registry. Each state might need to consolidate that 
international right in its national legislation.
Enshrining in an international treaty the national right to exercise jurisdictional 
powers in an extraterritorial manner through a national registry gives states 
an incentive to establish national registers, and to list their space objects on 
them. In so doing, it furthers the transparency of space activities, and as long 
as national registries are publicly searchable, outsiders can determine which 
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Figure 3 – OOSA International Registry Form
 Source: UNOOSA.  
New registration of space object
Additional information  
for previously registered space 
object
State of registry or international 
intergovernmental organization 
Other launching States 
Name
COSPAR international designator
National designator/registration 
number as used by State of 
registry
Date of launch
(hours, minutes, seconds optional)
 
Territory or location of launch
 
Nodal period
Inclination
Apogee
Perigee
Yes ¨
Submitted under the 
Convention: ST/SG/SER.E/  ¨  
Submitted under resolution 
1721B: A/AC.105/INF. ¨     
Check Box
UN document 
number in 
which previous 
registration data 
was distributed 
to Member 
States
Under the 
Registration 
Convention, 
only one State 
of registry can 
exist for a space 
object. 
Coordinated 
Universal Time 
(UTC)
minutes
degrees
kilometres
kilometres
Part A:  
Information provided in conformity with the Registration Convention or  
General Assembly Resolution 1721 B (XVI)
Launching State/States/international intergovernmental organization
Designator
Date and territory or location of launch
Basic orbital parameters
dd/mm/yyyy sec
hrs min
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General function of space object
Geostationary position
(where applicable, planned/actual)
Website:
Date of decay/reentry/deorbit 
(hours, minutes, seconds optional)
Sources of information
 
UN registration documents
COSPAR international 
designators 
Global launch locations 
Online Index of Objects Launched 
into Outer Space 
 
Date when space object is no 
longer functional 
(hours, minutes, seconds optional)
Date when space object is moved 
to a disposal orbit (hours, minutes, 
seconds optional)
 
Physical conditions when space 
object is moved to a disposal 
orbit (see COPUOS Space Debris 
Mitigation Guidelines)
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/SORegister/docsstatidx.html 
http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/spacewarn/ 
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/SORegister/resources.html 
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/osoindex.html
Coordinated 
Universal Time 
(UTC)
Coordinated 
Universal Time 
(UTC)
Coordinated 
Universal Time 
(UTC)
degrees East
Part A:  
Information provided in conformity with the Registration Convention or  
General Assembly Resolution 1721 B (XVI)
Part B:  
Additional information for use in the United Nations Register of Objects Launched 
into Outer Space, as recommended in General Assembly Resolution 62/101
General function
Basic orbital parameters
Additional Information
Change of status in operations
Change of status
dd/mm/yyyy
dd/mm/yyyy
dd/mm/yyyy
sec
sec
sec
hrs
hrs
hrs
min
min
min
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Part C:  
Information relating to the change of supervision of a space object, as 
recommended in General Assembly Resolution 62/101
Part D:  
Additional voluntary information for use in the United Nations Register of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space
Change of supervision of the space object
Previous orbital position
Change of function of  
the space object
New orbital position
Date of change in supervision 
(hours, minutes, seconds optional)
Identity of the new owner  
or operator
 Space object owner or operator
Launch vehicle
Celestial body space object  
is orbiting (if not Earth, please 
specify) 
Other information
(information that the State  
of registry may wish to furnish  
to the United Nations)
Sources of information
General Assembly resolution 
62/101
COPUOS Space Debris Mitigation 
Guidelines
Texts of the Registration 
Convention and relevant 
resolutions
Coordinated 
Universal Time 
(UTC)
degrees East
degrees East
Change of orbital position
Basic information
dd/mm/yyyy sec
hrs min
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/SORegister/resources.html
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/SORegister/resources.html
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/SORegister/resources.html
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space objects belong to which country. Coupled with this are the final sections 
of Article VIII, whereby states retain ownership of their launched space objects 
and their component parts while in outer space and upon return to Earth. States 
becoming party to the Outer Space Treaty and subsequent treaties should consider 
establishing and maintaining national space registries.  
Currently, over 30 states have national space registries, and some make  their 
national registries available and searchable online (although this is not a 
requirement). While international organizations cannot be parties to the 
Registration Convention, the European Space Agency (ESA) and the European 
Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT) also 
keep registries of their space objects. As the method for exercising jurisdiction 
over launched space objects, the national registry is an important component 
of a state’s oversight and responsibility requirements. National registration is 
discussed further in Chapter Two: National Registration.
Suborbital Launches
The Registration Convention requires registration of objects “launched into 
Earth orbit or beyond,” and the previous 
UNGA resolution likewise calls for 
registration of objects “launched into 
orbit or beyond.” However, there is 
no international requirement or call 
to register objects that are only being 
launched for suborbital operations. How 
to deal with suborbital space activities 
is an open question that new actors will 
need to consider from a registration 
perspective, as registration may impact 
whether suborbital activities are 
considered to be “space activities.” 
To the extent that a state’s suborbital 
activities take place solely above 
their national airspace and no other 
international aspects or elements are 
involved, these suborbital activities 
seem to be purely the national space 
activities of a single state. Launches that 
How to deal with 
suborbital space 
activities is an 
open question that 
new actors will 
need to consider 
from a registration 
perspective, as 
registration may 
impact whether 
suborbital activities 
are considered to be 
“space activities.” 
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go higher in altitude than some orbits, but have insufficient speed or are placed 
on a parabolic trajectory and return to Earth, are therefore also not considered 
“orbital.” To date, many states haven’t made a legal determination whether and to 
what extent international space law is applicable to suborbital activities.
However, one of the main goals of international registration is to alert the world to a 
state’s space activities. Consequently, continuing to observe the above-mentioned 
international registration requirements fulfills these objectives of international 
transparency and confidence-building about national space activities.
INTERNATIONAL FREQUENCY MANAGEMENT
Spacecraft communicate using frequencies in the electromagnetic spectrum that 
are limited by physics. Consequently, frequency coordination and allocation 
among users is one of the most important processes for the successful operation 
of a space project. 
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is a specialized agency of the 
United Nations. The oldest organization within the UN system, the ITU traces its 
origin to international postal unions in the mid-19th century. Today, the ITU has 
over 190 member states that are party to its principal treaties: the ITU Constitution 
and the ITU Convention. Since the beginning of the space age, the ITU has aided 
the exploration and use of space through international coordination and frequency 
allocation. The ITU is tasked with ensuring the rational, equitable, efficient, 
and economical use of the radiofrequency spectrum. Within the ITU, this task 
is primarily managed by the ITU Radiocommunication (ITU-R) sector.It also 
administers orbital positions (called “slots”) in geostationary Earth orbit (GEO). 
GEO is a limited natural resource in the sense that its use for satellite applications 
requires coordination between users to prevent congestion and misuse.
The ITU-R maintains the ITU Radio Regulations, which include the 
administrative regulations for radio communication services including satellite 
radio communication services. The Radio Regulations include the Master 
International Frequency Register (MIFR) of all coordinated frequencies. The 
Master International Frequency Register should be consulted very early in a space 
project, when considering which frequency or frequencies a space project’s space 
systems and Earth stations will use.
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The ITU divides the world into three administrative regions, as shown in Figure 
4. Region One includes Europe, Africa, the former countries of the Soviet Union, 
and Mongolia. Region Two includes the Americas and Greenland. Region Three 
is the rest of Asia, Australasia, and the Pacific. Each administrative region has 
assigned particular frequencies to particular technologies and services. The ITU 
has allocated a number of frequencies for specific space activities, including 
frequencies for Earth exploration, meteorology, radio astronomy, emergency 
telecommunications, radio navigation, space operations, space research, and 
amateur satellites. 
Radiofrequency spectrum is divided into bands that are either exclusively 
allocated or that share allocations for various applications. Applications with 
broad international usage enjoy exclusive allocations. A shared portion of the 
spectrum is available for one or more services, either on a worldwide or regional 
basis. Within the shared bands, different services are classed into either primary or 
secondary services. Primary services enjoy superior rights to secondary services.
The Radio Regulations require that secondary services:  
• not cause harmful interference to stations of primary services to which 
frequencies are already assigned or may be assigned at a later date; 
• cannot claim protection from harmful interference from stations or a 
primary service to which frequencies are already assigned or may be 
assigned at a later date; and
• can, however, claim protection from harmful interference from stations 
of the same or other secondary services to which frequencies may be 
assigned at a later date.   
Figure 5 shows the distribution of applications into different parts of the spectrum, 
each of which also depends on the region of the world in which that use is located.
Figure 4 – ITU World Regions  
 Source: ITU. 
ITU Regions Map
Region 3 Region 2 Region 1 Region 3
(c) EI8IC
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National administrators implement and apply the ITU Radio Regulations on the 
national level. A deeper discussion follows in Chapter Two, dealing with the 
procedure of coordinating with the ITU through national administrators, and 
in Chapter Three, dealing with coordination between operators and national 
administrators, and among the operators themselves.
World Radiocommunication Conference
World Radiocommunication Conferences (WRC) are held every three to four 
years, under the auspices of the ITU-R. Their purpose is to allow member states 
to review and revise the treaty deciding use of the radio-frequency spectrum and 
of the geostationary satellite and non-geostationary satellite orbit. A month-long 
conference with thousands of participants, the WRC is the primary venue through 
which frequency assignments for terrestrial, aerial, and space-based applications 
are reviewed and made. As such, decisions taken at the WRC can have significant 
impact on the spectrum resources available to satellite operators.
The WRC also determines the “Questions” for examination by the Radio-
communications Assembly and its Study Groups in preparation for future WRCs. 
Because agendas and questions are set so far in advance, new space actors should 
determine what areas being studied might affect their project plans and spectrum 
needs and whether they themselves need to advocate for changes to the Radio 
Regulations to accommodate their future plans.
Companies and other interested parties can become sector members of the ITU, 
allowing them to observe meetings and provide industry perspective.
Space Frequency Coordination Group
 An additional notable group is the Space Frequency Coordination Group (SFCG), 
an informal group of frequency managers from civil space agencies. Annual 
meetings of the group are held to create administrative and technical agreements 
about allocated bands in order to avoid interference in the space sector. The SFCG 
meetings adopts resolutions and recommendations containing technical and 
administrative agreements for space agencies to make the best use of allocated 
bands, and to avoid interference. The SFCG recommendations are not formally 
binding, and their effectiveness depends upon their voluntary acceptance and 
implementation by member agencies.
Laser Communications
In recent years, there has been considerable advancement in the development 
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of laser communications systems for satellites. Unlike radio communications, 
which utilize signals in the radio part of the electromagnetic spectrum, laser 
communications utilize signals in the optical part of the electromagnetic spectrum. 
Laser technologies have been demonstrated for communicating between ground 
stations and satellites orbiting the Earth, between two satellites orbiting the Earth, 
and between satellites orbiting the moon and Mars and ground stations on Earth.
There are several major differences between traditional radio satellite 
communications and laser communications. Laser communications are line-of-
sight, meaning that there must be a clear, direct line path between the transmitter 
and receiver. This means that laser communications are not able to broadcast over 
a wide reception footprint. But this also makes laser communications much harder 
to intercept, and there is very little chance of unintentional interference. Laser 
communications also use much higher frequencies than radio communications, 
which means they are able to carry much more data.
 
Laser communications pose significant questions for international regulation. 
Under the current definitions adopted by the ITU, satellites utilizing laser 
communications do not currently require a license. The ITU Radio Regulations 
Board is currently restricted to regulating the radiofrequency spectrum used for 
broadcast applications, which does not apply to laser communications. However, 
there are some who feel the definition of satellite communication should be 
expanded to cover laser communications, as the assignment of spectrum licenses 
is currently one of the few ways to regulate space activities.
REMOTE SENSING
Each state enjoys sovereignty over its territory, and therefore states are often 
concerned about others gaining insight into what is happening within their 
territory, either for commercial, political, or military purposes. So while space 
is free to be explored, many states feel some uneasiness about spacecraft turning 
their cameras back towards Earth, enabling neighbors to gain information.
To date, no international treaty directly governs remote sensing. Rather, a number 
of UNGA resolutions establish certain principles relevant to remote sensing. 
UNGA Resolution 41/65 of 1986 relates fifteen principles for states to follow 
in their remote sensing activities. The resolution first establishes a difference 
between “primary data” and “processed data.” Primary data means those “raw 
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data that are acquired by remote sensors borne by a space object and that are 
transmitted or delivered to the ground from space.” Conversely, processed data 
means the “products resulting from the processing of the primary data.” Analyzed 
information is defined as “information resulting from the interpretation of 
processed data, inputs of data, and knowledge from other sources.” 
Principle XII of UNGA 41/65 is perhaps the most important of the remote sensing 
principles, and strikes a balance between the freedom to explore space and the 
concerns states have about being observed (“sensed states”):
As soon as the primary data and the processed data concerning the territory 
under its jurisdiction is produced, the sensed State shall have access to them 
on a non-discriminatory basis and on reasonable cost terms. The sensed State 
shall also have access to the available analysed information concerning the 
territory under its jurisdiction in the possession of any State participating in 
remote sensing activities on the same basis and terms, taking particularly 
into account the needs and interests of the developing countries.
While Resolution 41/65 is a non-binding resolution from the United Nations 
General Assembly, it is meant to reflect the best practices of spacefaring states. 
Beyond this resolution, data-sharing has become a key principle in remote sensing 
activities because of an early recognition of the links between accessibility to such 
data and societal benefits, scientific progress, and commercial applications.
 
Open data-exchange at the international level has been upheld especially for global 
meteorological data and related products, as adopted in World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) Resolution 40. The Group on Earth Observations (GEO), 
a partnership of governments and organizations working towards coordinated, 
comprehensive, and sustained Earth observations and information, actively 
promotes full and open data-sharing of integrated observations to address 
challenges at the global, regional, national, and local levels.
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
International standards are accepted in many fields in order to increase safety, 
reliability, and quality, and are increasingly being implemented in the space field. 
A standard is merely a document that provides requirements, specifications, 
guidelines, or characteristics that can be used consistently to ensure that 
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materials, products, processes, and services are fit for their purposes. Standards 
can be as specific as an outline on how to interface with a particular class of 
device, or as general as providing details around management best practices for 
ensuring quality. 
 
While standards can be developed by any organization or entity, international 
standards are becoming increasingly important in a more globalized world. 
Adopting an international standard can help ensure compatibility across entire 
global sectors and can also be used by companies to signal to potential customers 
that their products or services are high-quality. Multiple organizations in a sector 
can use standards to codify lessons learned from past mistakes to help improve 
overall safety in a sector.
International Organization for Standardization
The primary international standards body is the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO). ISO is an independent, non-governmental organization 
created in 1946 to facilitate the international coordination and unification of 
industrial standards. The ISO membership consists of the primary national 
standards body from more than 160 participating countries. Individuals or 
companies cannot become members, but can be appointed by their national 
standards bodies as representatives in the areas of technical standards and 
policy development.
Although many of the ISO standards apply in some way to the space sector, 
there is one technical committee, TC20, that is focused on aircraft and space 
vehicles. Within TC20, the bulk of the space standards are developed by two 
subcommittees: subcommittee 13 (SC13)–Space Data and Information Transfer 
Systems, and subcommittee 14 (SC14)–Space Systems and Operations. Each 
subcommittee has multiple working groups that each focus on a specific area, 
such as systems engineering, operations and ground support, and orbital debris. 
ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector
The Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is the division of the 
ITU responsible for coordinating technical standards for telecommunications. It 
does this through a consensus-based approach with both member states and sector 
members providing input to the numerous study groups. The purpose of the study 
groups is to develop “Recommendations” and other technical documents, which 
become mandatory only when adopted as part of a national law.
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The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets 
every four years, approves the study groups, sets their work programme for the 
next four-year period, and appoints their chairmen and vice-chairmen.
Though not as important for space actors as the ITU-R, the ITU-T has study 
groups looking at cybersecurity, the Internet of Things (IOT), 5G, and other topics 
of interest to some companies.
Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems
The Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS) was founded in 
1982 by several major space agencies to provide a forum for discussing common 
problems in developing and operating space data systems. There are currently 11 
space agencies that are full members of CCSDS and 28 observer agencies. The 
main focus of CCSDS is developing standards for common space-data-handling 
needs, and specifically transferring data from satellites to terrestrial receivers. The 
CCSDS has developed standards for the following areas:
• Spacecraft Onboard Interface Services
• Space Link Services
• Space Internetworking Services
• Mission Operations and Information Management Services
• Systems Engineering
• Cross-Support Services 
Although officially separate organizations, ISO and CCSDS have developed close 
links for space standards. Standards adopted by CCSDS are also ISO standards 
under subcommittee 13. 
International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems
The proliferation of space technologies has led to the emergence of proposed 
international standards in other areas such as global navigation satellite systems 
(GNSS) and geospatial information. The International Committee on Global 
Navigation Satellite Systems (ICG), established in 2005, promotes voluntary 
cooperation on civil satellite-based positioning, navigation, timing, and value-
added services. Through its Providers Forum—which includes China, India, 
Japan, the European Union (EU), the Russian Federation, and the US—the ICG 
encourages coordination among current and future GNSS providers to ensure 
greater compatibility, interoperability, and transparency. 
 |    25
United Nations Committee of Experts on Global Geospatial 
Information Management
In the field of geospatial information, the United Nations Committee of Experts 
on Global Geospatial Information Management (UN-GGIM), established in 
2011, provides a forum for coordination and exchange among member states and 
international organizations while promoting the development of global geospatial 
information and its use in addressing global challenges. Key UN-GGIM initiatives 
integrate efforts to promote technical standards to advance interoperability 
priority datasets while promoting engagement on legal and policy issues and 
related issues impacting national and regional capacity for geospatial information. 
Complementary to the work of the UN-GGIM, the Open Geospatial Consortium 
(OGC), an international industry consortium of companies, government agencies, 
and universities, drives the development of publicly available interface standards 
to support the interoperability and accessibility of geospatial information 
and services. 
INTERNATIONAL EXPORT CONTROL
There is significant international concern over the uncontrolled spread of both 
conventional military goods and technologies and dual-use technology such 
as space technology. Dual-use technology is commonly defined as technology 
having both civil and military applications. An example in the space industry 
is the chemical rocket, which can be used as a space launch vehicle to place 
satellites and humans into orbit, but which can also serve as a ballistic missile for 
delivering weapons of mass destruction. All new actors, including private non-
governmental space actors, should be acutely aware of the sensitive nature and 
politically charged context of all space activities.
At the international level, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for 
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies is a significant effort 
to control the proliferation of specific types of military and dual-use goods 
and technologies. It was established in 1996 and currently has 41 participating 
states, mostly located in North America and Europe. The goal of the Wassenaar 
Arrangement is to contribute to regional and international security and stability 
by promoting transparency and greater responsibility for transfers of conventional 
arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilizing 
accumulations. Participating states control items in the “List of Dual-Use Goods 
and Technologies and Munitions List” and work to prevent unauthorized transfers 
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of those items. The arrangement also uses export controls as a way to combat 
terrorism, and is not designed to work against any particular state or group of 
states. Participating states agree to exchange information on sensitive dual-
use goods and technologies, follow agreed-upon best practices, and report any 
transfers or denied transfers of controlled items made to recipients outside of 
the Arrangement. 
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is another important 
international control in the realm of space activities. The MTCR is a voluntary 
regime that was originally established in 1987, and in 2017 has 34 participating 
countries. Four additional countries have agreed to abide by MTCR export control 
rules but have not formally joined. The goal of the MTCR is to coordinate national 
export licensing efforts in order to prevent the proliferation of uninhabited delivery 
systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. 
In 2002, the Hague International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile 
Proliferation, also known as the Hague Code of Conduct, was created to 
augment the MTCR. The Hague Code of Conduct calls on participating states 
to exercise restraint in the testing, production, and export of ballistic missiles. 
While the Hague Code is less restrictive than the MTCR, with 119 participating 
states it has significantly more international acceptance, and it serves as a solid 
TCBM. Subscribing states agree to making pre-launch notifications and annual 
declarations of their policies.
One country’s export control laws have had global effects. The United States’ 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), a set of government regulations 
that control the export and import of defense-related articles and services on the 
US Munitions List (USML), have affected how other countries develop domestic 
industries because of rules requiring “ITAR compliance.” Part of this depends 
upon registering with the US State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade 
Controls (DDTC) and obtaining relevant licenses when necessary. Items on the 
USML include some satellites and their related technologies. Alternatively, some 
states have successfully marketed their products as being “ITAR-free,” meaning 
that they would not have as many of the exporting restrictions that items on the 
USML would have.
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INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY
In international law, liability is a concept related to but altogether distinct from 
responsibility. Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty establishes the obligation that 
states launching space objects shall be internationally liable for
damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical 
persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space or in 
outer space, including the Moon or other celestial bodies.
This obligation to be held liable for resulting damage is necessarily linked 
with responsibility, but is distinct enough to require close attention. Whereas 
responsibility, discussed above, is an obligation to ensure that all national 
activities are carried out in conformity with the Outer Space Treaty, the liability 
provision requires that states undertake action towards the compensation of other 
states should certain damages occur. The definition of damage, as contained in the 
1972 Liability Convention, is “loss of life, personal injury or other impairment 
of health; or loss of or damage to property or of persons, natural or juridical, 
or property of international intergovernmental organizations,” and is usually 
interpreted to mean actual physical damage rather than pecuniary interests or 
other forms of non-physical damage.
Additionally, responsibility is placed on the state or states responsible for national 
activities. Liability may be imposed upon any “launching state” of space objects 
causing damage. While space launches are inherently dangerous, and the execution 
of a launch is not illegal per se, the imposition of liability for damages means that 
states shall offer compensation after damage occurs, with an understanding that 
no violation of international law is necessarily found if damage occurs. 
The Outer Space Treaty defines four categories of launching state: (1) the state 
“that launches,” (2) that which “procures the launching of a space object,” and 
each state from whose (3) territory or (4) facility an object is launched. The 
Liability Convention and the Registration Convention reiterate these categories. 
Consequently, there may be more than one launching state for the purposes of 
liability. Indeed, this is how many space activities are conducted today.
 
For states, the liability obligation means that while they are at liberty to conduct 
launches, they must ensure that they are otherwise lawful, and they must be ready 
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to pay compensation to other states should certain damages occur (either on the 
ground, in the air, or in space). While a launch may take place from another 
country’s territory, a state may still be exposed to potential liability if its activities 
fall within one of the four broad categories of launching state. In multilateral 
space activities, it makes sense for state partners to determine beforehand who 
will be considered a launching state.
  
In short, states are both responsible for all their national space activities and 
potentially liable for activities in which they are considered the launching state. 
For new entrants to the field of space activities, these obligations mean that 
supervising states should seek to limit risky launches or those that might cause 
damage to other states. The supervising state may also put in place provisions to 
reduce or offset their potential exposure to liability, such as requiring that new 
non-governmental entrants find insurance for their missions should damage occur. 
Insurance is discussed in both Chapters Two and Three. 
Because a launching state will be held accountable for any resulting damage, any 
state that is a launching state will be interested in regulating private activities. 
Once a state is a “launching state,” it will always be considered a launching state, 
and while there can be more than one launching state, there should usually be only 
one state which is the registering state. 
It might seem that a launching state 
would always be a registering state, but 
complex international launches happen 
more and more frequently. While being 
deemed a launching state is tied to the 
concept of liability, registering is tied 
more to responsibility for oversight, 
licensing, and supervision, as well as 
jurisdictional competency over the 
space object.
States seeking to foster domestic 
space activities and industries should 
consider what regulatory frameworks 
they should adopt to authorize and 
supervise these activities.
States seeking to 
foster domestic 
space activities 
and industries 
should consider 
what regulatory 
frameworks they 
should adopt to 
authorize and 
supervise these 
activities.
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DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
Though the desired outcome of any space activity would ideally never include a 
need for dispute resolution, either among states or private parties or a combination 
of the two, it is essential to consider which dispute resolution mechanisms are 
available if needed. This section addresses the basic mechanisms of dispute 
resolution open to states and private parties. 
The 1972 Liability Convention provides a framework by which states can pursue 
claims for damage caused by a space object—to another space object, to aircraft 
in flight, or on the surface of Earth. The Liability Convention sets out specific 
parameters for diplomatic claim resolution, beginning in Article IX. According 
to Article X of the Liability Convention, “A claim for compensation for damage 
may be presented to a Launching State no later than one year following the date 
of the occurrence of the damage or the identification of the Launching State which 
is liable.” 
Pursuit of a claim under the Liability Convention does not require the prior 
exhaustion of remedies in national courts. While a claim can be pursued either 
in national courts or through the Liability Convention, both avenues cannot be 
pursued concurrently.
If one or both parties to a dispute are not party to the Liability Convention, the 
Liability Convention does not apply. In that situation, any diplomatic resolution 
must follow the rules of international law that otherwise apply to the relevant 
states that are party to the dispute. For example, if both states are parties to the 
Outer Space Treaty, the provisions of Article VII of the treaty would apply.
Where a resolution cannot be achieved through diplomatic channels, the Liability 
Convention provides for the non-adversarial settlement of disputes in the context 
of a three-member claims commission, which can be initiated by either party to the 
dispute. The procedure for the formation of a claims commission is described in 
Articles XIV through XX. Whether they are resolved through diplomatic channels 
or through a claims commission, disputes decided under the Liability Convention 
are “determined in accordance with international law and the principles of justice 
and equity,” which generally attempt to restore the state that suffered damage to 
the position they would have been in had the damage not occurred.
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International Court of Justice
With regard to the settlement of space-related disputes between states, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) provides yet another option. Of course, the 
parties to a dispute must either agree to refer the dispute to the ICJ or recognize 
compulsory jurisdiction under the ICJ statute. Only states may bring claims to 
the ICJ (though certain international organizations can pursue advisory opinions). 
While the ICJ has yet to decide a space-related case to date, it would have subject-
matter jurisdiction over any space dispute that would be considered a dispute of 
international law.
Arbitration and Mediation
Arbitration agreements usually take the form of a clause in a contract setting forth 
the rights and responsibilities of the parties. Such arbitration clauses are globally 
well-recognized and are even favored in some jurisdictions, as they reduce the 
burden on court systems. However, not all parties share the same priorities for 
dispute resolution. An arbitration clause provides the parties with the authority to 
establish the arbitrator selection process and set arbitrator qualifications, and to 
determine whether and what discovery is available, what rules apply (evidentiary 
and procedural), scheduling, level of confidentiality, the role the arbitrators will 
serve, decision format and whether the decision is binding, the appeal process if 
any, choice of law, provisional remedies, and methods of enforcement. Arbitration 
clauses can specify a particular arbitral tribunal, in which case the parties must 
comply with the rules and requirements of that tribunal.
Mediation, like both arbitration and adjudication, also employs neutral third 
parties to resolve a dispute. However, the mediator(s) would not issue a binding 
decision. The procedures for mediation are less structured and more flexible than 
those followed by either courts or arbitral tribunals and can be entirely consensual 
or court-ordered. Resolution of disputes between non-governmental actors, such 
as corporations or other private entities, is dealt with in the following chapters.
In 2011, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), situated in The Hague, 
Netherlands, promulgated its Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating 
to Outer Space Activities. Additionally, the PCA recommends a model clause 
for insertion into contracts. These rules establish an alternative means of settling 
disputes among states, international organizations, and private entities. 
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ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
Protection of both terrestrial and space environments is necessary in order to 
ensure their continued habitability and usability. Space activities, particularly 
launches, are considered to be inherently dangerous and risky. Consequently, there 
are various laws and regulations addressing the protection of the environment 
that forbid certain activities or delineate who is responsible when damage occurs. 
There are also various principles for protecting the space environment, especially 
the particularly useful orbits and celestial bodies.
Protection of the Earth Environment
Launching into space is an inherently dangerous activity, usually involving the 
combustion of large amounts of solid and liquid fuel and the rapid transit of 
advanced hardware through harsh and unforgiving environments. For that reason, 
launch sites are chosen in isolated places, far from where accidents can cause 
harm to others.
 
A number of sources of law address protecting the Earth environment and allocate 
the burden of making compensation in case damage happens. On the international 
level, states are generally responsible for transboundary international harm they 
cause to other states. This obligation exists in the general custom of states, and is 
widely recognized. Particular to space law, Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty 
creates the liability rules for space launches, and includes liability for launching 
states causing damage on the Earth or in airspace to other states of the treaty.
Additionally, states are absolutely liable for damage their space launches cause 
on the surface of the ground, or damage to aircraft in flight. This absolute liability 
does not require that any fault or negligence be proven, merely that the damage 
occurred resulting from the activities of the responsible state. Consequently, 
while space activities are generally lawful, their ultra-hazardous nature is 
reflected in this absolute liability regime from the Outer Space Treaty and the 
Liability Convention.
Back-Contamination of Earth
Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty largely concerns protecting the space 
environment, but the second sentence concerns protecting the Earth environment 
from space material. It reads:
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States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies in outer space, including 
the moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so 
as to avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the 
environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial 
matter and, where necessary, shall adopt appropriate measures for 
this purpose. 
The International Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) is an interdisciplinary 
science organization that has long been concerned with protecting the unique 
and pristine conditions of space environments—pristine at least in relation 
to humankind’s interaction with them. To this end, COSPAR has promulgated 
planetary protection principles for space missions, and while the protection of 
other celestial bodies is discussed below, COSPAR’s highest levels of precaution 
are recommended for Earth-return missions, which may cause so-called 
“back-contamination.” 
COSPAR subdivides Earth-return missions into “Restricted Earth Returns” and 
“Unrestricted Earth Returns.” The Unrestricted Earth Return classification applies 
to missions returning from celestial bodies such as the moon and Venus, which 
have neither indigenous life forms nor the types of environments where life could 
flourish. Restricted Earth Return applies to missions returning from Mars and 
Europa, for example. Future Earth-return missions will be categorized prior to 
sample return, and others (to be determined by COSPAR when necessary). 
Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Space
Powering a spacecraft in the harsh environment of outer space requires 
recourse to ingenious techniques and technologies. Nuclear power sources have 
been used on spacecraft since the beginning of the space age. The steady and 
predictable decay of radioactive material gives off energy in amounts and in a 
manner suitable for a spacecraft’s needs. Radioisotope thermoelectric generators 
(RTGs) and radioisotope heat units (RHUs) are historically proven methods of 
power generation, with both the US and the Russian Federation utilizing nuclear 
power sources. 
Recognizing the particular suitability of nuclear power sources for space missions, 
UNGA Resolution 47/68 of 1992 establishes 11 principles relevant to their use. 
The nuclear power principles reiterate the applicability of international law and 
the concepts and framework already established by the Outer Space Treaty and 
the Liability Convention regarding the responsibility for and potential liability of 
the launching state, and the jurisdiction and control of the registering state. 
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Principle 3 of the resolution discusses guidelines and criteria for use, stating that 
nuclear power sources in space shall be restricted to those missions that “cannot 
be operated by non-nuclear energy sources in a reasonable manner.” It further 
requires that nuclear reactors shall only use highly enriched uranium–235 as fuel, 
and that reactors shall be designed and constructed so that they can only become 
critical upon reaching orbit or interplanetary trajectory, and through no other way 
(including rocket explosion, re-entry, or impact with water or land.)
Principle 5 contains instructions for making notifications about malfunctioning 
nuclear power sources that risk re-entry of radioactive materials to Earth. The 
information to be furnished includes basic launch and orbital parameters as well 
as information on the nuclear power source itself and the probable physical 
form, amount, and general radiological characteristics of the components likely 
to reach the ground. The notification should be sent to concerned states and 
to the UN Secretary-General. The principles further call for consultations and 
assistance between states, and reinforce the roles of responsibility, liability and 
compensation, and the settlement of disputes from the existing space treaties.
Subsequent to UNGA Res. 47/68, the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee 
of COPUOS worked jointly with the International Atomic Energy Agency to 
develop the Safety Framework for Nuclear Power Applications in Outer Space. 
This framework, though not legally binding, is intended to be used as a guide 
for national and intergovernmental safety purposes. The framework deals with 
the safe use of nuclear power sources in space mission and contains guidance 
for governments on how to authorize nuclear power-sourced space missions, 
guidance for the management of responsibility and safety roles of such missions, 
and technical guidance. When planned space missions involve nuclear power 
sources, these guidelines should be consulted early in the project. 
Space Debris
After more than 60 years of space activities, humanity has created a significant 
amount of space debris (Figure 6). Space debris is generally defined as the non-
operational satellites, spent rocket stages, and other bits and pieces created 
during the launch and operation of satellites. The US military currently tracks 
approximately 23,000 pieces of human-generated debris larger than 10 centimeters 
(4 inches) in size in Earth orbit, each of which could destroy an active satellite in a 
collision. Research done by scientists from various space agencies estimates there 
are 500,000 pieces of space debris between 1 and 10 centimeters (0.4 to 4 inches) 
in size that are largely untracked, each of which could severely damage an active 
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satellite in a collision. This debris is concentrated in the most heavily used regions 
of Earth orbit, where many active satellites also reside. These regions include the 
low Earth orbit (LEO) region below 2,000 kilometers (1,200 miles) in altitude 
and the geosynchronous region, approximately 36,000 kilometers (22,000 miles) 
above the equator. 
Former US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) scientist 
Donald Kessler was one of the first to 
predict what has since become known 
as the Kessler Syndrome: as the 
amount of space debris in orbit grows, 
a critical point will be reached where 
the density of space debris will lead 
to random collisions between space 
debris. These random collisions would 
in turn generate more debris at a rate 
faster than it can be removed from 
orbit by the Earth’s atmosphere. Unlike 
the dramatic scenario presented in the 
movie Gravity, this process would take 
place much more slowly over decades 
or centuries. Space was not a pristine 
environment before humans began to fill it with satellites, and there has always 
The Kessler Syndrome: 
as the amount of space 
debris in orbit grows, 
a critical point will be 
reached where the 
density of space debris 
will lead to random 
collisions between 
space debris. 
Figure 6 – Orbital trajectories for currently tracked satellites and space debris  
 in low Earth orbit. Source: Analytical Graphics Inc.
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been natural debris in space due to meteoroids. Kessler’s prediction was that 
these cascading debris-on-debris collisions would result in a human-generated 
debris population that would pose more of a threat to satellites than the natural 
debris pose.
There is now a general consensus among scientists that this critical point has 
come to pass, and there is enough human-generated space debris concentrated 
in the critical region in LEO between 700 and 900 kilometers (430 to 560 miles) 
to create more debris even if no new satellites were launched. These debris-on-
debris collisions will not lead to an infinite growth in the debris population. Rather, 
they will lead to a future equilibrium point that has a larger population of debris 
than today. The growth of debris will increase the risks—and thus the associated 
costs—of operating satellites in critical regions such as LEO. These increased 
costs could result from the need for more spare satellites to replace those lost in 
collisions, the need for heavier and more-engineered satellites that cost more to 
build and launch, and increased operating costs resulting from trying to detect 
and avoid potential collisions. These rising costs will likely hinder commercial 
development of space and will place additional pressure on government budgets, 
potentially resulting in the loss of some of the benefits currently derived from 
space, or preventing discovery of new benefits.
Efforts to tackle the problem of space debris fall into three major categories: 
debris mitigation, active debris removal, and space traffic management. Each 
category addresses a different aspect of the problem: limiting the creation of new 
space debris, addressing the legacy population of space debris already in orbit, 
and minimizing the negative impact of the existing debris on space activities.
Debris mitigation includes designing satellites and space systems to minimize the 
amount of debris they release during normal operations, developing methods to 
reduce the risk of fragmentation or explosion at end-of-life by venting leftover 
fuel or discharging batteries, and properly disposing of spacecraft and spent rocket 
stages after they are no longer useful. In the late 1990s, several major space agencies 
came together to form the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee 
(IADC). The purpose of the IADC is to help coordinate and share research on space 
debris among participating space agencies. In 2007, the IADC published the Space 
Debris Mitigation Guidelines. These technical guidelines define specific protected 
regions of Earth orbit and the recommended operational practices satellite operators 
should take to minimize the creation of long-lived space debris in the protected 
regions. Figure 7 illustrates the various protected regions per the IADC guidelines. 
T
H
E
 I
N
T
E
R
N
A
T
IO
N
A
L 
FR
A
M
E
W
O
R
K
36    |  Handbook for New Actors in Space
Fi
gu
re
 7
 –
 P
ro
te
ct
ed
 R
eg
io
ns
 in
 S
pa
ce
 
So
ur
ce
: S
ec
ur
e 
W
or
ld
 F
ou
nd
ati
on
.
 |    37
A simplified set of guidelines, the COPUOS space debris mitigation guidelines, 
which were more political in nature, were endorsed by the United Nations in 2009, 
although they also remained voluntary. Several states have implemented the 
debris mitigation guidelines through national regulations and policy, which will 
be discussed in Chapter Two.
In recent years, the IADC has focused its research efforts on active debris removal 
(ADR). In 2013, it published a study conducted by six space agencies using six 
different models which found an average increase of 30 percent in the LEO space 
debris population over the next 200 years, even with 90 percent adherence to the 
debris mitigation guidelines. This has provided increased emphasis on the need to 
start ADR in the near future.
Currently, the discussion on ADR includes three main approaches. The first 
approach is an effort to remove between five and ten of the most massive space 
debris objects per year. This would have the 
effect of slowing or perhaps even halting 
the long-term growth in the space debris 
population, but it would not address the near-
term collision risk. The second approach is 
to focus on removing smaller pieces in the 
1 to 10 centimeter size range. This would 
help reduce the short-term risk to satellites, 
but would have only a minimal impact on the 
long-term population growth of debris. The 
third approach is called just-in-time collision 
avoidance and involves predicting future 
collisions between two debris objects and 
altering their orbital trajectories to prevent 
the collision. Proposed methods for doing 
so include ground- or space-based lasers or 
frozen water mist.
Technical experts from around the world 
have been working intensively on both of 
these problems over the last several years, 
and there are some promising technical 
solutions for removing either large objects 
or small objects. However, efforts are largely 
Solving the 
challenges of 
space debris will 
require close 
coordination and 
cooperation among 
the engineers 
and scientists 
working on the 
technology, as well 
as the lawyers 
and policymakers 
developing policy 
and regulatory 
oversight.
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a choice between the goals. There is unlikely to be a single, all-encompassing 
solution that can deal with both large and small debris objectives. Moreover, none 
of these techniques has been operationally demonstrated in orbit and all of them 
pose a wide range of legal, policy, and other non-technical challenges. 
Solving the challenges of space debris will require close coordination and 
cooperation among the engineers and scientists working on the technology, as 
well as the lawyers and policymakers developing policy and regulatory oversight.
ADVANCED ISSUES
The preceding sections discussed important aspects of the international political, 
legal, and regulatory framework for space activities. Though subtleties exist at 
the boundaries of each of those topics, much is settled and understood. The last 
section of this chapter will discuss evolving issues and more advanced topics in 
space activities.
Boundary Between Airspace and Outer Space 
Despite over half a century of space activities, there is no internationally recognized 
legal definition of where airspace ends and where outer space begins. Neither 
the Outer Space Treaty nor any other international legal instrument specifies a 
beginning or bottom point above which outer space begins. A definition of outer 
space is important because the legal regimes governing airspace and outer space 
are fundamentally different, and because getting to outer space requires crossing 
through airspace. A distinction between these two domains would help clarify 
which legal regime governs activities that cross between them.
Sovereignty, a fundamental component of the modern state, is essentially the 
power of a government to impose its exclusive authority—by creating laws, 
by deciding disputes, and through related powers such as enforcing its laws 
and judicial decisions. A state is exclusively sovereign in the airspace above its 
territory and territorial waters. However, Article II of the Outer Space Treaty 
severely undercuts state sovereignty in outer space, leaving only jurisdiction and 
ownership rights to a state’s launched and registered space objects and personnel 
thereof. In air law, state sovereignty over airspace includes the right to keep others 
out, and only through complex bilateral and multilateral treaties do states allow 
civil aircraft from other states to enter (pass through, land on, and take off from) 
their sovereign airspace. This structure is the opposite of the regime for outer 
space; all states enjoy the right to freely access, explore, and use outer space.
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In 1976, a number of countries in the equatorial regions of the globe signed on to 
the Bogotá Declaration, asserting a legal claim to control the use of space above 
their own territory. The declaration sought to upend the existing legal structure by 
stating that the geostationary orbit, as a finite resource, “must not be considered 
part of the outer space.” While Colombia’s Constitution continues to recognize 
the orbital slot above the country as part of its territory, the Bogotá Declaration’s 
claims have not been widely recognized and states continue to defer to ITU 
allocations of geostationary slots.
Some feel that this issue—the lack of a legal boundary between airspace and 
outer space—may increase in relevance in the near future. Some activities might 
be considered to be occurring in airspace and would therefore be governed by 
air law; alternatively, they might be considered to be occurring in outer space 
and thus would be governed by space law. Is a reusable space plane governed 
by air law until it reaches Earth orbit? Or, because it is a spacecraft, does space 
law apply for the duration of the mission, including its transit? As a general 
operational rule, it can be assumed that the area where artificial satellites are able 
to orbit Earth qualifies as outer space, although this altitude does not necessarily 
reflect the ceiling of airspace. A “spatialist” approach would argue for a bright-
line distinction, perhaps at 100 kilometers above the Earth’s surface—often called 
the Kármán line.
Others first consider whether the activity involves craft with wings (like aircraft), 
or rockets (like spacecraft). Or they consider whether the craft takes off vertically 
like a rocket or horizontally like a plane. Depending on whether the craft looks 
like an aircraft or spacecraft, and what its mission is, it might make sense to 
group it under air law or space law. This “functionalist” approach does not try 
to decide on a physical demarcation above the Earth’s surface, as the spatialist 
approach recommends. 
Whether something qualifies as an aviation activity or a space activity impacts, 
and is impacted by, not only the rules of the area where it operates, but which 
national rules it must inherently follow and which international responsibility and 
liability rules apply. To date, however, no international definition has been agreed 
upon. This lack of certainty might be a result of the previously clear distinction 
between aircraft in the air and rockets and satellites in outer space. Additionally, 
neither the functionalist nor the spatialist approach has dominated the discussion. 
As technology develops and more states and non-state actors launch different 
types of craft and vehicles, it may become necessary to more clearly demarcate 
where space begins.
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A government considering space legislation might first consider whether there are 
any benefits to determining nationally where outer space legally begins, especially 
in the absence of an international 
definition. Likewise, a space start-
up should be aware of the different 
regimes of air and space law, and the 
lack of international legal certainty 
between them. 
Space Traffic Management
Space traffic management (STM) 
refers to measures taken to minimize 
or mitigate the negative impacts of 
the increasing physical congestion 
in space. As the number of active 
satellites and amount of space debris 
in space increases, particularly in 
highly used orbits and altitudes, 
physical congestion has become a 
growing problem. To date, there have 
been several confirmed, unintentional 
collisions between a functional 
satellite and another space object that 
have either damaged the satellite or 
completely destroyed both objects 
and created thousands of new pieces 
of space debris. The goal of STM is 
to try to eliminate future collisions 
and other incidents in space that could 
create additional debris or other safety risks for space activities, and to increase 
the safety and efficiency of space activities.
Space situational awareness (SSA) is an important element of STM. SSA refers 
to the ability to characterize the space environment and activities in space. A key 
component of SSA is using ground- or space-based sensors, such as radars or 
optical telescopes, to track space objects. The tracking data from multiple sensors 
is combined to estimate orbits for space objects and predictions of their trajectories 
in the future. Other key components include space weather, characterization of 
space objects, and pre-planned maneuvers as discussed in Chapter Three: On-
Orbit Operations.
A government 
considering space 
legislation might first 
consider whether there 
are any benefits to 
determining nationally 
where outer space 
legally begins, especially 
in the absence of an 
international definition. 
Likewise, a space  
start-up should be aware 
of the different regimes 
of air and space law,  
and the lack of 
international legal 
certainty between them. 
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While some countries currently engage in practices that could be considered to 
be part of STM, there currently is no widespread state practice or established 
international regime. In 2010, the US government began a program to provide 
close-approach warnings for all satellite operators. A few other countries provide 
similar warnings for national entities. Many satellite operators work with a third-
party service, such as the Space Data Association (SDA) or their own national 
space agency, to augment the basic warnings and data from governments. (This 
is discussed more fully in Chapter Three.) There have also been international 
political initiatives to discuss voluntary guidelines or norms for improving the 
safety and sustainability of space activities, and studies to examine the interactions 
between space and air traffic and possible safety concerns. 
There is ongoing debate over whether an international STM regime should begin 
with national practice or with an international treaty. Some have also made 
comparisons between STM and air traffic management, and called for a new treaty 
to establish an international body that would set standards for STM and be similar 
to the function of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) for air 
traffic management. However, ICAO was created to resolve differences between 
previously existing national airspace regulations. Furthermore, the air traffic 
standards that are set by ICAO require implementation by national regulative and 
administrative bodies, which many countries currently lack for space activities. 
As a result, others are pushing for major spacefaring states to establish national 
STM regimes that may evolve into an international regime in the future.
Status of Humans in Space
As states and private companies contemplate and prepare for crewed space 
operations ranging from suborbital to beyond Earth orbit, the legal status of 
humans in space within the international framework will need to be addressed. 
The treaty regime provides particular rights and responsibilities with regard to 
“astronauts,” and they may or may not apply to other spaceflight participants, 
such as space tourists.
Article V of the Outer Space Treaty refers to astronauts as “envoys of mankind,” 
and requires that states give them “all possible assistance in the event of accident, 
distress, or emergency landing” in their territory or on the high seas. This 
assistance also requires their safe and prompt return to the state of registry of 
their space vehicle. In outer space and on celestial bodies, states must render “all 
possible assistance” to astronauts of other states party to the treaty. Last, states 
must also inform other states and the UN Secretary-General of any phenomena 
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they discover in space that could constitute a danger to the life and health 
of astronauts.
The 1968 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and 
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space further develops and refines 
the rights and obligations of humans in space. The plain meaning of these texts 
is largely clear and highlights the peaceful and cooperative spirit animating the 
positive obligations it imposes upon states. However, neither these treaties nor 
any subsequent source of international law defines the term “astronaut.” The issue 
of the status of humans in space travel is one that many new actors in space 
may not face immediately, but could consider in the future. It is likely that states 
seeking to build their space credentials will be interested in having their citizens 
join the list of the fewer than 600 humans who have ever traveled to outer space.
Protecting Celestial Bodies
In addition to the environmental issues discussed in previous sections, the 
protection of celestial bodies is an advanced issue which some new actors in 
space may face. Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty first establishes a positive 
commitment where states shall be guided by the principle of cooperation and 
mutual assistance, and all activities shall be conducted with due regard for the 
corresponding interests of other state parties. Concerning the environment of 
celestial bodies, all studies and exploration shall be pursued “as to avoid their 
harmful contamination.”  
The article then requires that states undertake “appropriate international 
consultations” before any activity or experiment they have reason to believe would 
cause potentially harmful interference with the space activities of other states. 
Last, states may request consultations concerning the activities or experiments of 
other states when they have reason to believe the activities or experiments would 
cause potentially harmful interference with their own activities.
 
While the text of the article is related to environmental protection, it is chiefly the 
second sentence of Article IX that concerns the protection of celestial bodies and 
creates the positive obligation for states to adopt appropriate measures to prevent 
the harmful contamination of outer space and celestial bodies. This sentence 
also concerns the creation of space debris and preventing the introduction of 
extraterrestrial matter to Earth. As such, this treaty article reflects the desire by 
states to preserve celestial bodies, and it has led to further elaboration on the 
meaning of planetary protection.
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As mentioned, COSPAR has promulgated a Planetary Protection Policy for 
missions to other celestial bodies. The Planetary Protection Policy, last updated 
in March 2011, reflects the concerns of scientists interested in the origin of life 
and the preoccupation that celestial environments might be contaminated, even 
unintentionally, by crewed or robotic spacecraft arriving. The Planetary Protection 
Policy lays out five categories of missions according to the destination involved 
and the type of mission (i.e., orbiter, lander, return-to-Earth mission; see Table 2).
Category I missions are those to celestial bodies lacking direct relevance for 
understanding the process of chemical evolution or the origin of life, and include 
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Planetary Targets  
and Locations
 
Undifferentiated, metamorphosed 
asteroids; Io; others to be determined 
(TBD). 
Venus; Earth’s moon; Comets; non-
Category I Asteroids; Jupiter; Jovian 
Satellites (except Io and Europa); Saturn; 
Saturnian satellites (except Titan and 
Enceladus); Uranus; Uranian satellites; 
Neptune; Neptunian satellites (except 
Triton); Kuiper-Belt Objects (< 1/2 the size 
of Pluto); others TBD.
Icy satellites where there is a remote 
potential for contamination of the liquid-
water environments, such as Ganymede 
(Jupiter); Titan (Saturn); Triton, Pluto and 
Charon (Neptune); others TBD.
Mars; Europa; Enceladus; others TBD 
(Categories IVa-c are for Mars).
Venus, moon; others TBD: “unrestricted 
Earth return.”
Mars; Europa; Enceladus; others TBD: 
“restricted Earth return.”
Mission Types
Flyby, Orbiter, 
Lander
Flyby, Orbiter, 
Lander
Flyby, Orbiter, 
Lander 
Flyby, Orbiter
Lander, Probe
Unrestricted
Earth-Return
Restricted
Earth-Return
Mission  
Categories
I
II+
II
IIII 
IV (a-c)
V
(unrestricted)
V
(restricted)
Table 2 – Planetary Protection Categories
Planetary Protection Categories
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certain types of asteroids and other destinations to be determined. No planetary 
protection concerns are defined for Category I missions, whether they be orbiters, 
rovers, or landers. 
Category II missions also cover orbiters, rovers, and landers, but relate to missions 
to several major celestial bodies: Venus, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, and Neptune, 
as well as Ganymede, Callisto, Titan, Triton, Pluto and Charon, and Ceres, as 
well as comets, carbonaceous chondrite asteroids, and Kuiper Belt objects. These 
Category II missions address missions to celestial bodies where there is a significant 
scientific interest related to the process of chemical evolution or the origin of life, 
but, because of the physical environment of the destination, there is only a remote 
chance that contamination might compromise future investigations. Category II 
missions require a record of planned impact probability and contamination control 
measures, as well as a documentation of the planetary protection measures taken 
through the general planetary protection plan, a pre-launch report, post-launch 
report, post-encounter report, and an end-of-mission report. 
Categories III through V are for more advanced missions; either flybys or 
orbiters to Mars, Europa, or Enceladus (Category III), landers to Mars, Europa, 
or Enceladus (IV), or any Earth-Return mission (V). Earth-Return missions from 
Venus or the moon are classified as “Unrestricted Earth Return,” while missions 
to and from Mars or Europa are “Restricted Earth-Return Missions” requiring 
heightened scrutiny.
COSPAR guidelines are implemented on a national level, where space agencies 
and governments adopt them into their national licensing and regulatory 
frameworks or implement them in the national space agency’s plans. In the United 
States, NASA has a Planetary Protection Office, an agency-wide policy directive, 
and mandatory procedural requirements for its missions. 
Outside of planned missions to preserve celestial bodies for their scientific value, 
there is also the desire to protect and preserve certain areas and artifacts on celestial 
bodies because of their importance to space exploration. The landing sites of the 
Apollo missions, including the hardware the astronauts left on the moon and even 
the iconic footprints from Neil Armstrong, Buzz Aldrin, and later astronauts are of 
permanent cultural value. The same is true for the Soviet-era rovers on the surface 
of the moon, such as Lunokhod, and of the rovers on other celestial bodies. While 
there has been talk of making some of these sites United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage sites before 
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they are encroached upon by next-generation missions, so far it is up to national 
governments and their space agencies to try to preserve those sites and artifacts in 
which they have particular interest.
For missions planned to certain 
destinations, responsible actors 
would be well-advised to educate 
themselves on the various 
planetary protection policies and 
to observe them in the execution of 
their missions.
Space Resources
As discussed at the beginning of 
this chapter, there are significant 
freedoms to explore and use outer 
space. The Outer Space Treaty 
even ensures that this exploration 
and use is “the province of all 
mankind.” But what rights do states, private companies, or even people have 
to use space resources? While the drafters and negotiators of the Outer Space 
Treaty considered this topic, they left it vague enough to allow further refinement. 
However, this treaty—while enshrining significant freedoms in space—does have 
some prohibitions. Article II of the Outer Space Treaty states that: 
Outer Space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject 
to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or 
occupation, or by any other means.
This article could have been made a lot shorter if it merely said “Outer Space is 
not subject to national appropriation,” but it included extra clauses to elaborate on 
the negative prohibition it contains. Listing the moon and other celestial bodies 
shows that the prohibition applies to both physical celestial bodies and to “void” 
space. More importantly, the listing of claims of sovereignty, and the use of or the 
occupation of space, is a list of methods (or means) that would not justify a state’s 
appropriation of outer space. Neither a statement (such as a claim) nor a physical 
act (such as using or occupying) constitutes lawful appropriation. Article II’s 
list is not exhaustive; it is merely illustrative of a few explicit methods that will 
not legitimize national appropriation in space. Additionally, the term “celestial 
For missions planned 
to certain destinations, 
responsible actors 
would be well-advised 
to educate themselves 
on the various 
planetary protection 
policies and to observe 
them in the execution 
of their missions.
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States considering 
next-generation space 
resource activities or 
industries should be 
wise to consider how 
they will interpret 
their rights to use and 
explore space under  
the Outer Space Treaty,  
and how those rights 
are balanced  
or restricted by  
Article II of the Outer 
Space Treaty. 
bodies” is nowhere defined in international law, and questions can be raised as 
to whether an asteroid or comet is as much a “celestial body” as one of the large 
planets in our solar system.
 
The further interpretation of this prohibition may come to the forefront as a 
range of activities in space become possible. Consider a situation where a crewed 
mission to Mars arrives at its destination after many months in space. A particular 
interpretation of the prohibition would indicate they are forbidden from accessing 
the frozen hydrogen in polar regions or the frozen waters to mix rocket fuel and 
create breathable air or drinkable water. According to this interpretation, all the 
fuel, water, and air they use on Mars must come from Earth. This is a particularly 
strict interpretation of the treaty and may be counter to the intended interpretation 
of the original drafters. The vast freedoms enshrined elsewhere in the treaty, as 
well as the purpose and context for which it was drafted, suggest otherwise.
An alternative interpretation suggests that use of the frozen water reserves on Mars 
would not qualify as national appropriation, and not be thus under the sovereign 
command of a nation millions of kilometers distant. Additionally, both the US and 
the USSR brought back lunar samples, and have acted in ways consistent with 
asserting and transferring uncontested ownership rights in those samples.
While the issue of the use of space 
resources is being examined, the purposes 
of the Outer Space Treaty would seem 
counter to overly drastic prohibitions that 
would limit the next generation of space 
activities. As long as the use of space 
resources conforms to the purposes of 
the treaty, advances the aims of the treaty, 
and otherwise conforms to international 
law, it is permissible. Additionally, as 
long as these activities do not rise to the 
level of a state establishing a sovereign 
appropriation akin to colonizing 
space or celestial bodies, they are 
likewise permissible.
States considering next-generation space 
resource activities or industries should be 
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wise to consider how they will interpret their rights to use and explore space under 
the Outer Space Treaty, and how those rights are balanced or restricted by Article 
II of the Outer Space Treaty.
RELEVANT ORGANIZATIONS
New actors should be aware of the following organizations when conducting 
space activities. 
International Intergovernmental Organizations
Group on Earth Observations: 
Established in 2005 and currently with over 100 participating countries, the Group 
on Earth Observations acts to increase interoperability between the various Earth 
observation systems. www.earthobservations.org/
Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee: 
Founded in 1993, the IADC is an international governmental forum comprised 
of space agencies and focused on worldwide coordination of activities related 
to man-made and natural debris in space. The IADC formulated technical space 
debris mitigation guidelines. www.iadc-online.org/
International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems: 
Established in 2005, the ICG strives to promote voluntary cooperation 
on matters of mutual interest related to civil satellite-based positioning, 
navigation, timing (PNG), and value-added services. This includes 
coordination among providers of GNSS, regional systems, and augmentations 
in order to ensure greater compatibility, interoperability, and transparency. 
www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/icg/icg.html
International Telecommunication Union: 
The ITU is a specialized agency of the UN system and is based in Geneva, 
Switzerland. It is tasked with facilitating equitable access to the electromagnetic 
spectrum and orbital resources with regards to satellite services, and with promoting 
the advancement, implementation, and efficient operation of these services. The 
ITU manages the international frequency coordination process, develops global 
standards, and maintains the MIFR. Every three to four years, the ITU also 
convenes the WRC to revise or adopt the international Radio Regulations—a 
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treaty containing the regulatory, operational, procedural, and technical provisions 
applicable to radio spectra and orbital resources. Each country has one vote at the 
WRC, though many decisions are adopted by consensus. www.itu.int/
United Nations: 
Established by the Charter of the United Nations in 1945, the UN is the world’s 
largest and most important international intergovernmental political institution. 
Its principal organs (the General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and 
Social Council, Secretariat, and International Court of Justice) work to maintain 
international peace and security, cooperate in solving international economic, 
social, cultural and humanitarian problems, and promote respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. www.un.org/
United Nations General Assembly: 
The General Assembly is the UN’s main deliberative organ, and is composed 
of all member states, who each have one vote on all decisions. The General 
Assembly meets in New York at UN Headquarters each year in the second half 
of September. Decisions on important matters (such as peace, security, and 
new members) require a two-thirds majority, while all other matters require a 
simple majority. Much of the work of the General Assembly is carried out by 
its committees and other bodies, two of which concern themselves with matters 
related to outer space. www.un.org/en/ga/
First Committee: 
The First Committee of the UN General Assembly is the Disarmament and 
International Security committee, which tasks itself with general disarmament 
and international security issues which occasionally touch upon issues related 
to outer space. www.un.org/en/ga/first/
Fourth Committee: 
The Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly 
is the Special Political and Decolonization committee. The yearly 
report from COPUOS is received by the Fourth Committee, which 
also creates the mandate for the next year of work by COPUOS. 
www.un.org/en/ga/fourth/
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: 
Established by a UN General Assembly resolution in 1958, COPUOS is the principal 
UN committee considering space activities. COPUOS and its two subcommittees 
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meet in Vienna, Austria. The Scientific and Technical Subcommittee (STSC) 
meets for two weeks each February, the Legal Subcommittee (LSC) meets for 
two weeks each March, and the large COPUOS plenary meets each June for one 
and a half weeks. As of 2017, membership (which is only open to states) is 84 
and growing, and a diverse number of intergovernmental and non-governmental 
permanent observers also attend. Reports from COPUOS are sent for approval 
to the UN General Assembly’s Fourth Committee. COPUOS is the body where 
the principal legal instruments, such as the Outer Space Treaty, were drafted and 
negotiated. www.unoosa.org/
United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs: 
Headquartered in Vienna, Austria, OOSA is organized under the UN Secretary-
General, and has two sections: the Committee, Policy, and Legal Affairs section, 
and the Space Applications Section. OOSA acts as the Secretariat to COPUOS 
and to its two subcommittees. OOSA’s Programme on Space Applications assists 
developing countries in using space technology for development, providing 
technical assistance, training, and fellowship programs in remote sensing, satellite 
communication, satellite meteorology, satellite navigation, space law, and basic 
space sciences. OOSA is also the keeper of the UN registry of space objects, and 
serves as the secretariat to the ICG. OOSA also manages the Platform for Space-
based Information for Disaster Management and Emergency Response (UN-
SPIDER) with offices in Vienna, Austria; Bonn, Germany; and Beijing, China. 
www.unoosa.org/
United Nations Conference on Disarmament:  
Headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, as a successor to previous UN-organized 
committees related to disarmament, the current Conference on Disarmament 
(CD) was established in 1980 and deals with a number of issues interrelated with 
disarmament, including as a regular agenda item the prevention of an arms race 
in outer space (PAROS). www.unog.ch/cd
United Nations Committee of Experts on Global Geospatial  
Information Management: 
Established in 2011, UN-GGIM provides a forum for coordination and exchange 
among member states and international organizations while promoting the 
development of global geospatial information and its use in addressing global 
challenges. http://ggim.un.org/
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World Meteorological Organization: 
Established in 1950, the WMO is a specialized agency of the United Nations 
dedicated to international cooperation in the areas of meteorology, hydrology, 
and related applications. The WMO facilitates policy formulation and exchange 
of data related to these areas, and maintains a number of reference standards and 
datasets. The WMO Space Programme works to coordinate the availability and 
utilization of space-based data sources and products for weather and climate 
observation purposes in the WMO’s 191 member states. www.wmo.int
Non-Governmental Organizations
Numerous membership based non-governmental organizations, trade associations, 
or other groups exist to provide industry coordination, outreach, and education 
functions. These entities may be domestic or international in nature and may be 
specific to the space and satellite sector or they may include space within a broader 
group of aerospace or defense industry actors. A few illustrative examples follow.
Asia-Pacific Satellite Communications Council:
The Asia-Pacific Satellite Communications Council (APSCC) is an international 
non-profit association representing all sectors of the satellite and/or space-
related industry. Its members include satellite manufacturers, launch service 
providers, satellite service providers and satellite risk management companies, 
telecom carriers, and broadcasters from Asia, Europe and North America. 
APSCC’s overall mission to is to promote the development and use of satellite 
communications and broadcasting services, as well as other aspects of space 
activities, for the socioeconomic and cultural welfare of the Asia-Pacific region. 
http://www.apscc.or.kr/ 
Commercial Spaceflight Federation:
The Commercial Spaceflight Federation (CSF) is a US-based trade organization 
that mainly focuses on the commercial space transportation industry. CSF was 
founded in 2006, and currently has more than 70 member organizations. The main 
goals of CSF are to promote technology innovation, guide the expansion of Earth’s 
economic sphere, bolster US leadership in aerospace, and inspire America’s next 
generation of engineers and explorers. http://www.commercialspaceflight.org/
European Association of Remote Sensing Companies: 
The European Association of Remote Sensing Companies (EARSC) is a 
non-profit, membership based organization which promotes the use of Earth 
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observation technology, with an emphasis on European companies which offer 
Earth observation-related products and services. EARSC's mission is to foster the 
development of the geo-information service industry in Europe. As of December 
2016 EARSC has 85 member organizations. Member of observer status is available 
to any organization which uses or provides remote sensing observations of the 
Earth and its environment, irrespective of sensor type or source (e.g. satellite, 
aircraft, or unmanned aerial vehicle.) http://earsc.org/
European, Middle-East, and Africa Satellite Operators Association:
The European, Middle-East, and Africa Satellite Operators Association (ESOA) 
began in 2002 as a non-profit organization representing European satellite 
operators, and in 2015 it expanded to cover operators in the Middle East and 
Africa region. ESOA’s goal is to be a unified voice for global and regional satellite 
operators towards all international, regional, and national organisations and 
regulators, and achieve global coordination amongst all satellite operators across 
the world.  www.esoa.net
International Amateur Radio Union: 
Founded in 1925, the International Amatuer Radio Union (IARU) is an international 
union for the cooperation among and coordination of radio frequencies allocated 
to amateurs, including amateurs using amateur-satellite applications. The IARU 
has a Satellite Frequency Coordination division, and its IARU Satellite Advisor 
can help in planning space telemetry, space telecommands, and operating 
frequencies. Frequency coordination with the IARU is necessary in some 
nations for transmission from space of certain amateur allocated frequencies. 
www.iaru.org/satellite.html
International Astronautical Federation: 
Founded in 1951 by scientists from around the world interested in dialogue 
and collaboration in the field of space research, the International Astronautical 
Federation (IAF) holds the yearly International Astronautical Congress (IAC) at a 
different locale each fall and other global conferences on space exploration, space 
sciences, and related themes. www.iafastro.org/
International Institute of Space Law: 
Founded in 1960, the International Institute of Space Law (IISL) is comprised of 
institutions and individuals elected on the basis of their contributions to the fields 
of space law and related social sciences. Dedicated to fostering the development 
of space law, the IISL organizes and holds an annual Colloquium at the IAC in 
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partnership with the IAF, publishes an annual volume of its proceedings, and 
organizes an annual space law moot court competition and other events throughout 
the year. The IISL is a permanent observer at COPUOS, and in recent years has 
jointly organized a symposium on the first day of the COPUOS LSC meeting. 
www.iislweb.org
International Organization for Standardization: 
Headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, the ISO is an independent organization 
with a membership of 163 national standards bodies. Through its members, it 
brings together experts to share knowledge and develop voluntary, consensus-
based, and market-relevant international standards that support innovation and 
provide solutions to global challenges. ISO maintains a standing Technical 
Committee on Aircraft and Space Vehicles (TC20), and subcommittees on 
Space Data and Information Transfer Systems (SC13) and Space Systems and 
Operations (SC14). www.iso.org/ 
Open Geospatial Consortium: 
The OGC is a membership-based non-profit organization dedicated to the 
development and promulgation of open-source standards for the international 
geospatial community. Its members include private-sector representatives 
from the space, airborne, and terrestrial remote sensing industries, government 
agencies, academia, research organizations, and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). OGC works through a consensus process to develop standards for 
the interoperability and sharing of geospatial data, regardless of source. Its 
membership currently consists of more than 500 organizations worldwide. 
www.opengeospatial.org
Satellite Industry Association: 
The Satellite Industry Association (SIA) is a US trade association representing 
the commercial satellite industry. SIA was formed in 1995 by several major 
US satellite companies as a forum to discuss issues and develop industry-wide 
positions on shared business, regulatory, and policy interests. SIA has established 
active working groups involved with a host of policy issues including government 
services, public safety, export control policy, international trade issues, and 
regulatory issues (satellite licensing, spectrum allocation, and regulatory 
policy). SIA is now a recognized focal point for the US satellite industry in 
Washington, D.C., representing and advocating industry positions with key 
policymakers on Capitol Hill and with the White House, Federal Communications 
Commission, and most Executive Branch departments and agencies. 
http://www.sia.org/
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Space Frequency Coordination Group:
Comprised on member agencies including space agencies and international 
organizations, the SFCG works informally to develop resolutions and 
recommendations which express technical and administrative agreements to 
prevent and alleviate the risks of radiofrequency interference. The effectiveness 
of SFCG recommendations depends upon their voluntary acceptance and 
implementation by members. www.sfcgonline.org/
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Aspace policy and an administrative system are essential aspects of a nation’s  governance  of its 
space enterprise.  The authoritative 
structure makes possible the regulation of 
space actors and activities, aligning them 
with national development objectives and also  bringing them in line with 
the country’s  international regulatory  obligations.
This chapter discusses  national space policy whose purpose is to define 
the roles and responsibilities of the different players and stakeholders. 
It elucidates the various components that make up the ecosystem of the 
space enterprise,  encompassing, inter alia, investment by the private 
sector, interests of non-governmental entities and civil society, the 
foundational role of science and technology, and enforcement of controls 
on exports and imports.
Meanwhile, in the context of a nation’s international obligations,  a scheme 
for national oversight is necessary. The chapter brings to light the various 
regulators whose jurisdiction over licensing, frequency management, 
export controls, contracting, disputes, and liabilities should be delineated.
A case for remote sensing is presented at the end of chapter that 
demonstrates the necessity for the orchestration of policies and oversight.
The issues covered in this chapter are part of the plethora of a nation’s 
undertakings in the complex management of the space enterprise. Two 
and a half  decades ago when I initiated the Malaysian national space 
programme, many of these things were shrouded in secrecy and were  a 
big mystery to me. The new entrant to the space business today will greatly 
benefit from the guidance provided here.
Mazlan Othman, PhD
Former Director of  
the United Nations Office  
for Outer Space Affairs
INTRODUCTION
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TWO NATIONAL SPACE POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION
This chapter provides an overview of how and why states create national frameworks for space activities through policy and regulation. A policy is a principle or a set of principles used to guide decision-making 
and actions. 
In the context of government, “public policy” refers to why, how, and to what 
effect governments pursue particular courses of action or inaction. Public 
policy decisions often involve weighing the potential positive and negative 
impacts of competing options. These decisions are further complicated by the 
participation of many different interest groups and political actors who have 
competing perspectives in the decision-making process. In conjunction, “public 
administration” is the implementation of policy through the organization of 
government bureaucracy, the establishment of programs and institutions, and the 
day-to-day running of services and activities. 
This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section focuses on public 
policy aspects of national frameworks, including various ways space policy can 
be established; why states put in place national policy; the relationship between 
space and science, technology, and innovation policy; and the role of international 
cooperation. The second section focuses on public administration: how countries 
implement their own national policy and international obligations through 
regulative and administrative structures.
PUBLIC POLICY
Policy can be established through many different methods, several of which may 
be interacting at the same time. One way of establishing policy is through the 
international, bilateral, and multilateral treaties and agreements by which a state 
is bound. National policy can be established explicitly through formal decision-
making processes such as intra-governmental committees or legislation. Policy 
can also be established implicitly through a choice to not pursue a particular 
path and can be manifested through cultural or ideological contexts that impact 
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decision-making and choices. In countries with a separation between executive and 
legislative powers, policy may not be consistent and may even be contradictory. 
In the context of space, policy can take many different forms. Some states choose 
to put in place a national space policy, which may or may not be accompanied by 
narrower policies covering specific space sectors such as launch, communications, 
or remote sensing. Other states choose to put in place policy at the organizational 
level, or through legislation that establishes specific programs and projects. 
Making national space policy or strategy—the documentation from the national 
government that spells out national goals and priorities for space—publicly 
accessible is one way to demonstrate intentions and priorities for a national space 
program. It also gives an idea of how much budgeting may go into a nation’s space 
activities and raises the overall level of transparency. In addition, developing a 
national space policy or strategy forces a government to go through the process 
of having an intergovernmental discussion about priorities and goals for its space 
program, information which can then be used to inform national and international 
discussions. The following sections provide an overview of the different uses and 
common elements of space policy.
Rationales, Objectives, and Principles
A national space policy provides the rationale for why a state chooses to engage 
in space activities. The reasoning and motivation for engaging in space activities 
may differ drastically between states. Some states choose to engage in the entire 
spectrum of space activities and capabilities across the commercial, civil, and 
national security sectors, while other states chose to focus on or exclude specific 
types of activities. In some cases, this choice may reflect a national decision on 
a specific interpretation of what the peaceful uses of space means, or a state’s 
relationship and ideological approach to its private sector. Explicitly and publicly 
defining the rationales for space activities may also be part of a strategy for 
boosting internal political support for funding and resources which support 
space activities.
National space policy also provides the objectives for the space activities a state 
chooses to engage in. The reason for doing so is to provide high-level guidance on 
the goals a state is pursuing. These goals can be specific, such as accomplishing a 
certain task in a set amount of time, or broad, such as enhancing national prestige. 
Explicity outlining these objectives not only provides a signal to other countries, 
but also can help generate national support and motivation for specific space 
activities and programs.
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Case Study: United Arab Emirates Mars Mission
In July 2014, the government of the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) announced its intentions to develop and launch a 
robotic spacecraft to Mars orbit. The plan marks an ambitious 
expansion of the UAE’s space activities, which had previously 
focused on remote sensing and communications and coincided 
with the establishment of the United Arab Emirates Space 
Agency. The UAE’s commitment to a scientific Mars exploration 
project encompasses many of the typical goals and drivers that 
are found in government space programs.
Emirati officials have described three key motivations for the 
project: symbolism and inspiration; acting as a catalyst for 
knowledge and skill development; and providing an anchor 
project for the domestic space industry in the UAE. The launch 
of the spacecraft will be symbolically important, as it is planned 
to arrive at Mars in 2021 to coincide with the 50th anniversary 
of UAE independence. The mission has also been named 
“Hope” with the explicit purpose of sending a message of 
optimism. The UAE has defined specific science objectives for 
the mission, and is involving local universities in the execution 
of scientific activities. It is planned that the spacecraft and 
associated mission support elements will be manufactured 
entirely by Emirati citizens, with up to 150 people employed 
in the program. 
Despite the Emirati-led nature of the program, it also 
demonstrates the role international partnerships often play in 
the execution of national space programs. The spacecraft will 
be launched on a Japanese launch vehicle, and the government 
of the UAE has entered into several cooperative agreements 
with other nations (including the US and Russia) to exchange 
information related to Mars science and exploration. Through 
these agreements, the UAE is seeking access to training and 
knowledge-development for its scientists and engineers. 
To that end, the UAE Space Agency has also entered into an 
agreement with Lockheed Martin under which a training 
program in space-related skills will be established for students 
N
A
T
IO
N
A
L 
SP
A
C
E
 P
O
LI
C
Y
 A
N
D
 A
D
M
IN
IS
T
R
A
T
IO
N
58    |  Handbook for New Actors in Space
and young professionals. Although not solely related to the 
Mars mission, this program demonstrates the UAE’s emphasis 
on linking space development to scientific and technical 
capacity-building.
National space policy can also define the principles by which a state will conduct 
its space activities. These principles can be used to reaffirm or demonstrate a 
state’s adherence to international agreements and treaties, and to outline national 
principles that have a historical, cultural, or ideological basis. The principles 
in a national space policy can also 
form the foundation for lower-level 
government policies in specific 
sectors such as national security or 
commercial space. 
Those proposing a new space activity 
in a country would be well advised 
to measure the compatibility of their 
proposal with national policy and 
principles related to space. If serious 
incompatibilities exist, strategies 
for overcoming them need to be 
addressed in the planning process.
Government Roles and 
Responsibilities
A second major use for national 
space policy is to delineate roles 
and responsibilities between various 
government agencies and entities to 
comply with a state’s obligations under the international framework discussed 
in Chapter One. States need to assign responsibility to government entities 
performing functions such as administering and licensing radio frequencies used 
by communications satellites, licensing remote sensing satellites, and maintaining 
a national registry of space objects. 
 
States have multiple options for how to assign roles and responsibilities. 
Although some countries choose to consolidate all of their space activities into 
Those proposing a 
new space activity in a 
country would be well 
advised to measure 
the compatibility of 
their proposal with 
national policy and 
principles related 
to space. If serious 
incompatibilities 
exist, strategies for 
overcoming them need 
to be addressed in the 
planning process.
 |    59
one organization, it is much more common for there to be multiple government 
entities that are each tasked with a portion of the space activities or oversight. This 
division of labor could be functional, such as dividing licensing responsibilities 
between agencies depending on their expertise. The division could also be 
between civil and national security space activities, in order to enable easier public 
acknowledgment and international cooperation while also protecting sensitive 
technology or capabilities. 
National space policy can also be used to direct coordination between national 
agencies or entities. If roles and responsibilities are divided among multiple 
government agencies, it is often the case that there will be a need for some of 
those agencies to coordinate their activities with other entities. This coordination 
may not happen naturally, as it can involve disputes over power, control, and 
budget. Space policy can be used to direct coordination with other agencies in 
situations where their responsibilities overlap, or direct coordination with private 
sector or international entities to accomplish policy objectives and principles. 
The process by which a government makes national space policy decisions is 
important and can vary widely by country. The intra-governmental decision-
making process helps ensure that space-related policies are consistent with larger 
policy objectives, for example foreign policy or innovation policy objectives. 
Decisions that are made by individual government agencies or entities without 
coordination and input from other stakeholders, including the private sector, are 
likely to be suboptimal. This is because barriers between commercial, civil, and 
national security space activities are increasingly becoming blurred. Most space 
technology is dual-use, and policy decisions on space technology need to strike 
a balance between controlling access to the technology to minimize national 
security risks and increasing access to maximize its socioeconomic benefits. 
As a result, policy decisions related to space activities will often result from the 
coordination and collaboration of the main government agencies and bodies, and 
may benefit from the input of advisory bodies that represent other stakeholders 
both within and outside of government.
For new actors in space, it is important to have administrative implementation 
of national policy and responsibilities. New state actors should determine how 
best to implement their international obligations, while also advancing their 
national priorities.
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Although each state’s national space 
policy is a unique reflection of its politics, 
culture, and priorities, there are a few 
common themes that occur across many 
national space policies. These themes 
reflect common challenges that states 
face and priorities they try to promote 
through their national space policies.
Role of Space in Science, 
Technology, and  
Innovation Policy
The significant socioeconomic benefits 
reaped by established space nations, 
such as the US and India, have been cited 
as a key motivator by emerging space 
countries making initial investments in 
space. Often tied to larger strategic goals 
for national science, technology, and innovation (STI) policy, space activities 
may include a high degree of investment in basic science and in research and 
development (R&D), with the goal of contributing to the national economy in 
sectors other than space. In this respect, a government’s space policy may be a 
subset of STI policy, and space may be one of several other target innovation 
areas, such as energy, aeronautics, public health, and computing.
STI policies will generally focus on the interactions among the relevant 
government, academic, and industry actors involved in education, basic and 
applied science, technology, and innovation. The coordination of STI-related 
efforts among the different actors is often a key challenge, as is the ability of 
actors within the ecosystem to integrate innovative products or processes. One 
particular challenge is overcoming the gap between moving from basic research 
to commercial adoption, sometimes referred to as the “valley of death.” In this 
respect, STI policies will seek to not only incentivize innovation (e.g., intellectual 
property rules; competitive grants or awards), but also to develop the mechanisms 
to sustain innovation through the different development cycles so it can yield the 
desired economic advantages.
 
As an example, Mexico’s National Innovation Program highlights the value of 
innovation in achieving sustainable economic growth and the need for policies 
For new actors in 
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also advancing their 
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at the federal and state levels to develop a productive innovation ecosystem. 
Improving the productivity and competitiveness of the manufacturing and services 
sectors is a main goal. With respect to space, Mexico has developed a subset of 
federal- and state-level policies and programs to promote innovation within this 
sector, such as establishing aerospace clusters to attract foreign investment and 
improve the competitiveness of aerospace companies in the global marketplace. 
Among the primary goals often contained in STI policies is the development of a 
highly skilled workforce through investments in science, technology, engineering, 
and mathematics (STEM) education. The development of human capital is 
considered fundamental in industrial policy as part of efforts to develop niche 
capabilities and reduce the emigration of skilled or highly educated workers, also 
known as “brain drain.” Malaysia, for example, has sought the development of a 
knowledge-based economy as a national political goal, a main motivator for the 
establishment of its national space agency. The agency is charged with realizing 
the vision of “harnessing space as a platform for knowledge generation, wealth 
creation and societal well-being.” This motivation is also reflected in the practice 
of many countries seeking partnerships that include capacity-building components 
as a way to build human capital and grow national technological capacities. 
Placing space activities within a larger STI framework can help answer critical 
questions about the long-term goals of these activities, how they relate to other 
science and technological efforts, and how best to coordinate among government 
and non-governmental efforts. 
International Cooperation
International space cooperation is a key aspect of most space programs. Depending 
on the objectives, this cooperation can take many forms, such as multilateral 
cooperation at the international or regional level and bilateral cooperation with 
individual countries. Depending on the format of this cooperation, countries 
may designate specific agencies or institutions as the main representative, but 
the activity may involve other agencies or departments and non-governmental 
representatives from industry or academia.
At the multilateral level, active participation in the key space forums (e.g., the 
United Nations [UN] Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space [COPUOS], 
International Telecommunication Union [ITU]), as well as related forums for 
cooperation in specific application areas (e.g., the Group on Earth Observations 
for cooperation in Earth observation), is often considered a fundamental aspect of 
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these activities. Countries see it as both a way to exert leadership and ensure their 
views are represented in relevant exchanges at the international level and a way to 
share information about their space activities and learn of the activities of others. 
This participation may thus influence policy debates at the national level.
At a regional or bilateral level, countries may adopt multiple mechanisms to 
formalize relationships—whether issuing joint declarations or statements, signing 
cooperative agreements to pursue specific activities together or to exchange data, 
pooling institutional or financial resources in a cooperative program, or other 
methods. Regional space cooperation organizations have also emerged as a way 
to improve cooperation in and coordination of space activities at the regional 
level. For example, the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF) 
seeks to advance space activities in the Asia-Pacific region with institutions from 
more than 40 countries participating.
While an exhaustive description of the multiple mechanisms actors have pursued 
to enable international cooperation is beyond the scope of this section, the key 
insight is that international cooperation is rarely pursued haphazardly, but is instead 
often part of larger policy and strategic considerations. International cooperation 
is often considered both a mechanism and a goal, so it may feature in policy 
documents. As a mechanism, space cooperation enables actors to leverage the 
expertise, investments, and resources of others in the development of programs, 
whether through the direct acquisition of hardware or the joint development of 
technical capacity. 
International cooperation can also be driven by larger policy objectives and be 
part of a strategy to advance foreign policy, innovation, or trade policy goals. In 
emerging space countries, the two aspects may be tightly linked. Chile’s space 
policy, for example, identifies international space cooperation as a key initiative 
in efforts to advance priority areas, such as human capital and innovation. For 
Chile and other countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region, international 
cooperation—particularly bilateral and regional cooperation—is considered a 
priority as a way to extend limited resources, as well as to support related strategic 
and political goals. 
Other states have pursued international space cooperation as an added measure 
to foster positive relationships with other countries. For example, a 2008 Policy 
Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean describes China’s goals of engagement 
with countries in the region, which has included partnerships with Venezuela and 
Bolivia, among others.
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In this respect, national space policies may detail the goals and priorities of 
international cooperation efforts, a mechanism that helps signal others about 
a government’s priorities and goals in space, enhances transparency of their 
activities with partner nations, and invites new actors to identify opportunities 
for engagement. 
Export Control and Technology Transfer
The underlying question when working on export controls is, with the increased 
access to space and burgeoning role of the private sector in space, how does a 
state balance controlling the proliferation of militarily-sensitive technologies 
with commercial development and innovation? It is particularly challenging to 
do so while supporting and propelling the space industrial base—an objective of 
many national space strategies—as export control is perceived to be a necessary 
part of ensuring national security and assuring a stable and predictable space 
environment. The balance between efficiency and commercial interests on one 
hand and national security on the other is a difficult one to strike; another way of 
looking at this is as being part of a larger discussion about promoting innovation 
while minimizing risks.
Keeping in mind the international aspect of export control discussed in Chapter 
One: Export Control, export control restrictions on the national level are 
extremely challenging to develop and, as a result, should be undertaken only 
after a considerable amount of discussion with all stakeholders, including 
industry, and when the government has a solid understanding of what it is trying 
to accomplish with export control protections. Without stakeholder input, the 
domestic industry can suffer unduly with very little benefit to a country’s national 
security. States have to be careful of unintended consequences; for example, as 
seen in cases where export controls were changed and thus created new burdens 
for smaller groups in the space industry. It is important to get the conversation 
as wide as possible when creating government regulation about an industry, and 
to have an open conversation with industry to ensure that all aspects of an issue 
are considered. 
Maintaining a list of technologies that should be controlled is challenging, 
particularly for space technologies, many of which are dual-use. One sticking 
point for export controls is that often the technology outpaces the legal regimes. 
This can be seen currently, for example, in regard to software development. 
How helpful are export regulations when they are essentially protecting outdated 
technology? Another significant issue is that export control, by its nature, tries 
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to control the technology or goods themselves, regardless of how they are being 
used. This runs contrary to one of the emerging lessons from dealing with dual-
use space technologies; it is more important to focus on the actions and use than 
on the technology itself.
New state actors in space should 
consider how they will balance 
their national security concerns and 
their position on fostering domestic 
industries and innovation. For non-
governmental actors, a thorough 
appreciation of relevant export 
control regimes must begin early 
in the planning process.
Government Relationship 
with the Private Sector 
Governments occupy a range of 
roles in their interaction with the 
private sector: regulator, customer, 
supplier (of technology and 
intellectual property), collaborator, 
and competitor. The way these 
roles are expressed is a major influence on the development of a broader space 
industry outside of the government program in a given country. Along with its 
role in the market as a regulator, government also exerts considerable influence 
through its role as a customer. Governments must be aware of how the choices 
they make in engaging the private sector through the procurement of goods and 
services affects both the development of industry and the evolution of government 
space strategy and programs.
Governments may choose to develop required capabilities or services internally, 
and not engage the private sector at all. There are several scenarios in which this 
approach may be preferred: the capability may not exist in the private sector, 
a determination might have been made that development of the capability is 
considered a core governmental function (for example, a capability used for 
national security purposes), or the capability provides a public good. Developing 
capabilities internally to the government provides the government with complete 
control over execution of the project as well as any intellectual property 
New state actors in 
space should consider 
how they will balance 
their national security 
concerns and their 
position on fostering 
domestic industries 
and innovation. For 
non-governmental 
actors, a thorough 
appreciation of relevant 
export control regimes 
must begin early in the 
planning process.
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developed. It may help the government remain abreast of current technology, and 
can help government personnel stay engaged with program execution. However, 
in-house work has drawbacks, including a lack of transparency, and potential 
cost and efficiency challenges as compared to wholly private work. Governments 
must also remain aware of similar capabilities that the private sector may be 
developing in order to ensure that approaches remain current with regard to 
comparable capabilities.
By contracting for required capabilities, government is able to foster market 
competition in the private sector, which in theory supports broader economic 
development objectives. Competition may also lead to more innovative solutions 
than might be developed if the work were to be completed in-house. In general, 
contracting with the private sector is intended to provide capabilities in a more 
cost-effective and efficient manner than the developing of capabilities internally 
to the government. However, contracting imposes administrative costs on both the 
government and the private-sector entities, specifically in terms of administration 
and performance oversight. While typically contracts provide the government 
with a certain level of oversight and ability to specify quality level, contract 
performance attributes, and execution timelines, the contracting process inherently 
involves a decision to cede some control of the development of the capability, as 
compared to developing it in-house. Contracting may also create dependencies 
between the government and companies receiving contracts. The government 
may find itself dependent upon one or a few suppliers for a critical capability, and 
companies may find themselves dependent upon the government as a critical source 
of revenue.
Due in part to these drawbacks, governments are increasingly utilizing public-
private partnership-based approaches to engage the private sector. Public-private 
partnership approaches typically seek to develop capabilities in a way that ensures 
both the government and the participating private-sector entities are co-invested 
in the success of the activity. Commonly, governments might specify a need and 
some basic requirements, as well as allocate a certain amount of funding. The 
capability to be acquired is one that the commercial sector can use to satisfy 
non-governmental requirements, with the governmental funding intended to be 
complemented by investment and capital provided by the commercial sector. 
Projects of this type give the government less control over the execution of the 
project but can provide capabilities at less cost than traditional contracting. The 
private-sector participants are required to invest their own funding. However, they 
are able to retain ownership of the products and intellectual property produced. 
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Guidance to new 
actors, whether they 
are states new to space 
or non-governmental 
private actors, is that 
the governmental 
policy toward the 
private or commercial 
space sector will have 
a significant impact on 
the business chances 
of those private space 
ventures.
These types of activities may also be used to stimulate the development of 
capabilities that require governmental support to overcome initial research and 
development costs.
 
Governments may also procure capabilities on a purely commercial basis. In 
this approach, the private sector offers items at a standard price, commonly via a 
catalog. Governments are able to purchase those items in a market transaction no 
different from business-to-business sales. These sorts of transactions have a lower 
administrative burden than contracting approaches. They are typically used for 
the purchase of bulk goods or commodities. The government is able to procure 
required items quickly and efficiently but is not able to specify the details of the 
development process.
Governments may choose to acquire capabilities through the use of grants instead 
of contracts. Grants are typically used in situations where the government’s 
interest is in acquiring research or technology development services, activities, 
or results. Grants provide a large amount of flexibility in execution and scope 
of activities and are well-suited to activities where the purpose is investigational 
rather than operational. Grants typically specify a topic of investigation and a 
general timeline for the delivery of results. They generally do not provide the 
government with much ability 
to specify performance 
approach or methods, nor do 
they require frequent reporting 
from awardees. 
Guidance to new actors, whether 
they are states new to space 
or non-governmental private 
actors, is that the governmental 
policy toward the private or 
commercial space sector will 
have a significant impact on the 
business chances of those private 
space ventures.
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Case Study:  
The United Kingdom Satellite Applications Catapult
The United Kingdom Satellite Applications Catapult was 
established by the government of the United Kingdom (UK) in 
May 2013 with the goal of creating economic growth in the 
UK through supporting the development, commercialization, 
and use of satellite applications. According to its Delivery Plan 
2015–2020, the Catapult (Figure 8) aims to promote satellite 
application and technology development and to help domestic 
industry “bring new products and services more rapidly to 
market.” The Satellite Applications Catapult is one of 11 
“Catapults” operating in the UK, each focusing on different 
technologies and application areas. The Catapult operates as 
a private, not-for-profit research organization. It is governed 
by a board, which includes representation from the United 
Kingdom Space Agency (UKSA) and from Innovate UK—a 
government agency focused on fostering technology and 
economic development.
The UK-wide Catapult network was established to promote 
innovation and improve the ability of UK industry to 
commercialize outputs from what the government viewed as 
a strong national fundamental research capacity. In November 
2014, the UK government published the UK Space Innovation 
and Growth Strategy Growth Action Plan. This plan set a target 
of growing the annual revenue of the UK space industry from 
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Figure 8 – The UK Satellite Applications Catapult 
 Source: Adapted from Satellite Applications Catapult Peterborough   
 Industry Day Presentation, February 2015.
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£11.3 billion as of October 2014 to £40 billion by 2030. The 
Satellite Applications Catapult has since been positioned as one 
of several policy strategies the UK government is employing as 
components of achieving this revenue target.
The Catapult views increasing exports as a key element of 
achieving this growth. To this end, its programs support the 
development of satellite applications-based products. The 
Catapult focuses its efforts on working with companies (and 
academia) to bridge what is known as the “valley of death” 
in the process of transferring a product or technology 
from fundamental research to active commercialization. 
The “valley of death” refers to the gap in available funding 
and resources that developers often encounter between 
the fundamental research phases of development and the  
commercialization phase. 
The Catapult is not a funding agency itself—it does not provide 
direct grants or financing to industry (or academia). Instead, 
it acts as a technical, networking, and facilities resource for 
UK companies looking to develop and commercialize satellite 
applications. The Catapult maintains technical facilities, 
including labs, test equipment, and computing capabilities, at 
its central campus. These facilities can be accessed and rented 
for development purposes. The organization regularly hosts 
business networking workshops and events and works to link 
UK businesses to foreign partners and business opportunities. 
It actively helps UK companies raise private capital and 
maintains relationships with finance sources such as the Space 
Angels Network. The Catapult also helps UK companies identify 
intellectual property and human capital resources related 
to their business objectives. The Catapult may also partner 
with companies to pursue specific business opportunities, 
jointly developing satellite applications projects in response to 
available funding sources.
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Property Rights
Ownership and control rights to space objects launched by a state and registered 
by it are protected for that state (and are protected for its nationals as long as 
their state extends those rights to them). These rights may also apply to a state 
that procures a launch from another country. Other tangible property rights are 
more uncertain. 
There is, for example, no clearly identified mechanism in international law for the 
transfer of jurisdiction to a non-launching state in the case of a satellite sale or 
transfer. Registering states are usually also launching states. De-registration from 
one state registry and subsequent re-registration on a new state registry would 
seem to be the only available path to clearly and transparently transfer national 
jurisdictional competency. Chapter One: Registration of Space Objects, and the 
sub-section on United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 62/101, show a path 
forward for this. 
Concerning rights to resources, while samples of space materials may be obtained, 
commercial rights to extracted natural resources in space are widely debated and, 
so far, untested. Since the Outer Space Treaty prohibits claims to sovereignty over 
any celestial body, states are effectively prohibited from granting title to any real 
property beyond Earth. States retain jurisdiction over their nationals, however, 
and this means that states have the power to protect the commercial operations 
of their nationals from interference from others with the same nationality. This 
is the strategy employed by the US in crafting its US Commercial Space Launch 
Competitiveness Act of 2015. 
The debate over rights to material extracted from a celestial body is complicated 
by differences over the meaning of the ban on “appropriation” in the Outer Space 
Treaty. For some, that means a prohibition on assuming any property right for 
off-Earth material. For others, there is a clear distinction between the use of 
resources extracted or harvested from a celestial body, such as regolith or water, 
and ownership of the body itself. Since the United States, Russia, and Japan have 
all obtained material from celestial bodies, returned it to Earth, and exercised full 
ownership and control of it, any ban is shown by practice to not be absolute.
For the immediate future, then, it appears that property rights to material obtained 
from celestial bodies will largely be determined by national legislation, and that 
those rights will pertain only within the territorial and personal jurisdiction of the 
legislating state. As a cautionary note, business plans developed with the intention 
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of exporting off-Earth material or products derived from it should ensure that the 
sovereigns with authority over the intended export markets will permit the sale of 
such material and products. No rules specific or unique to space activity exist for 
intellectual property. In general terms, the rules are the same as those that would 
apply for terrestrial activity.
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND NATIONAL OVERSIGHT
As explained in the previous chapter, states bear international responsibility 
and liability for damage caused by the space activities of their nationals. They 
also are tasked with oversight of their national space activities, including space 
activities conducted by non-governmental actors. States use national legislation 
and regulations to fulfill these international legal obligations. In accordance with 
their policy rationales and objectives, as discussed previously in this chapter, a 
number of domestic administrative methods or levers exist by which governments 
exercise oversight of both government and non-governmental space activities. 
National Regulators
The Outer Space Treaty obligates state parties to authorize, license, and continually 
supervise national activities for conformity with international law, but it is at the 
discretion of each state’s government to determine which agencies are tasked with 
this regulation. In some countries, these responsibilities will be divided among 
several different agencies.
In the United States, for example, the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has 
responsibility for commercial launches, 
the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) deals with telecommunications and 
frequency allocations, the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
regulates remote sensing, and the Department 
of State and the Department of Commerce 
share responsibility for export control. Deciding 
which agency is covering which activity can 
eliminate both gaps and redundancies in the 
oversight regime.
Deciding 
which agency 
is covering 
which activity 
can eliminate 
both gaps and 
redundancies 
in the oversight 
regime.
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Licensing
Licensing is the standard method used by a state to authorize and regulate its 
national, non-governmental space activities. Individual actors must comply with 
requirements to obtain national licenses before undertaking space activities. The 
types of licenses required can vary: launch licenses, frequency-use licenses, 
remote sensing licenses, broadcasting licenses, etc. The criteria for obtaining 
these licenses can include scientific, technical, environmental, safety, insurance, 
and financial solvency requirements, to name a few. In most cases, private sector 
space activities require positive 
confirmation (i.e. a license) before 
they are allowed to occur. This is 
different from many non-space 
sectors, where private sector activities 
are often allowed by default, and 
only specific types of activities, for 
example those that are particularly 
risky or harmful, are required to have 
permission to proceed.
Understanding the licensing requirements in the applicable jurisdiction is 
incredibly important to successful and responsible space operations.
National Registries of Space Objects 
In accordance with the Outer Space Treaty and the Registration Convention, 
states assert ownership of their space objects by placing them on their national 
registries. This ownership is twofold, encompassing jurisdiction and control. 
Jurisdiction is a legal power to create and enforce laws and to settle claims, and is 
held by the state. Control is an operational power analogous to command over the 
space object. Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty confers these rights:
A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer 
space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, 
and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial 
body. Ownership of objects launched into outer space, including objects 
landed or constructed on a celestial body, and of their component parts, 
is not affected by their presence in outer space or on a celestial body or 
by their return to Earth. Such objects or component parts found beyond 
the limits of the State Party to the Treaty on whose registry they are 
carried shall be returned to that State Party, which shall, upon request, 
furnish identifying data prior to their return.
Understanding the 
licensing requirements 
in the applicable 
jurisdiction is incredibly 
important to successful 
and responsible space 
operations.
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While the Outer Space Treaty gives states the rights and the method to assert 
jurisdiction and control, it does not make it mandatory; the 1975 Registration 
Convention, in turn, requires and obligates states to establish national registries 
of space objects. For states party to the Registration Convention, Article II 
requires the establishment of a national registry, and providing notification of the 
establishment of such registry to the UN Secretary-General.
National registries are usually created through legislative acts, either as part 
of general space legislation or in an act specifically for the purpose of creating 
such a registry, as in the cases of Argentina, the Netherlands, and Italy. National 
registries may also be created by executive decree or within regulations by an 
agency granted the power to create them.
As of 2017, 63 states were party to the 1975 Registration Convention, and 31 
of them had established national registries of space objects and informed the 
UN of such national registries.  European Space Agency (ESA) and  European 
Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT) 
have also established registries. Table 3 lists national registries of space objects, 
and which governmental agencies maintain its national registry. Some states place 
the task with their national space agency, others with their federal aviation office 
even if they have a national space agency, as is the case with Germany.
For states wishing to exercise 
jurisdiction and control over 
space objects, establishing and 
maintaining a national registry 
of space objects is a reliable 
method to assert and consolidate 
jurisdictional powers. It might 
also be the state’s duty to 
establish and maintain such a 
registry. For non-governmental 
actors, due diligence and 
compliance with governmental 
oversight likely includes 
determining which state will have their spacecraft on its national registry 
and supplying that agency with the relevant information on their spacecraft 
and activity.
For states wishing to 
exercise jurisdiction and 
control over space objects, 
establishing and maintaining 
a national registry of space 
objects is a reliable method 
to assert and consolidate 
jurisdictional powers. 
 |    73Table 3 – National Registries of Space Objects
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belarus
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
Chile
 
China
Czech Republic
France
Germany
Greece
India 
 
Italy
Japan
 
Kazakhstan
 
Mexico
 
Netherlands
North Korea
Norway
Pakistan
 
Peru
Russia
Slovakia 
 
South Africa
 
South Korea 
 
Spain
 
Ukraine
UK
USA
National Commission on Space Activities of Argentina (CONAE)
Space Licensing and Safety Office of the Government of Australia
Ministry of Transport, Innovation and Technology
National Academy of Sciences (NASB)
Belgian Science Policy Office (BELSPO)
Brazilian Space Agency (AEB)
Canadian Space Agency (CSA)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs–Directorate  
for International and Human Security
China National Space Administration (CNSA)
Czech Ministry of Transport
National Center for Space Studies (CNES)
Federal Aviation Office (LBA)
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Greece
Department of Transportation– 
Wireless and Planning Coordination Wing 
Italian Space Agency (ASI)
Ministry of Education, Sports, Culture,  
Science and Technology (MEXT)
Ministry for Investment and Development– 
Aerospace Committee (KazCosmos)
Mexican Space Agency–General Coordination  
Office for Space-Related Security and International Affairs
Ministry of Economic Affairs Telecommunications Agency
National Aerospace Development Administration
Norwegian Space Center (NSC)
Pakistan Space and Upper Atmosphere  
Research Commission (SUPARCO)
National Aerospace Research and Development Center (CONIDA)
State Space Corporation (Roscosmos)
Department of Higher Education, Science and Research– 
Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport
Department of Trade and Industry– 
South Africa Council for Space Affairs
Ministry of Science, Information and Communications Technology,  
and Future Planning (MSIP)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs– 
Department of International Economic Relations
National Space Agency of Ukraine (NSAU)
UK Space Agency (UKSA)
Department of State–Bureau of Oceans  
and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs
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Insurance Requirements
In order to ensure that entities undertaking space activities are able to indemnify 
the state in case international liability is incurred, and/or are able to pay claims 
by fellow nationals, many states require entities engaging in space activities to 
carry insurance. After R&D costs and launch costs, insurance is typically the 
third-highest cost associated with satellite activities, and thus is something to 
seriously consider when planning for a space venture. For example, Australia, 
Brazil, France, Japan, South Korea, the UK, and the US all require the purchase 
of insurance at varying levels, as shown in Table 4.
Waivers
There are different kinds of waivers that may be used for space activities. A cross-
waiver is a legal instrument between parties where each reciprocally contracts to not 
hold the other party liable for any damage suffered. Cross-waivers of liability are 
often used in the space industry and might be used between the launch provider and 
the operator, and also between contractors and sub-contractors. Waivers have the 
effect of making it easier to contemplate and compute the possible liability exposure a 
project faces.
On a regulatory level, waivers can be granted in order to relieve operators from 
following a regulation that evolved after their satellite was launched. This type of 
waiver might also be called a “variance.” Alternatively, operators can apply for 
a waiver from obeying a regulation that they believe to be unduly onerous or to 
have national security consequences. Granting waivers can be used by regulators 
to allow an industry to innovate.
National Frequency Administration and Broadcasting 
The International Telecommunication Union deals with frequency allocation 
and coordination at the international level, which is covered in Chapter One: 
International Frequency Management. National administrators determine 
frequency use at the domestic level, commonly through licensing and national 
frequency tables. For example, the Ministry of Communications and Information 
Technology in India handles their national frequency allocations, and the Office 
of Communications (Ofcom) in the UK provides licenses for radiofrequency 
use. In the United States, the FCC coordinates non-federal use of frequencies, 
while the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) 
coordinates federal spectrum use. 
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Country
Australia
 
 
Brazil
France
 
 
Japan
 
 
 
South Korea
 
 
United 
Kingdom
 
USA
Regime
Space Activities Act of 1998
 
 
Resolution on Commercial 
Launching Activities from 
Brazilian Territory (Res. No. 
51 of 26 January 2001); 
Regulation on Procedures 
and on Definition of 
Necessary Requirements 
for the Request, Evaluation, 
Issuance, Follow-up and 
Supervision of Licenses 
for Carrying out Launching 
Space Activities on Brazilian 
Territory (No. 27)   
Space Operations Act of 
2008 (entered into force 10 
December 2010)
Law Concerning Japan 
Aerospace Exploration 
Agency, Law Number 161 
of 13 December 2002
Space Liability Act 
(Republic of Korea) Law n. 
8852 of 21 December 2007
Outer Space Act 1986, as 
amended 1 October 2015
 
US Code Chapter 509–
Commercial Space Launch 
Activities
Third-Party 
Liability Amount
A$750 million 
or Maximum 
Probable Loss 
(no fixed amount)
€60 Million 
¥20 billion for 
H-IIA; ¥5 billion 
for smaller rocket 
(e.g., Epsilon)
KRW200 billion 
maximum
 
€60 Million 
 
 
Up to $500 million 
based on per-
mission Maximum 
Probable Loss 
calculation
Comments
Limit up to A$3 billion for 
claims by Australian nationals
 
Amount of the insurance 
depends on the specific  
launch vehicle
 
Operator third-party liability 
limited to maximum of €60M 
for cases “involving single 
satellite missions employing 
established launchers, satellite 
platforms and operational 
profiles”
Any claims exceeding the 
insured amounts are payable 
by the US government on 
behalf of the licensee, up to 
the statutory maximum of $1.5 
billion (subject to congressional 
appropriation)
Table 4 – Indemnification Regime of Some Spacefaring States
Indemnification Regime of Some Spacefaring States
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In addition to working on frequency issues, these administrators can reinforce 
other best practices. For example, in order to receive authorization from the FCC 
to use a frequency, US commercial satellite operators must submit an orbital 
debris mitigation plan that is in accordance with internationally recognized debris 
mitigation guidelines. Laws and regulations pertaining to broadcasting are not 
limited only to space-based services and can include other sectors such as cable 
television. It is important for any entity undertaking space-based broadcasting 
activities to comply with any relevant national rules regarding broadcasting 
generally. For example, in Canada, companies engaged in broadcasting are 
required to broadcast a certain amount of Canadian content. The national regulator 
may also impose resolution limitations on remote sensing or limitations on 
power emissions.
Spectrum regulation is a part of a government’s responsibility for oversight. This 
planning function allows for spectrum allocation, which grants use of a frequency 
band to a specific user, dependent upon national policies, technical characteristics 
of the spectrum, and international agreements. This allocation process helps 
ensure that the spectrum is managed and used in a sustainable way while limiting 
the amount of harmful interference created by its use. Next, spectrum engineering 
is the regulatory function that creates technical standards for equipment whose 
frequencies affect or are affected by the radio spectrum. Finally, there is 
spectrum compliance, which involves monitoring the use of the radiofrequency 
spectrum to ascertain that users are complying with technical standards and 
frequency allocations. 
 
Administration of Export Controls and Technology-Transfer
States implement export control measures to meet international commitments 
for non-proliferation regimes, to enhance regional stability, and out of national 
security interests. States must decide how to administer export control laws.
In order to reliably control exports, a country must establish legal authority to do so, 
which would correspond to six principles: comprehensive controls, implementing 
directives, enforcement power and penalties, interagency coordination, 
international cooperation, and protection of government dissemination of 
sensitive business information. Next, a country needs to establish clear regulatory 
procedures that include a list of controlled items. Finally, the export control 
system should have enforcement built into it, including transparent procedures 
for issuing export licenses, compliance mechanisms, and investigation of possible 
illicit exports.
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Case Study: Export Controls in the United States
The US has three agencies with the authority to issue export 
control licenses: the Departments of Commerce, State, and 
the Treasury. Often, exporters must go to more than one 
agency and must ask for multiple licenses. There is interest in 
streamlining this process to have one single licensing agency 
in charge, although this would be a complicated effort and 
challenging to implement.
The US Department of State administers perhaps the 
most well-known example of export control regimes, the 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), a set of US 
government regulations that control the export and import of 
defense-related articles and services on the US Munitions List 
(USML). Businesses must register their products with the State 
Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), 
and are required to apply for export licenses and approvals 
for hardware on the USML or technical data that can be 
exported. The process can be expensive and lengthy and can 
add significant burden to commercial activities, particularly for 
smaller firms. Failure to comply with the ITAR requirements 
can lead to serious fines, jail time, and other civil and  
criminal penalties. 
Satellites and related technologies present a significant 
challenge for export control. In the early 2000s, US Congress 
passed legislation that placed all satellites and space-related 
technologies on the USML, due to concerns over transfer of 
space technology to China that could be used to improve 
ballistic missiles. The stricter controls on export of US satellite 
technology led to foreign firms developing their own products, 
which were often marketed as “ITAR-free.” As a result, the 
global market share for US satellite companies dropped 
precipitously. A strong push from industry led to Congress 
passing an updated law in 2012 that gave the White House 
the authority to determine which specific space technologies 
would remain on the USML, and which technologies would be 
transferred to the less onerous Commercial Control List (CCL), 
while retaining a prohibition on export of space technologies to 
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specific countries. In 2014, after two years of interagency and 
public deliberations, the Department of Commerce announced 
the shift of some types of satellites and space technologies to 
the CCL.
However, the steps to reform US export controls for satellites 
have not satisfied all the critics. Companies now need to 
determine whether or not they need to apply for a license 
from the State Department or the Commerce Department, and 
the overall system has become more complex. Furthermore, 
commercial satellites performing above a certain standard 
would still remain on the USML, as would any spacecraft 
designed for human habitation that has integrated propulsion. 
There continues to be an on-going discussion between the US 
space industry and the US government over future changes 
and reforms to export control. 
Congestion in Space 
As states are responsible for their own space activities and those of their non-
governmental entities, national policies and administration for dealing with 
congestion in space are important for improving space sustainability. Efforts 
to tackle the problem of congestion fall into three major categories, with each 
category addressing a different aspect of the problem: limiting the creation of new 
space debris, addressing the legacy population of space debris already in orbit, 
and minimizing the negative impact of the existing debris on space activities.
Case Study: Space Debris Policy and Administration  
in the United States
In the United States, the national space policy directs all 
federal agencies to adhere to the US Government Orbital 
Debris Mitigation Standard Practices, which closely reflect the 
Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) 
guidelines. The standard practices apply to all US governmental 
programs and projects, including those directly carried out by 
US agencies and those funded by the US government. The 
various federal agencies that conduct governmental space 
activities each have their own policy guidance and framework 
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for implementing these directives. There are some parts of the 
implementation that are coordinated through the interagency 
process, but also some parts that are left to agency discretion.
There are also three US federal agencies with existing  
regulatory authority over non-governmental space activities 
that implement and enforce space debris mitigation guidelines 
on the private sector. NOAA under the Department of 
Commerce has the authority to license non-governmental 
space-based remote sensing of Earth. The FAA under the 
Department of Transportation has licensing authority over 
commercial launch, re-entry or reusable vehicles, commercial 
launch or re-entry facilities, and commercial human spaceflight. 
The FCC also has the authority to provide licenses to the radio 
frequency spectrum for non-governmental satellite activities.
In general, the space debris mitigation guidelines are currently 
implemented for non-governmental space activities as part 
of the licensing processes in each of these three agencies. 
However, there are differences in the requirements set by these 
agencies. For example, the FCC requires that licensees present 
a plan for debris mitigation during both normal operations and 
post-mission disposal, whereas NOAA requires that licensees 
present a plan for just post-mission disposal of their remote 
sensing satellite. The FCC also requires licensees to follow 
the 25-year rule in de-orbiting all pieces from a space launch, 
whereas the FAA does not. These differences in licensing 
requirements and rules are largely due to the differences the 
two agencies have in their approach to risk mitigation as a result 
of different legislative and policy mandates. Furthermore, only 
NOAA currently has regulatory authority over operational 
space activities—the other two entities conduct pre-launch 
licensing and certification only.
A topic many states struggle with is potential exceptions to the space debris 
mitigation guidelines. It may be necessary to exempt some long-running 
government programs from specific aspects of the guidelines because portions 
of the program(s) were designed and implemented before the guidelines 
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were adopted. States may also be inclined to exempt some new programs 
over concerns that implementing the guidelines will lead to increased costs 
or operational challenges. However, widespread exemptions would have a 
deleterious effect on adherence to the guidelines, which would ultimately 
negatively impact all space actors. If states are to make exemptions to the 
guidelines, they should do so through a well-defined, rigorous process that 
includes high-level decision-makers and clearly outlines the costs and benefits of 
the exemptions.
In addition to limiting the creation of new debris, several states have also put in 
place policies and administrative practices to minimize the impact that existing 
space debris have on space activities. The United States, Russia, France, Germany, 
and Japan are among the states that have governmental organizations tasked 
with monitoring the population of space objects and predicting potential close 
approaches. In some cases, these organizations do so for their own governmental 
satellites, while in others they do so for non-governmental or foreign satellites 
as well. In either case, they have put in place procedures and data-sharing 
mechanisms for notifying satellite operators and assisting them in assessing the 
risk of collision and implementing any avoidance measures.
These practices are often included in the larger discussion about space traffic 
management (STM), but at present there is no standard national practice for 
implementing STM in a comprehensive manner. It is currently up to each satellite 
operator to determine their own tolerance for risk and to use that as a basis for 
determining whether to take steps to avoid a close approach with another space 
object. Current techniques for predicting close approaches and possible collisions 
in orbit are not sophisticated enough to enable mandatory maneuver policies, with 
the specific exception of activities such as human spaceflight.
Several states have also put in place policies and organizations for providing a 
national space situational awareness (SSA) capability. Developing the capability 
to track all space objects requires a considerable network of tracking-station 
locations around the world. Thus, most countries focus on developing a more 
limited national capability over their own territory. In most cases, it is either based 
on existing national military or intelligence capabilities or dual-use capabilities. 
This can create challenges for states that do not have a prior working relationship 
between their national security community and their civil space community, or for 
states that try to develop SSA capabilities as a purely civil function. 
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An example of how to overcome this challenge can be seen in the case of Germany. 
The Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy is the lead entity for 
space affairs in Germany and coordinated the process of establishing a German 
national space strategy. The coordination involved the German Aerospace Center 
(DLR), which is responsible for the execution of the national space program, and 
the Federal Ministry of Defence, which operates several satellites. Part of the 
implementation of the strategy was the creation of the German Space Situational 
Awareness Center, a joint venture between the DLR and the German Air Force, 
in 2009. 
All states are encouraged to put in place 
national mechanisms to implement 
the IADC Space Debris Mitigation 
Guidelines for both governmental and 
non-governmental actors. How they are 
implemented can vary depending on a 
state’s specific governmental structure. 
Usually, implementation includes 
policy directives for federal agencies, 
a regulatory component in national 
law, and licensing requirements for 
non-governmental entities.
Government Contracting
Governments commonly contract 
for the delivery of required goods 
and/or services from private sector 
enterprises. Contracts, which take 
various forms (see Table 5), generally 
specify technical and performance 
requirements for the goods or services to be delivered, a timeline for execution, 
performance reporting requirements, and financial terms of payments. In general, 
contracts are intended to pay for the cost of developing and delivering a required 
capability, along with a certain amount of profit or fee for the company executing 
the work.
Dispute Settlement Clauses 
In contracting, parties will likely desire to place particular clauses for the 
predictable and fair settlement of disputes. The Model Law on International 
All states are 
encouraged to put 
in place national 
mechanisms to 
implement the IADC 
Space Debris Mitigation 
Guidelines for both 
governmental and 
non-governmental 
actors. How they are 
implemented can vary 
depending on a state’s 
specific governmental 
structure. 
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Commercial Arbitration, drafted by the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), defines the principal requirements, or 
elements, of dispute resolution by arbitration. These principles might be included 
in an international agreement. The principal requirement is an agreement by the 
parties to submit to arbitration all (or certain) disputes which have arisen or which 
may arise out of a defined legal relationship between them, whether the disputes 
are contractual or not. 
Only claims arising out of a defined legal relationship are covered by the arbitration 
agreement. Generally, the agreement will refer to claims “which arise out of or in 
connection with this contract.” Such language is sufficient to encompass all issues 
associated with the contract’s conclusion, validity, interpretation, performance, 
damages, and termination. Tort claims may be covered if they bear some nexus to 
the performance of the parties’ relevant contractual obligations.
Finally, there are the Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Outer 
Space Activities, which have been put forth by the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
(PCA).  As discussed in Chapter One: Arbitration and Mediation, these rules 
provide sample arbitration clause language that can be used in instances where 
the parties wish to implement the Optional Rules. If the parties agree to refer a 
dispute to the PCA under these Optional Rules, then a “waiver of any right to 
immunity from jurisdiction, in respect of the dispute in question, to which such 
party might otherwise be entitled” will be construed; it would not be necessary 
for a jurisdiction to characterize the dispute as specifically relating to outer space 
for these rules to apply. The Optional Rules are based on and modify the 2010 
Specific, exact price for services and delivery terms; maximizes 
incentive for contractor to control costs; reduces government  
insight into performance; reduces incentives for innovation.
Costs are variable based on expenses incurred and fee rate; little 
incentive for contractor to control costs; potential for scope 
overruns; high degree of government insight into performance.
Costs are variable based on expenses incurred and fee rate; difficult 
to manage the amount of work performed; best-suited for highly 
defined scopes.
Fixed Price
Cost  
Reimbursement
Time and  
Materials  
Table 5 – Common Contract Types
Common Contract Types
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UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and are meant to address the particular needs of 
parties engaging in space activities. They contain the relevant language to govern 
elements of arbitration, including notice, representation, number and selection of 
arbitrators, and procedures to be followed.
Recourse to Domestic Courts
Of course, in a commercial dispute, recourse to domestic courts is an option in 
any court that would possess jurisdiction over the dispute in accordance with its 
rules. Whether or not a state can be party to a dispute in a domestic court, though, 
will be a separate question. Issues such as sovereign immunity play a role in 
whether a court will be considered to have jurisdiction over a particular state. 
The key threshold question with regard to pursuit of any case in domestic court is 
jurisdiction, both over the parties and over the subject matter. When jurisdiction 
has been determined, then a plaintiff must consider the most favorable forum in 
which to pursue the claim. Such issues as access to enforcement mechanisms for a 
judgment, in addition to consideration of prior case law in the jurisdiction, should 
be considered before selecting a forum.
IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS: REMOTE SENSING POLICY  
AND ADMINISTRATION
Remote sensing satellites have continually sensed Earth for more than four decades, 
yielding a valuable repository of data about the planet which has applications 
in areas as far-reaching as health, climatology, and urban planning. Given its 
strong linkages to socioeconomic development, space-based remote sensing is 
a key area of activity for new and established space actors alike. In light of this, 
remote sensing is a useful case study highlighting the interaction between public 
policy and public administration and illustrates some of the approaches different 
countries have taken to managing this kind of activity. Additionally, new trends in 
remote sensing activities, especially by non-governmental actors, illustrate larger 
policy transformations that are useful for new space actors to consider. 
Remote Sensing Policy 
Consistent with the main elements of public policy described in the beginning of 
this chapter, remote sensing policies primarily seek to: 
• identify objectives and priorities guiding the acquisition of data about 
the planet; 
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• define roles and responsibilities of government remote sensing activities 
as well as related oversight obligations; 
• set requirements by designating procedures private operators must 
follow to operate remote sensing systems; and 
• identify data policies to govern the conditions of access and distribution 
of the data acquired through the operation of these systems. 
Remote sensing policies may be included within national-level space policies 
or may have dedicated policies of their own. In some cases, a government will 
lay out specific goals with respect to the information being collected or priority 
application areas, identifying departments or agencies that are responsible for 
acquiring research or operational datasets. Specific government agencies may 
also be tasked with operating specific systems. Sector guidance in the 2010 US 
National Space Policy, for example, dictates that the US Geological Survey 
(USGS) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) shall 
cooperate to maintain an operational land remote sensing program. The policy 
also describes tasks related to the acquisition, archiving, and distribution of the 
global land remote sensing dataset. 
In light of technological advances driving the proliferation of these systems 
and the international liability responsibilities discussed in Chapter One, 
remote sensing policies also define roles with respect to the oversight of non-
governmental remote sensing activities, identifying the specific department 
or agency and the tasks they perform in the process. These guidelines may be 
further detailed in related regulations, laws, or agency-level policies. In the 
United States, the licensing authority of private remote sensing space systems 
lies with the Secretary of Commerce, a task that has been delegated to the NOAA 
for implementation, and whose principles are captured in a national Commercial 
Remote Sensing Policy. NOAA agency-level policies specify the principles 
guiding related activities, such as a partnership policy among government, 
academia, and the private sector in the provision of environmental information 
and services.
Policies also allude to coordination processes necessary to orchestrate the different 
elements involved in managing remote sensing activities, which, in addition to the 
those common for any satellite mission (research, development, launch, operations, 
etc.), include tasks specific to the processing, archiving, and distribution of Earth 
observations data. Institutional coordination is particularly necessary in the field 
of remote sensing because of the diversity of users and stakeholders who routinely 
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derive valuable intelligence from this information. Understanding needs across 
these different user communities is an often challenging but crucial task that 
feeds into this coordination process to improve the value of investments in remote 
sensing programs.
Oversight of Non-Government Activities 
Rapid technological advances often drive the evolution of remote sensing 
policies, particularly given the growth of high-resolution imaging satellites from 
non-governmental sources. Remote sensing policies primarily seek to advance 
national (including commercial) remote sensing activities for the provision of 
services, imagery/data or value-added products while balancing national security 
and foreign policy interests. To do this, the policy will specify procedures that 
non-governmental operators must meet to be allowed to operate space remote 
sensing systems, and the limitations on such activities. Access to the data acquired 
by these systems, whether freely or commercially, is also subject to specific 
limitations imposed by the oversight authority. Canada’s Remote Sensing Space 
Systems Act of 2005, for example, details the procedure by which an operational 
license may be cancelled or temporarily revoked when it is determined to be 
“injurious to national security, the defence of Canada, the safety of Canadian 
Forces or Canada’s conduct of international relations” or “inconsistent with 
Canada’s international obligations.” In some countries, a license may not be 
revoked but the operator may be required to temporarily cease operations 
during crisis or conflict—sometimes called “shutter control”—or to refrain from 
sensing or distributing data on areas of the world deemed to be sensitive by the 
licensing authority. 
Permissions are often granted through licenses issued after the operator has 
committed to meeting certain operational and even disposal procedures, and 
sometimes following inter-agency review. As an example, a US commercial 
remote sensing license application available on the NOAA Commercial Remote 
Sensing Regulatory Affairs website highlights the basic requirements, including 
the following:
• Corporate information: contact information and other details about the 
business, a description of significant agreements with foreign nations or 
persons, etc.
• Launch segment information: proposed launch schedule, anticipated 
operational date, orbital parameters, etc. 
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• Space segment information: anticipated resolution and swath width of 
sensors, on-board storage capacity, anticipated system lifetime, etc. 
• Ground segment information: proposed system data collection and 
processing capabilities, transmission frequencies, plans for protection of 
uplink and downlink, etc. 
• Other information including financial information about proposed 
commercial data distribution policies, a plan for post-mission satellite 
disposal, etc. 
Data Policies 
Data policies are a key component of remote sensing policies since these specify 
the access and distribution rights and obligations of data acquired through these 
activities. Generally, policies make most government-acquired remote sensing 
datasets available for scientific, social, and economic benefit by making the 
data available to users across government, academia, and the private sector. The 
European Union’s Copernicus system’s data policy “promotes the access, use and 
sharing of Copernicus information and data on a full, free, and open basis,” and 
is specifically tied to the promotion of economic development and technological 
innovation goals. Bilateral and multilateral data exchange programs also exist to 
facilitate the sharing of specific datasets among operators and users of partner 
countries or when such exchange helps address shared challenges. The World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO), for example, facilitates the international 
exchange of meteorological and related data and products, including those derived 
from space-based systems, as tied to “matters relating to safety and security 
of society, economic welfare and the protection of the environment.” National 
open-data policies may also apply, usually as part of a larger policy governing the 
access and use of government-funded data that is not limited to space, and may 
include data acquired through airborne or in-situ platforms. 
Even with the proliferation of open data access policies, remote sensing policies 
include language specifying conditions of restriction on access or redistribution 
of datasets, particularly driven by national security concerns. The main driver for 
these different policy elements is the inherent dual-use nature of remote sensing 
technologies, which enable applications across civil, commercial, and military 
domains. In some countries, such as Chile, a single remote sensing satellite or 
system serves the needs of both civil and military users, thus making it “dual 
use.” However, even while a satellite or a system may be designed to serve 
exclusively civil needs, the dual-use nature of the technology remains, as the 
data gathered can be aggregated or reused to feed into applications for military 
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purposes. Consequently, and to balance national security concerns associated 
with access to potentially sensitive information, data policies typically specify 
resolution or temporal restrictions for the distribution of high-resolution data or 
imagery, including those from commercial operators and providers. The exchange 
or redistribution of these datasets may be subject to additional requirements and 
examined on a case-by-case basis. In Germany, Earth observation data acquired 
through “high-grade” systems are subject to the German National Data Security 
Policy for Space-Based Earth Remote Sensing Systems, and distribution is 
allowed depending on the level of “sensitivity” of the data. Moreover, India’s 
Remote Sensing Data Policy of 2011 notes that specific agreements are necessary 
for the exchange of data better than 1-meter resolution.
Broader Policy Context
Driven in large part by technological advances, data policies—and their application 
through licenses and other legal mechanisms—will remain a focal point in the 
evolution of remote sensing practice currently manifest through the emergence 
of multiple sources of non-government data and services. The expansion of 
non-government actors in the full value-chain of remote sensing activity—from 
research and operations to data processing and archiving—is one of the trends 
raising new policy and regulatory questions. Another important trend is the 
proliferation of geospatial products and services that result from the aggregation 
of multiple datasets, which may come from several data providers and are often 
collected from various space-based, airborne, and in-situ platforms. In a context 
where space activities represent a portion of the remote sensing activities that 
governments must oversee, space-derived data and services may be subject to 
regulation or oversight by multiple government agencies and be governed under 
different legal regimes. For example, privacy debates arising from uninhabited 
aircraft systems (UAS) in the US are beginning to expand to include discussion 
of similar concerns related to small satellites, despite the fact that these systems 
currently operate in distinct legal domains. These and other developments suggest 
that in some countries, new rules may emerge that apply to applications or the 
kinds of data being collected, rather than specific collection platforms. In this 
context, new space actors should be aware of this broader policy context and 
should pay attention to how public administration practices—encompassing 
policy, legal, and regulatory measures—from non-space domains may apply to 
this key area of space activities. 
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Earth orbit offers a unique vantage for critical applications in industry, science, policy, and more. Historically, many have thought this space real estate was virtually infinite; however, 
with satellite constellations, we will fast approach the congestion 
limits of various orbits. 
Operators may use these orbits, but, like other environmental 
resources, they must protect them for future generations. 
Spacecraft, constellation, and operational design should minimize 
the chance of creating debris during both the active mission lifetime 
and the disposal phase of the spacecraft. Perhaps industry will align 
on voluntary norms of behavior to ensure safe constellation design 
and traffic management; if not, inter-governmental agencies will 
need to step up to the task. 
To modify an old adage: we do not inherit Earth orbit, but borrow it 
from future missions!
Greg Wyler
Founder and  
Executive Chairman
OneWeb
INTRODUCTION
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RESPONSIBLE OPERATIONS  
IN SPACE
The preceding chapters discussed the international legal framework within which national activities exist, and how states establish space policy, perform interagency coordination, and supervise and regulate their 
national activities through legislation, licensing, and authorization. 
This chapter focuses on space activities themselves, and is divided into pre-launch, 
launch, on-orbit, and end-of-life issues. As a result, it is also more technological 
and operational in perspective than previous chapters. It gives concrete guidance 
to new actors in space—whether they are new states, start-up companies, or 
academic and university-led projects—as they begin their space activities. The 
best practices contained in this chapter are the types of behaviors that responsible 
actors will observe if they want to conduct successful space operations while also 
preserving order, fostering cooperation, and ensuring the long-term sustainability 
of space activities. 
PRE-LAUNCH
Space activities begin well before a satellite is actually launched into space. In 
addition to designing and building the spacecraft, there are a number of policy, 
legal, and administrative steps that need to be taken into consideration. The 
following topics are deeply connected to the operational side of any space activity 
and should be considered well before launch and the commencement of operations 
in space. 
Licensing 
In many cases a satellite operator or other new actor needs to get one or more 
licenses for their space activities. These licenses include radio frequency, 
remote sensing, and launch vehicle operations. National governments generally 
administer this access through licenses that satellite operators are required to 
obtain before they are permitted to launch their system(s). Launch operators must 
also obtain licenses, which might separately pertain to launch activities and to 
re-entry activities.
THREE
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Licensing Requirements
Licensing requirements affect most aspects of space operations, including 
telecommunications and remote sensing operations, launch services, and the 
operations of satellite ground stations on Earth (satellite Earth stations). The 
issuing of licenses is one of the means states use to maintain compliance with their 
treaty obligations, as discussed in Chapter One. Licenses cover a range of topics 
including spectrum access, national security oversight, compliance with insurance 
and safety requirements, and space debris mitigation guidelines. Satellite and 
launch operators are responsible for applying for and securing licenses from the 
relevant national regulatory authorities where they are headquartered or where 
they will be conducting operations. The regulatory authorities responsible for 
issuing licenses vary by country and domain of operations, and may include 
national space agencies, national telecommunications agencies, and national trade 
or economic agencies.
Frequency Licensing
In the satellite telecommunications segment, a primary purpose of licensing 
requirements is the coordination and allocation of radiofrequency spectrum 
on a domestic and international basis. Operators seeking to deploy a satellite 
communications system must apply for a license to operate that system. As 
spectrum is a limited resource, the licensing process acts to ensure fair access to 
that resource while providing a mechanism to limit the potential for interference 
between satellite systems, and between satellite systems and terrestrial uses of the 
same or adjacent radiofrequencies.
As covered in Chapter Two: Public Oversight and National Administration, 
regulators have generally implemented a licensing regime that ensures coordination 
and compliance with International Telecommunication Union (ITU) policies and 
regulations. In many jurisdictions, the regulator responsible for issuing a license to 
a communications satellite operator is the same authority responsible for making 
ITU submissions for that country. This is not, however, always the case; for 
example, in the United Kingdom (UK), the Office of Communications (Ofcom) is 
responsible for ITU filings while the UK Space Agency is the licensing authority.
In general, any operator seeking to operate a satellite system that will receive or 
transmit data (including command and control linkages) over the radiofrequency 
spectrum must apply for a license from its relevant regulatory agency. Prospective 
operators must provide a range of technical and business information to the 
regulator when submitting license applications. In general, license applications 
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must contain technical data describing the system including the spectral bands 
to be used, a planned implementation timeline, and information concerning 
financial ability to construct, launch, and operate the system. Applications may 
also require detail on the steps to be taken to reduce interference potential through 
coordination with other operators, as well as a post-mission disposal plan that 
takes into account space debris mitigation guidelines.
Some regulators also require operators to obtain licenses for the ground stations 
used to communicate with the satellites, including end-user terminal equipment 
(traditionally referred to as “Earth stations”). Earth station licenses serve to 
reduce the potential for radiofrequency interference, in particular interference 
with other terrestrial applications, and may also include provisions to evaluate 
physical interference with other applications, such as aviation. Earth station 
license applications typically require similar technical and business details to 
satellite network applications. For end-user terminals, the licensing authority may 
issue blanket licenses covering technically identical equipment.
Remote Sensing Licenses
In compliance with the international regime discussed in Chapter One and also 
discussed in the in-depth analysis on Remote Sensing at the end of Chapter 
Two, national governments may also require commercial remote sensing 
satellite operators to apply for a license covering the imaging capabilities of the 
satellite system. These licenses may be issued by authorities separate from those 
responsible for the communications systems aspects. Remote sensing licenses are 
typically required to ensure coordination with national security policies. Required 
information to be submitted may include system technical details; expected dates 
of operation; launch information; data acquisition, access, and distribution plans; 
data pricing policy; planned agreements with foreign entities; and a post-mission 
disposal plan. Remote sensing licenses may apply conditions on the operator, such 
as resolution restrictions and the ability to restrict imaging of national territory.
Launch and Re-Entry Licenses
Entities providing commercial launch services are typically required to obtain 
a launch license from a national authority, which may differ from the authority 
responsible for other space-related licenses. Launch licenses may be specific to 
launch operations or re-entry operations, and may have varying requirements 
based on whether the launch (or re-entry) vehicle is experimental or operational, 
and whether it is expendable or reusable. 
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Launch and re-entry licenses authorize an operator to conduct one or more launches 
or re-entries defined by a specific set of operational parameters, which are codified 
in (and authorized by) the license. These parameters generally include, but are not 
limited to: mission names, intended launch windows and trajectory, parameters 
for the payload(s) intended and final orbits, ground and flight safety plans, 
accident investigation plans, and re-entry windows and trajectory (if applicable). 
Typically, operators are also required to submit information demonstrating that 
their intended launch operations are in compliance with environmental policies, 
export control regulations, other licensing requirements (e.g., frequency and 
remote sensing), and insurance and liability coverage obligations.
In order to obtain a license, the launch providers may request information from the 
operators of the satellites to be launched. The process of obtaining a launch license 
entails multiple steps and submissions to the regulatory authority. Accordingly, 
the authorities often offer pre-application consultation services so that operators 
are aware of the steps and information required before they initiate the process. 
Launch and re-entry licenses serve numerous purposes. They act to protect 
public safety interests including protection of third-party safety on the ground 
and coordination with air traffic management functions. The licensing process 
provides national authorities with the ability to review the intended launch 
operation against national security considerations and other national regulations 
and requirements. The launch licensing process also acts to ensure that national 
authorities collect the information necessary to satisfy international registration 
requirements for the launch.
The Licensing Process: Getting a License
The licensing process imposes obligations on both the government agencies issuing 
the licenses and the operators who are the licensees. The license approval process 
typically includes an inter-agency coordination process in which the licensing 
authority consults with other government agencies who might be affected by, or 
have oversight of, the proposed operation. This reduces the administrative burden 
on the operator by reducing the number of consultations they must undertake. 
Licensing authorities also may have an obligation to conduct technical and 
financial due diligence on applications received. This helps reduce the number of 
frivolous applications received, and helps prevent resources (such as spectrum) 
from being allocated to operators who are unable to use it. Operators should be 
prepared to respond to due-diligence requests during the license approval process. 
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When applying for a license, operators should be aware of potential administrative 
fees and the time required to process the application. Fees are intended to allow 
the issuing authority to recover costs associated with processing the applications. 
Application processing times vary, but can be significant depending upon the 
efficiency of the authority and the amount of interagency coordination required. 
For applications requiring full coordination and processing with the ITU, the 
processing time required can be measured in years. System deployment plans 
must account for these processing times.
Licensing applications, processes, and requirements may differ by operating 
domain or type of system. Systems operating in geostationary Earth orbit (GEO) 
may be subject to a different process than those operating in other orbits. In the 
telecommunications segment, Fixed Satellite Services (FSS), Mobile Satellite 
Services (MSS), and Broadcasting Satellite Services (BSS) can have differing 
licensing processes. Some national regulators may offer less onerous licensing 
requirements for amateur satellite operators, and some authorities responsible 
for launch operations offer distinctions between experimental and operational 
systems. It is the responsibility of the operator to ascertain which categories are 
applicable to their system, although national authorities may offer consultation on 
this subject. During the application process, applicants should also be aware that 
some national regulators make applications public (either in total or in part) and 
may also allow public commentary on applications. This may present implications 
for business strategy.
Once a license is issued, the operator is responsible for various continuing 
reporting requirements. Licenses typically have a validity period, after which a 
renewal application may be required. Satellite operators are commonly required 
to report any major changes in system operations or performance, including 
technical faults, to the licensing authority, and may also be required to submit 
annual performance reports. These reporting requirements satisfy the licensing 
authority’s obligation to provide continuing oversight of licensees. 
Launch Vehicle Selection
When selecting a launch vehicle, satellite operators, especially new operators, 
usually hire a technical consultant to advise on launch vehicle selection. The 
technical consultant is usually an experienced industry veteran knowledgeable 
about the range of considerations involved. The satellite operator and technical 
consultant then request technical assessments from launch operators to determine 
whether a launch vehicle is capable of accommodating the operator’s specific 
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satellite mission. A group of qualified launch operators are asked to submit 
a proposal. Launch proposals are evaluated by the satellite operator and 
technical consultants. 
If a satellite operator requires launch insurance (and most operators do require 
insurance in order to meet financial obligations and licensing requirements), an 
insurance broker will likely work with the satellite operator and the proposed 
launch providers to determine the appropriate insurance rates. If possible, it is 
important for a satellite operator to work closely with a launch provider and 
to have an independent representative on-site and participating in a launch 
provider’s operations. Insurance is discussed later in this chapter. It is important 
to select a launch vehicle with adequate performance capability and appropriate 
performance margin to accommodate modest satellite mass growth if necessary. 
Launch service providers will not allow their limits to be exceeded because this 
will result in catastrophic failure or deployment into an incorrect orbit.
Launch providers normally have a queue of payloads waiting to be launched. 
Conducting a space launch is a complex endeavor requiring coordination of many 
complicated tasks that are affected by a variety 
of factors that are difficult to control. The launch 
vehicle and satellites are often composed of 
components manufactured by dozens to hundreds 
of suppliers. Those components must be tested 
to ensure proper function before and during 
integration between the satellite and the launch 
vehicle. Any anomalies discovered during testing 
often require disassembly and further testing. 
Furthermore, failure of a satellite or launch 
vehicle in orbit that shares hardware with a new 
satellite in manufacture may require a delay in 
production until the cause of the other mission’s 
failure is determined. Even if a spacecraft and 
launch vehicle show up at the launch site on 
schedule, it may be necessary to wait for the 
launches of other payloads that have priority but 
have experienced schedule slips. Once on the 
launch pad, weather and launch-range issues can 
further delay a launch. All of these factors lead to 
the reality that many launches do not occur when 
originally scheduled. 
A new satellite 
operator must 
be financially 
prepared 
to survive a 
significant 
launch delay 
which could 
require 
expensive 
satellite storage 
fees and a lack 
of planned 
revenue 
from satellite 
operations.
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A new satellite operator must be financially prepared to survive a significant 
launch delay which could require expensive satellite storage fees and a lack of 
planned revenue from satellite operations.
Integrating Multiple Payloads
There are multiple ways a launch provider can integrate multiple payloads into the 
same launch. One of the most proven forms of multi-payload launch deployment 
is satellite stacking. The Russian Proton heavy-launch vehicle stacks two 
satellites, with the lower satellite carrying the mass of the upper satellite through 
an appropriate interface. Alternatively, the European Ariane-5 launch vehicle uses 
a rigid structure, a type of shelf that carries the mass of the upper satellite, instead 
of it resting on the lower satellite.
Some satellites are designed from the beginning to be launched together in an 
efficient, clustered manner. The French-Italian satellite manufacturer Thales 
Alenia Space designs spacecraft buses, such as those used in the Iridium 
constellation, to be efficiently clustered to take advantage of lower cost launch 
options. Designing for clustering from the start is particularly common with large 
constellations of smaller satellites, several of which can be launched into the same 
orbital plane at the same time. For example, the Iridium low Earth orbit (LEO) 
communications constellation was designed to have 66 operational satellites 
spread across 11 orbital planes. Except for the occasional solo launch, most of the 
Iridium satellites were launched in groups of four and six on American, Russian, 
and Chinese launch vehicles.
For other satellite missions, it is more efficient to deploy a payload into space 
on another operator’s satellite, a technique known as a hosted payload, thereby 
negating the need to build and launch a dedicated satellite. In a hosted payload 
configuration, the payload owner pays the host spacecraft operator to carry an 
instrument that uses the host satellite’s utilities, such as power, data transfer, 
etc. Finally, as new, large constellations of communications satellites have been 
announced, a concept called a hosted bus has emerged. In this configuration, a 
satellite operator can purchase a spacecraft based on the same bus as the other 
satellites in the constellation. The hosted bus operator benefits because the 
non-recurring engineering costs of the satellite bus have been paid for by the 
constellation operator, making the hosted bus satellite much less expensive to build. 
Another major benefit is that the hosted bus operator can use the constellation’s 
communications network and ground infrastructure, and may be able to ride-share 
a launch for a relatively low price.
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More recently, the concept of launching multiple payloads from multiple 
operators on the same launch, known as a rideshare, has become popular. A 
rideshare, at its most basic level, can be defined as multiple satellites sharing the 
same launch vehicle. Many satellite operators, especially those operating small 
satellites or cubesats, may elect to launch as a secondary payload rather than as 
a primary purchaser of a launch vehicle. As a secondary payload, operators are 
taking advantage of surplus payload volume and mass margin to essentially share 
a ride on a launch purchased by another satellite operator. Entities wishing to 
pursue launch in a ridesharing arrangement might contract directly with a launch 
operator or with a satellite operator. They might also work through a launch 
broker service, which matches payloads to launch opportunities. Some launch 
brokers may themselves purchase a dedicated launch opportunity and aggregate 
multiple payloads together.
Ridesharing arrangements are typically lower in cost than purchasing a dedicated 
launch, which may be cost-prohibitive for many new actors. However, the 
approach has its drawbacks. Secondary payloads typically have a reduced ability 
to influence the schedule of the launch, which is usually negotiated between the 
launch operator and the primary payload operator. Secondary payloads may also 
find themselves with limited orbital insertion options and facing a suboptimal 
vibration and acoustic environment during launch, as these parameters are defined 
according to the mission requirements of the primary payload. Furthermore, a 
rideshare increases the complexity of the launch and deployment and therefore 
increases the risk of failure. A variety of rideshare hazards must be assessed 
prior to launch, including explosive hazards, electromagnetic compatibility, 
electrical shock, battery rupture, electrolyte leakage, sharp edges, protrusions, and 
premature mechanism deployment. 
Launch Services Agreement
Securing a launch to outer space with a launch provider will require entering 
into a legally binding contract called a launch services agreement. The launch 
services agreement will methodically define all the particulars of launching, and 
give definitions for many elements of the launch. The agreement delineates all 
the particular roles and responsibilities of the actors, but in general, these are that 
the customer will be handing over a satellite that is fit for launch, and the launch 
provider will be performing certain services, such as successfully integrating 
the satellite into the rocket and safely and successfully launching it into the 
correct orbit.
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Each launch services agreement will include unique elements for each particular 
launch, but—as with most contracts—it will always have certain elements that 
make it sufficient as a legally binding contract. While the contracts that companies 
use may seem lengthy, deal in minutiae, and address scenarios that might not 
happen (such as launch failures and other mishaps), legal contracts are actually 
nuanced documents in that they refine all of the various shared understandings and 
expectations of the parties into a finite number of words that address all details, 
define all roles, assign risks, and do so in a fashion that would stand up in court 
as being a valid contract. A contract is a written reflection of the parties’ shared 
understanding of what they undertake to do.
So that both the launch provider and the customer have the exact same 
understanding of particular words, a launch contract will define its most important 
terms. The definitions section of a contract might define the following: “satellite,” 
“launch services,” “launch opportunity,” “launch vehicle,” “launch window,” 
“launch” or “launching,” “post-launches services,” “shared launch,” “third party,” 
“auxiliary payload,” “launch abort,” “launch failure,” “partial failure,” and other 
important terms. Because they are defined, each party is held to understand these 
terms, and to agree to them upon entering into the contract. 
The implications of this should be clear. For example, “launch failure” might be 
defined differently than “partial launch failure,” and should the unfortunate occur 
and the satellite not be placed into the correct orbit, the resulting situation might 
be categorized as a launch failure—or perhaps only a partial launch failure. This 
categorization might have a direct impact on the triggering of insurance and even 
liability provisions. The definitions in the launch contract matter, and should be 
deeply scrutinized by the parties. 
Another component of the launch services agreement are the sections listing the 
undertakings to be executed by both sides. Sometimes called the commitments, 
or technical commitments, these enumerate precisely what each side must do so 
that the other side can fulfill its obligations under the contract. Because launching 
advanced hardware to outer space is such a technological achievement, the parties 
are essentially becoming partners with each other for a certain amount of time. 
Last, parties to a launch contract must face the possibility of disaster, and consider, 
negotiate, and agree upon what risks are borne by whom, what rights are accorded 
in the case of certain events, and what roles each party must play. A section of the 
contract will contain some allocation of potential liabilities and risks.
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Standard contracts outside of the space industry have a clause sometimes called a 
force majeure clause, which means that an intervening, supervening, or otherwise 
unpredictable “act of God” will excuse the parties from undertaking their 
commitments under the contract. 
Insurance
Insurance may be required by the national regulatory authority licensing and 
supervising the space activities. It might also be required by the launch services 
provider in the launch services agreement. A launch buyer may procure insurance 
to minimize exposure resulting from a launch failure. Generally, launch vehicles 
with a less reliable track record have more expensive insurance while more 
reliable systems have less expensive insurance. Therefore, insurance can balance 
out the price differential between low-price, high-risk launch options and high-
price, more reliable launch providers. The most commonly purchased insurance 
is launch insurance, which extends coverage from launch-vehicle ignition to in-
orbit delivery. A separate policy, if required, is purchased to cover satellite failure 
during its operational phase in orbit. A launch buyer should also be aware of the 
liability environments in the nations hosting the launch providers. If a launch 
failure causes damage to the uninvolved public, a buyer may be exposed to 
liability. Some nations have put in place indemnification regimes that establish a 
maximum third-party liability level so that damages in excess of that amount are 
paid for by the national government.
Pre-Launch Payload Testing
Launching a satellite into space exposes it to significant vibration and acoustic 
forces, shock, coupled loads, and thermal and electromagnetic effects. Satellite 
designers and engineers need to reference a launch vehicle’s user guide for 
information about the environment during launch, and properly test a spacecraft 
to make sure it will survive the launch. These risks may also extend into the 
early phases of a satellite’s on-orbit activities, particularly if it will be undergoing 
weeks of maneuvering to reach its final orbit. Steps can be taken during the design, 
engineering, and testing phases of satellite development to prepare a spacecraft 
for successful deployment.
During the design phase, it may be advisable to select a satellite bus—the main 
body of the satellite—that has significant legacy space experience. Commonly 
used satellite designs should have significant data collected about how the 
spacecraft structure and components handle a launch environment. Furthermore, 
using a proven satellite and launch-vehicle combination further reduces the risk 
of payload deployment failures.
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Spacecraft must be designed to handle the vibration and acoustic effects generated 
by rocket motors as a satellite is launched into space. A spacecraft will be exposed 
to at least three types of vibro-acoustic environments that occur during launch, 
including random vibration, sine vibration, and acoustically induced vibration. 
The greatest vibro-acoustic effects are present during the first minutes of a launch, 
as overpressure and reverberations are the strongest. This is followed by flow noise 
as air streams over the payload fairing, causing reverberating sound within, and is 
particularly strong during flight through high-dynamic pressure, such as transition 
through the sound barrier. Information about the vibro-acoustic environment of a 
launch system can be found in a launch vehicle’s user guide.
Most ground testing regimes simplify the launch environment and test to the most 
extreme conditions, not the specific mission profile. Therefore, if a spacecraft 
design is susceptible to vibrational effects, a non-standard, more spacecraft-
specific vibration testing regime should be developed. Vibration effects can be 
mitigated during the design and engineering phases by incorporating motion 
control solutions to aid in attenuating sine vibration events and random vibration 
created by the launch vehicle.
Spacecraft will experience short, intense transient accelerations with broad 
frequency content and a very short duration, generally less than 20 milliseconds. 
These shocks occur during specific flight actions, such as the severing of a spent 
stage with an explosive charge, and can be straightforwardly modeled and tested 
on the ground. The hazards of shock can be mitigated by using non-pyrotechnic 
bolt-cutter-type release mechanisms. 
In addition to taking account of the effects of vibro-acoustics and shock generated 
by a launch vehicle, it is also necessary to understand the coupled loads generated 
by the interaction of a launch vehicle and spacecraft as a complete structural 
system. There are a variety of methods to model coupled loads, but their quality 
and accuracy are highly dependent on the spacecraft’s structural dynamic model 
and data gathered from flights. During the course of a satellite’s design and launch-
vehicle selection process, it is wise to iteratively update a coupled load’s model 
as the spacecraft design matures and more data about the force environment of a 
launch system are collected.
During the launch and orbit raising phase, the thermal environment has to 
be maintained within the bounds for which the electronics and deployment 
mechanisms have been designed and qualified. Different methods are used to 
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ensure this. At the launch pad, the capsule of the launch vehicle is air-conditioned 
or heated to maintain the limits of the temperature excursion. After the fairing 
is deployed, the launch vehicle rotates to expose the satellite to the sun to keep 
the temperature inside of the satellite within the allowable temperature range 
acceptable to the electronics, and to warm the deployment mechanisms.
During launch, spacecraft will be exposed to various electromagnetic 
environments, including energy from tracking radars, launch vehicle 
radiofrequency (RF) transmitters, flight through regions of energetic protons, and 
atmospheric lightning. Therefore, during the engineering phase, it is important 
to strictly adhere to electromagnetic design specifications, and to model possible 
occurrences of electrical interference. System-level compatibility between a 
spacecraft and launch vehicle is addressed through integrated avionics testing 
during manufacturing, with attention to bonding and isolation requirements for a 
launch vehicle. Full system integration testing occurs at the launch site.
The Links Between Testing and Anomaly Mitigation
The importance of the design, manufacturing, and testing of a spacecraft cannot 
be overemphasized when it comes to mitigating on-orbit anomalies. For all but 
human missions, these phases present the only opportunity for true “hands-
on” and re-engineering time with the system. The following list provides best 
practices to consider in developing a process from the pre-operational phase to the 
phases for reducing occurrences of, and impact from, certain on-orbit anomalies:
 ; Perform a detailed Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) at multiple 
phases of design and eliminate single-point failures wherever possible. 
 ; Leverage FMEA results to develop robust and detailed operational 
procedures and execute these during the integration and test (I&T) phase to 
characterize system behavior with an opportunity to update prior to launch.
 ; Catalog and save all documentation and test data including vendor-
provided material. This information can be critical to determining the root 
cause of an on-orbit failure.
 ; Develop a flight-like simulator and/or engineering model of the system. 
A robust simulator is an invaluable tool for testing complex operational 
procedures, validating firmware and software upgrades, and performing 
detailed root cause investigations.
 ; Ensure the design of the spacecraft provides ample data for diagnosing 
anomalies by incorporating sufficient telemetry access points providing 
insight from every unit onboard a vehicle and developing detailed and 
well-organized telemetry formats.
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Practices such as these help the satellite operator understand the risk inherent in 
the mission profile (space environment and operations requirements) and design 
to mitigate those risks.
Launch Mission Assurance
Launch operations deploying satellites rely on a partnership between the launch 
operator and the launch buyer to implement a process and culture focused on 
mission success. This type of relationship and process, called mission assurance, 
is a standard that is perhaps not feasible for smaller commercial budgets, but 
can be employed by large-scale buyers, such as national governments. Mission 
assurance as a process is an iterative and continuous technical and management 
activity employed over the entire lifecycle of a launch system. To achieve 
success, the mission assurance process must include a disciplined application 
of systems engineering, risk management, quality assurance, and program 
management principles. 
Key features of mission assurance include a launch procurement strategy that 
includes adequate contingency funding, which then ensures that the launch 
provider maintains the workforce, facilities, and data-sharing required to perform 
integration and launch, handle contingencies, and reach agreement when issues 
arise. Another key feature of mission assurance is clear accountability, which 
requires that a single entity is responsible for understanding, tracking, and 
ensuring that flight worthiness is maintained.
Next, continuity and independent verification require that funding is available 
to maintain the depth of independent technical capabilities to analyze potential 
issues and render assessment of spaceflight worthiness. Finally, it is necessary 
to conduct extensive reviews; both those leading to the spaceflight worthiness 
certification and the go/no-go decision for launch, as well as post-flight 
data reviews.
LAUNCH
Launching an object into orbit requires a huge amount of energy. At present, that 
energy is created using immensely energetic chemical reactions taking place 
in extremely complicated machines that often are attached to very expensive 
payloads. Significant care must be taken to both increase the odds of a successful 
space launch and minimize the risk that space launch activities pose to people, 
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ground installations, and air and maritime vehicles. The launch phase is considered 
the most dangerous time period during any space project.
There have been satellite launches from approximately 30 sites around the world. 
Today, most launches occur from roughly a dozen launch facilities. Creating 
and safely operating a launch facility requires thorough consideration of launch 
safety, environmental, and ground safety issues. Spaceports are generally located 
in sparsely populated regions to minimize the risk that a launch failure could harm 
people or property in the area. Spaceports are also often located near oceans or 
deserts so that a rocket’s ascent trajectory overflies large, relatively uninhabited 
regions in order to minimize public exposure to expelled rocket stages or other 
falling debris. Once a site for a launch facility is identified, a national government 
often requires completion of an environmental assessment to ensure that 
operation of a launch facility will not pollute or disrupt natural wildlife habitat to 
an unreasonable extent. Finally, the design and operations of a spaceport need to 
follow best practices that have evolved at established spaceports.
There are no globally agreed-upon rules for how to develop and operate a 
space launch facility. Spaceports are usually developed as national assets and 
are managed by government agencies. Many states have conducted studies to 
determine a path forward toward commercial spaceport development. Some 
states have taken steps to incentivize and enable development of commercially 
operated spaceports. The US has created the most proactive commercial spaceport 
regulatory regime thus far, and other states often reference US regulations.
Terrestrial Environmental Safety Considerations
The terrestrial environmental impact of constructing and operating a proposed 
launch site may be significant, and the relevant national authority will likely 
require an environmental impact analysis. Developers of launch facilities need to 
take into account the effect of launch activities on various environmental domains 
including the atmosphere, noise sources and effects, and surface environments.
One environmental concern is the impact space launches have on the atmosphere. 
Ambient air near Earth’s surface is often regulated by national air-quality 
standards to ensure pollutant levels do not reach damaging levels. Due to their 
ultra-hazardous effect on ambient air quality if they are accidentally released, the 
storage and use of some high-energy and volatile rocket fuels may be of unique 
concern. In addition, some launch vehicles emit hazardous gases even during 
normal operation. Other types of launch vehicles, especially those with solid 
 |    103
rocket motors, emit various type of particles when traveling through the upper 
layers of atmosphere, which may come under increased scrutiny by environmental 
regulators in the future.
A second major source of environmental concern is noise. The amount of noise 
created by a proposed launch facility needs be understood and evaluated in 
the context of the natural noise environment. Rocket launches tend to generate 
significant amounts of noise that can disrupt wildlife habitats. Sonic booms 
generated by launch and re-entry activities along a trajectory may cause further 
damage to wildlife, property, and human physiology.
Finally, launch facilities are often placed in areas that are remote from human 
populations, but may also be pristine wildlife habitats. Land, marine, wetland, 
and other surface environments surrounding a launch site may each have 
unique features requiring protection. Site-specific studies and impact mitigation 
plans should be in place prior to construction. Developing a launch facility 
near areas containing threatened and endangered species habitats should be 
especially avoided.
The tensions among spaceport activity, wildlife habitat, and economic interests 
were demonstrated in Japan’s decisions around the amount of launch activity 
allowed at the Tanegashima Space Center in southern Japan. Launch activity was 
initially limited to a 190-day annual window with a cap of 17 total launches per year 
in order to address local concerns that launch activity could negatively impact the 
fishing industry. After further study of the environmental impact and a recognition 
of the need to launch year-round to be commercially competitive, Japan lifted the 
restrictions in 2011. In Europe, the European Union's Registration, Evaluation, 
Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (EU REACH) regulation applies to 
all EU entities, including the aerospace sector, and might be investigated by actors 
looking to conduct activities there.  
Ground Safety Considerations
Once appropriate environmental concerns are addressed, a national regulatory 
entity will likely require a policy review to ensure that a proposed new space 
launch facility would not jeopardize national security, foreign-policy interests, or 
international obligations of the hosting nation.
Next, casualty risk assessment will be conducted. Launch sites should be placed 
in areas where launch activities will not jeopardize public health and safety or the 
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safety of property. Therefore, the flight corridor for a launch vehicle—the land 
under its launch trajectory—must be adequately unpopulated so that there is a 
minimum chance of damages should the rocket vehicle or spent stages impact the 
area. Models exist to calculate the risk to the public, and some nations, such as the 
United States, set minimum quantitative casualty risk levels.
Because of the explosive nature of many solid and liquid propellants, another key 
part of the initial design of a space launch facility is the creation of an explosives 
site plan that shows the location of all explosive hazard facilities, the distances 
between them, and the distances to public areas. Safe handling and management 
of explosive launch-vehicle propellants is critical. Standards exist to guide 
construction of launch site infrastructure in order to avoid causes of accidental 
explosions, such as lightning, static electricity, electric supply system problems 
and electromagnetic radiation.
To ensure safe space launch facility operations, it is important for an operator to 
address controlling public access, scheduling operations at the site, notifications, 
recordkeeping, and launch site accident response and investigation. Access to the 
site should be controlled using security guards, fences, and other barriers. People 
entering the site should be taught the safety and emergency response procedures. 
Alarms and other warning signals are necessary for informing people at the site of 
an emergency situation. If a launch site has multiple users on the site at the same 
time, the site operator should have procedures for scheduling operations so that 
the activities of one do not create hazards for the other.
Hazard areas are another particular concern. Coordination with the national 
maritime and air traffic control entities is necessary to limit how closely aircraft 
and watercraft can approach launch and re-entry operational hazard areas. Notices 
to Mariners are issued for spaceports near waterways when launch activities are 
being conducted. The notices require vessels to clear hazard areas during specific 
windows of time. Alternatively, Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) are issued for 
areas surrounding a launch facility and beneath a launch corridor when expected 
casualty calculations exceed specified thresholds. When a launch facility conducts 
a flight operation, the appropriate equipment to track a launch vehicle’s progress 
across the launch range must be aboard the launch vehicle and on the ground.
Range Safety During Launch Operations 
The launch of a satellite requires significant planning, coordination, and risk 
management. Range safety operations have evolved over time at launch facilities 
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around the globe. Standards that are in development by the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) identify safe practices that apply to launch 
site operations, flight safety systems, and other areas. Globally, most spaceports 
are operated by national governments and have varying approaches to the specific 
range safety practices. However, core principles are common. Range safety 
practices discussed in this section most often reference the commercial regulations 
developed and implemented by the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
First, a flight safety analysis is conducted by a launch operator for each launch in 
order to control the risk to the public from hazards created during both a normal 
and a malfunctioning launch-vehicle flight. A risk assessment analysis should 
account for the variability associated with each source of hazard during flight, 
the normal flight and each failure response mode of the launch vehicle, and each 
external and launch-vehicle flight environment. Additionally, a risk assessment 
should consider populations potentially exposed to the flight, and the performance 
of any flight safety system (including time delays associated with the systems).
The outputs of a risk assessment are used to create a plan to sufficiently isolate the 
hazard to keep risk to the public within acceptable quantitative limits. A summary 
of the various analyses required as part of a flight safety analysis are identified in 
Table 6.
Table 6 – Flight Safety Analyses
Trajectory 
Overflight gate
Probability of failure
Malfunction turn
Hold-and-resume gate
Ground debris risk
Orbital debris
Data loss flight time and planned safe 
flight state
Toxic release hazard
Flight safety limits
Time-delay
Far-field overpressure blast effects
Straight-up time
Flight hazard-area
Collision avoidance
Flight Safety Analyses
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Public Risk Criteria
National regulatory entities such as the US FAA set specific quantitative criteria 
for the risk exposure of the public that launch operations must meet. These 
standards consist of specific probabilities of risk to the public from inert and 
explosive debris, toxic release, and far-field blast overpressure. These quantitative 
limits do not apply to aircraft or watercraft, and as a result, a launch operator must 
establish hazard areas with rules requiring the removal of waterborne vessels and 
aircraft from the hazard zone during the launch activity.
Flight Termination System
In order to meet public risk criteria, it is necessary to incorporate self-destruct 
systems on launch vehicles. Activation of a destruct system breaks the launch 
vehicle into smaller debris, burns off fuel, and keeps overpressure effects 
isolated from the public. Termination criteria are developed during various 
flight safety analyses and implemented as part of the written flight safety plan. 
Flight termination systems are a critical element of range safety. There are some 
exceptions to this rule, especially in the older rocket systems that use toxic fuels, 
in which case it is preferable for the rocket to destruct farther from the launch site 
on a trajectory that is routed into non-populated areas.
Flight Safety Plan
Based on the conclusions reached during the flight safety analysis, a written flight 
safety plan defines how launch processing and flight of a launch vehicle will be 
conducted without adversely affecting public safety and how to respond to a 
launch mishap. A flight safety plan should identify the flight safety personnel who 
will approve and implement each part of the plan.
 
Elements of a flight safety plan include flight safety rules, a flight safety system, 
data on trajectory, and debris dispersion data. The plan must also identify flight 
hazard areas that must be cleared and controlled during launch, and support 
systems and services including any aircraft or ship that a launch operator will use. 
Last, the plan must have a description of the flight safety-related tests, reviews, 
rehearsals, and other safety operations.
A ground safety plan describes the implementation of hazard controls that have 
been identified by a launch operator’s ground safety analysis and that address all 
public-safety-related issues. The plan should at least include a description of the 
launch vehicle and any payload (or class of payload), and identify each hazard, 
including explosives, propellants, toxics and other hazardous materials, radiation 
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sources, and pressurized systems. The plan must also include figures that show 
the location of each hazard on the launch vehicle and indicate where at the launch 
site a launch operator performs hazardous operations during launch processing.
A variety of other plans are necessary as part of a flight safety plan, including:
• Launch support equipment and instrumentation plan
• Local agreements and public coordination plans
• Frequency management plan
• Hazard-area surveillance and clearance plan
• Flight termination system electronic piece-parts program plan
• Communications plan
• Accident investigation plan
• Countdown plan 
Safety-Critical Preflight Operations
A launch operator must perform safety-critical preflight operations that protect the 
public from the adverse effects of hazards associated with launch processing and 
the flight of a launch vehicle. For example, a launch countdown plan should be 
distributed to all personnel responsible for the countdown and flight of a launch 
vehicle. Any nearby region of land, sea, or air necessary to the launch should be 
assessed and monitored to ensure the number and locations of members of the 
public meet established safety standards. The operator should monitor the weather 
to identify meteorological conditions that could threaten the safe performance of 
a launch, such as the presence of lightning. To ensure accuracy, data verification 
of launch-vehicle tracking should be employed.
If the launch vehicle exits flight boundaries, the readiness of flight safety systems 
must be ensured if intentional destruction of the launch vehicle is required. At 
least two tracking sources should be available prior to lift-off, and no less than one 
verified tracking source at all times from lift-off to orbit insertion for an orbital 
launch, or to the end of powered flight for a suborbital launch.
ON-ORBIT ACTIVITIES
Each day, more than 1,500 operational satellites orbit the Earth performing a variety 
of missions critical to the global economy and security. Remotely operating these 
spacecraft to ensure mission assurance and safety of flight requires managing 
R
E
SP
O
N
SI
B
LE
 O
P
E
R
A
T
IO
N
S 
IN
 S
PA
C
E
108    |  Handbook for New Actors in Space
a variety of risks—not the least of which is avoiding running into other active 
satellites and the hundreds of thousands of pieces of space debris also orbiting 
the Earth. The following sections provide a more detailed discussion of the major 
issues that satellite operators need to deal with in order to ensure the well-being of 
their satellites and prevent collisions or incidents that could undermine the long-
term sustainability of the space environment.
Satellite Orbit Determination and Tracking 
The first step is for satellite operators to be able to know where their own satellite 
is in orbit, and know the locations of other objects that may pose a collision 
risk. Unlike our having the ability to find our position on Earth using a global 
positioning system (GPS), the majority of satellites in Earth orbit currently do 
not or cannot use GPS. And neither do any of the hundreds of thousands of pieces 
of debris. As such, the vast majority of space objects must be observed using 
systems which do not rely on the cooperation of the object being tracked in order 
to determine their orbit. Traditionally this is known as space surveillance, or more 
recently as space situational awareness (SSA).
Satellite operators need to determine how they will obtain orbital trajectory 
information on their satellites and other space objects. Satellite orbit determination 
(OD) is the process by which operators or third parties can obtain knowledge 
of the satellite’s trajectory, usually relative to the center of mass of Earth. The 
basic theory involves determining a satellite’s position and velocity—its state—
at a specific time in the past, and then using a set of differential equations that 
model changes in its position and velocity over time to predict where it will be 
in the future. In aerospace terms, this is “generating an ephemeris,” which is a 
set of points in space that define the future trajectory of a satellite. A significant 
challenge in performing accurate OD is developing precise and accurate equations 
of motion that include the various natural forces or perturbations that act on 
the satellite, such as irregularities in Earth’s gravity, atmospheric drag, and the 
gravitational pull of the sun and the moon.
Satellite OD begins with data on the position and velocity of a satellite, known 
as observations. A single observation measures a satellite’s position, and perhaps 
velocity as well, at a specific moment in time, and relative to the location of a 
specific sensor. Multiple observations taken over a single period of time are called 
a track. The observations from one sensor can be used by themselves or combined 
with data from other sensors which observe the space object at other points in 
its orbit.
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Different measurement types have different characteristics, and these lead to 
different levels of confidence in satellite state elements estimated from these 
measurements. Traditionally, the main source of data has been collected by ground-
based radars and ground-based and space-based telescopes. Telescopes may also 
use satellite laser ranging (SLR) techniques to directly illuminate satellites using a 
laser source, rather than relying on illumination from the sun. Radar observations 
can provide velocity information and typically have excellent angular tracking, 
but can suffer from poor range rate estimations. SLR can derive excellent range 
and range rate estimations while having poor estimations of angular rates.
No matter the type of sensor, it is important to understand the accuracy and 
precision of the tracking data it provides. Often, sensors are periodically tasked 
with tracking calibration spheres or other space objects whose orbit is well-known 
in order to determine their accuracy. If a sensor’s measurements are consistently 
off true, a deliberate bias can be introduced to correct some or all of the error. 
The historical performance of sensors can be tracked in order to determine their 
accuracy and precision over time, which in turn can be used as a weighting factor 
for valuing their data relative to other sensors. 
Accurately tracking a space object requires collecting observations from many 
parts of its orbit. That means a global network of sensors is required, which can be 
terrestrial or space-based. To operate and maintain such a network has historically 
been expensive, and as a result, tracking satellites and space debris has been 
primarily a governmental function. To date, the US government has been the 
primary source of this type of information to the public, via the US military’s Joint 
Space Operations Center (JSpOC), although there are increasingly other sources 
of tracking information (both governmental and non-governmental) available to 
satellite operators.
Orbit Propagation
Knowing where an object is now, however, is only part of the problem, since 
there is also a need to know where an object will be in the future to assess the 
risk of collision. That means understanding the various forces acting on an 
orbital object—Earth gravity, solar and lunar gravitational effects, solar radiation 
pressure, and atmospheric drag, the last of which presents a major challenge for 
LEO objects. Much scientific research has gone into developing mathematical 
models to estimate how these and other natural forces—known as perturbations—
affect satellite trajectories over time. But one force can be extremely difficult 
to model: the thrust used to maneuver a spacecraft. Most active spacecraft have 
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to maneuver periodically to maintain the orbit needed to perform their mission. 
A maneuver that takes place during the timeframe of a future prediction—such 
as the probability of whether the satellite will collide with another object—will 
invalidate the analysis. Thus, accurate modeling and predictions need to take into 
account both models of natural perturbations and any planned maneuvers. 
The good news is that the satellite operator must know this information well in 
order to perform their mission. Sharing the information with other operators can 
provide more timely updates and avoid confusion as a result of not knowing an 
operator’s intentions. The challenge is that each operator typically uses their own 
coordinate systems (and sometimes different time systems), which means they all 
have to be normalized—or put in a common reference system—to be useful. This 
process requires a full understanding of units, coordinate and time definitions, and 
a way to validate that information, since many satellite systems were not designed 
to interoperate with those of other operators, only to be internally consistent.
The results also need to be shared in a standard way to ensure that each operator 
knows how to understand and apply that normalized data. And that sharing needs 
to be done on a regular basis to ensure a common understanding of how to apply 
the data and to avoid the possibility of misinterpretation in the midst of responding 
to a serious event. 
Two Techniques for Combining Observations into a State
Two main techniques are used for combining multiple observations into a single 
state for a satellite. The traditional technique is known as the batch processor, and 
it is based on the well-known method of least squares mathematical technique, 
which selects the final solution that minimizes the distance between all of the 
observed locations of a space object and the projected trajectory.
While the simplest version of the batch least squares technique is relatively 
straightforward and easy to calculate, it has three major shortcomings. The first 
is that each observation error is weighted equally even though the accuracy of 
the observations may differ widely. An inaccurate observation from one sensor 
is given just as much weight in the final estimate as a very accurate observation 
from a different sensor. The second major problem is that the observations may 
be correlated with each other, and using correlated observations in a simple least 
squares solution violates one of its underlying mathematical assumptions. Third, 
the batch least squares method does not consider that the errors are samples from 
a random process and makes no attempt to utilize any statistical information.
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To overcome these limitations, a method of determining a weighted least squares 
solution and the minimum variance is implemented. The weighted least squares 
solution selects an estimate x as the value that minimizes the weighted sum of 
the squares of the calculated observation errors. This algorithm for determining a 
state estimate is referred to as the “batch processor.” The name derives from the 
fact that all data generally are accumulated beforehand and processed in a single 
batch to determine the solution. The batch formulation provides an estimate of 
the state at some chosen epoch or time period using an entire batch of data. This 
estimate and its associated covariance matrix can then be mapped to other times.
A second and more modern technique for combining multiple observations into 
a single state estimation is the sequential estimation algorithm. In sequential 
estimation, the observations are processed as soon as they are received. The 
sequential estimation algorithm is often referred to as the Kalman filter, and it 
utilizes new observations to continually correct its estimate of the future state. 
The sequential estimation algorithm takes an estimated state and a covariance 
matrix for that state and propagates them forward in time. New observations of 
the future state are used to recursively correct the original state. The sequential 
processor provides an estimate of the state at each observation time based on 
observations up to that time. The solution and the covariance matrix can also be 
mapped to other times.
Both techniques can misrepresent the actual error in the predicted state. With the 
sequential estimation algorithm, the state estimation error covariance matrix may 
approach zero as the number of observations becomes large. The magnitude of the 
covariance matrix elements will decrease depending on the density, information 
content, and accuracy of the observations. A similar effect may be seen with the 
batch processor, where the state estimation error covariance matrix generally 
underestimates the actual error in the predicted state.
Conjunction Assessment Procedures and Standards
For a satellite operator, one of the key tools for reducing on-orbit risk is to 
perform conjunction assessment (CA)—that is, to determine which objects might 
have a chance of coming close to, and possibly colliding, with your spacecraft. 
Conceptually, the CA task is straightforward. The operator simply needs to 
know where all the objects that might present a collision risk are, and be able 
to predict where they will be for a period far enough into the future to enable 
an effective course of action should a close approach be deemed unsafe. With 
that information, the process of screening each of the operator’s satellites can 
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be performed quickly using well-known analytical techniques. The challenge 
comes from understanding current limitations to performing effective CA and 
identifying areas for improvement.
Typically, CA is performed for a pair of trajectories, each representing the location 
of a space object over time, where the relative separation distance between two 
objects is computed over a given prediction time span. The trajectories may 
be generated using high-accuracy catalog data from a data-provider, or using 
positional data generated by the spacecraft itself. A conjunction event is where 
the relative separation reaches a local minimum, commonly referred to as the 
point of closest approach.
Operational collision risk management starts with the generation of close approach 
predictions and ends with an action/no-action decision from mission stakeholders. 
The step-by-step process consists of:
• Screening a defined set of space objects against another set of objects to 
identify close approaches, referred to as conjunction events;
• Reporting all conjunction events that are predicted to violate a specific 
separation-distance threshold over some future time span;
• Assessing and quantifying the collision threat for each conjunction event 
that is identified; and
• Developing and executing collision avoidance maneuvers for conjunction 
events that exceed the operator’s risk threshold.
Potential collisions can be identified by individual spacecraft operators, 
operational support organizations such as Aerospace Corporation or the Space 
Data Association (SDA), and government organizations such as US Strategic 
Command (USSTRATCOM) or national space agencies. To be most useful to 
satellite operators, the entity conducting the conjunction analysis should have 
accurate trajectory data on both active satellites, including planned maneuvers 
within the prediction time, and other space objects. 
Operational Conjunction Assessment
The conjunction assessment process occurs throughout the lifetime of a satellite, 
from pre-launch to end-of-life operations. Phases of conjunction assessment 
include launch, early orbit, on-orbit, collision avoidance, and de-orbit or disposal. 
Launch conjunction assessment is the process of predicting and reporting the 
close approaches between launch vehicles and orbiting objects. This is done by 
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screening planned launch trajectories against all objects in the space catalog. The 
launch provider typically generates the trajectories, which may include multiple 
iterations corresponding to different launch times within the launch’s window 
of opportunity.
The process of launch screening compares the trajectory of the launch vehicle 
(delivered as ephemeris data) to a catalog of space objects. The preliminary 
screening process may begin weeks to days ahead of the launch date depending on 
the launch provider’s or launch range’s requirements. Subsequent screenings are 
then performed at predetermined intervals, such as at T−4, 3, and 2 days before 
launch, and finally on the day of the launch, to produce the most accurate and 
timely assessment.
Screening results are provided for predetermined screening volumes that depend 
on the satellite mission. For example, a robotic mission with active payloads may 
use a stand-off screening distance of 25 kilometers. This means that the launch 
operator will be notified of any predicted close approaches with miss distances 
less than that.
A number of entities provide launch conjunction assessment services. The US 
military performs launch conjunction assessment for all launches that occur from 
the US Air Force’s eastern and western launch ranges, as well as for any other 
global launch provider who requests the service. Other data providers, such as 
Aerospace Corporation, also provide launch conjunction assessment, and many 
launch agencies across the world perform independent internal assessments using 
publicly available data.
There is ongoing debate about the usefulness of pre-launch conjunction 
assessment. In many cases, there is a significant amount of uncertainty in the 
predicted insertion orbit and the predicted trajectories of existing satellites. As a 
result, launch conjunction assessments may yield a high degree of false positives, 
and may unnecessarily cause launch delays or aborts. Some launch operators have 
concluded that it is only worthwhile to conduct launch conjunction assessments 
against the International Space Station, while others do so for a much larger 
number of satellites and debris objects. However, one significant benefit of 
conducting launch conjunction assessment screenings is that a satellite operator 
will discover which other objects are “in the neighborhood,” and thus which other 
operators they will need to establish working relationships with. In some cases, 
satellite operators have decided to modify the planned operational orbit for their 
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satellite based on a launch conjunction assessment which showed that it was going 
into a high-traffic region. In the case of China’s TanSat, the decision was made to 
not launch it into the “A-Train” constellation of Earth observation satellites due 
to the complicated requirements and procedures necessary for all participants in 
the A-Train.
Early-orbit conjunction assessment spans the phase from the spacecraft’s 
separation from the launch vehicle to its arrival at its final orbit. This phase can 
take days or months depending on the maneuver plan and methods, and presents 
unique challenges to the conjunction assessment process. First, the limited 
observational data in the first few days after launch can delay the ability to 
generate an accurate prediction of a newly launched object’s future trajectory. 
Additionally, the spacecraft’s constant maneuvering makes it difficult to maintain 
consistent tracking and updated orbit determinations. Consequently, accurate 
and timely early-orbit conjunction assessments often require the use of operator-
provided data for ephemeris-based screenings.
Early-orbit conjunction assessment typically includes the operator providing the 
early-orbit maneuver plan to a data provider in addition to a schedule of planned 
maneuvers and required screening volumes. As the early-orbit phase progresses, 
the operator provides ephemeris to the data provider for pre- and post-maneuver 
screenings against the space catalog. This data exchange allows the operator to 
perform collision avoidance, if needed, and helps the data provider maintain 
accurate positional data for the maneuvering satellite. The JSpOC provides this 
service to all satellite operators who provide their ephemeris, and some space 
agencies also provide the service for their own governmental payloads. Several 
private entities, including academic and commercial companies, have started to 
offer SSA data and services.
However, as is the case with launch conjunction assessments, early-orbit 
conjunctions can be difficult to predict in advance. A real life situation where 
early orbit conjunction assessment created challenges involved Europe’s Sentinel 
1-A satellite. Sentinel 1-A was launched on April 3, 2014, and within its first day 
on orbit, it was predicted to have a very close approach with a defunct American 
satellite which had not shown up during the launch screening. Planning and 
conducting the maneuver proved to be very challenging, as Sentinel 1-A was still 
in the process of conducting a set of maneuvers to deploy its solar arrays and 
antennas. Ultimately, the maneuver went smoothly and a potentially disastrous 
situation was avoided.
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On-orbit conjunction assessment is primarily used to ensure spaceflight 
safety throughout the lifetime of a satellite. The process screens all active 
satellites against all other cataloged space objects. The results provide satellite 
operators with predictions of future close approach events. The close approach 
prediction information allows satellite operators to take actions to mitigate the 
risk of collision. The primary metric for doing so should be the probability of 
collision (Pc).
Close approach screening results are performed for prediction times that are 
dependent upon the satellite’s orbital regime. The prediction time for satellites in 
GEO is typically longer than that of all other regimes, largely because GEO orbits 
are more predictable over long periods. The screening volume also varies across 
the different orbital regimes, and often includes a larger monitoring volume and a 
smaller high-interest, or reporting, volume. Table 7 provides an example of how 
different orbital regimes may be defined and assigned specific screening durations 
and volumes depending on their level of risk.
Table 7 – Examples of CA Screening Volumes
GEO
HEO 1 
MEO
LEO 4
LEO 3
LEO 2
LEO 1
10 days
10 days
10 days
7 days
7 days
7 days
7 days
12
40
2.2
0.5
0.5
0.5
2
364
77
17
2
12
28
44
30
107
21
2
10
29
51
1300min < Period < 1800 min 
Eccentricity < 0.25 & 
Inclination < 350
Perigee < 2000 km & 
Eccentricity > 0.25
600 min < Period < 800 min 
Eccentricity < 0.25
1200 km < Perigee < 2000 km 
Eccentricity < 0.25
750 km < Perigee < 1200 km 
Eccentricity < 0.25
500 km < Perigee < 750 km 
Eccentricity < 0.25
Perigee < 500 km 
Eccentricity < 0.25
Orbit 
Regime
Predict/
Propagate/
Time
Radial
Miss
(km)
In- 
Track
Miss
(km)
Cross-
Track
Miss
(km)
Orbit Regime
Criteria/Definition
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The satellite operator, data provider, or service provider may perform conjunction 
screenings based on schedules dictated by specific missions using any variation of 
trajectories, as described before. Currently, the JSpOC is the primary data provider 
for global space operators, and performs catalog and ephemeris screenings using 
their High Accuracy Catalog (HAC). The JSpOC provides catalog screenings 
at a minimum of once per day for all active objects, and additional ephemeris-
based results when satellite operators provide state information from ephemeris 
files. The latter screening process is useful when satellite operators wish to 
screen trajectories for planned maneuvers. Service providers such as the Space 
Data Association specialize in ephemeris-versus-ephemeris screenings, a 
complementary service for satellite operators who elect to join the organization.
Conjunction assessment reports may be issued and exchanged in a variety of ways, 
but the prevailing standard is the Conjunction Data Message (CDM) that has 
been defined by the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS), 
an international body of space agencies. Although the JSpOC is currently the 
premier data provider for spaceflight safety, it does not provide advanced analysis 
or risk mitigation recommendations. Rather, the organization provides the 
maximum amount of releasable data to allow operators to devise and execute 
their own risk mitigation strategies. Other governmental and non-governmental 
entities, such as NASA, the French National Center for Space Studies (CNES), 
and the SDA, may provide advanced analysis or recommendations to their 
satellite operators.
Risk Assessment and Avoiding Collisions 
Not all satellites possess on-orbit maneuvering capability, but for potential 
collisions that involve at least one satellite with maneuvering capability, decisions 
on whether to conduct maneuvers to reduce the risk of a collision must be made. 
The decisions involve calculating the risk of collision and the potential costs of 
a maneuver (such as expending fuel or disrupting operations). Calculating the 
risk of collision requires not just knowledge of where the two objects will be, but 
also the amount of uncertainty associated with that knowledge. The location and 
uncertainty give the probability of collision, which must be future-combined with 
the consequences of a particular collision scenario.
Unfortunately, just calculating the probability of a collision is difficult. Most of 
the data that is currently publicly available on space debris and other satellites—
including that provided by the JSpOC—does not include information on the 
uncertainty of the data, for national security reasons. Although the JSpOC has 
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recently begun including uncertainty data in the conjunction summary messages 
(CSMs) it sends to satellite operators, it can be misleading due to limitations 
resulting from decisions made in designing the Space Surveillance Network 
(SSN). When the SSN was built, data storage and bandwidth were at a premium, 
so it was not practical to send all the observations collected during a satellite pass 
by a phased-array radar back for processing. Instead, the data was (and still is) 
sub-sampled to extract a minimal set of data—eliminating much of the associated 
uncertainty in the measurements. As a result, the uncertainty associated with 
that orbital estimate can be incorrectly interpreted as being more accurate than 
it actually is. The problem is further compounded when tracking maneuvering 
satellites, since failing to recognize 
that a maneuver has occurred can 
create a bad orbital prediction, over-
inflated uncertainty, or both. Similar 
results can be seen when trying 
to process observations for GEO 
satellites operating in clusters when 
observations are incorrectly associated 
with the individual satellites.
From a practical perspective, it is 
incumbent upon each operator to do 
their best to track their own satellites, 
regularly calibrate their results against 
other data sources (particularly to 
avoid unplanned system glitches), 
and be willing to share that data 
with other operators in as timely a 
fashion as possible. The predicted 
trajectory should include natural 
perturbations and previously planned 
orbital maneuvers, and new orbital 
estimates should be provided as soon as possible after performing a maneuver or 
incorporating or canceling a planned maneuver. That data should be provided in 
the form of ephemerides far enough into the future to allow sharing and analysis 
of the data in support of decision-making—that is, early enough to plan and 
conduct an avoidance maneuver, if it is deemed necessary.
In the face of missing, incomplete, or potentially misleading uncertainty 
information, it is imperative that a variety of orbital data sources be compared 
R
E
SP
O
N
SI
B
LE
 O
P
E
R
A
T
IO
N
S 
IN
 S
PA
C
E
From a practical 
perspective, it is 
incumbent upon each 
operator to do their 
best to track their own 
satellites, regularly 
calibrate their results 
against other data 
sources (particularly 
to avoid unplanned 
system glitches), and 
be willing to share 
that data with other 
operators in as timely a 
fashion as possible. 
118    |  Handbook for New Actors in Space
to assess a more realistic uncertainty of the relevant orbits. This process must be 
applied for every case—not assumed to be the same from case to case.
Although it is impossible to prevent all collisions, these steps can mitigate the 
probability of a serious collision that can completely disable a satellite occurring 
and thereby creating the next large piece of debris or generating even more small 
debris that jeopardizes the entire near-Earth orbital environment. Collaboration 
and sharing—between satellite operators and between operators and tracking 
services—are key to success. 
Space Weather 
In addition to possible collisions with other space objects, the space environment 
itself can also pose a hazard to satellites. “Space weather” is the term for the set 
of physical and electromagnetic processes and effects that occur on the sun, and 
ultimately interact with the Earth’s magnetic sphere, atmosphere, and surface. 
These phenomena, which include solar flares, solar wind, geomagnetic storms, 
and coronal mass ejections, can have adverse effects on activities in orbit and on 
the Earth’s surface.
The sun is constantly emitting electrically charged particles, which flow outward 
throughout the solar system in a phenomenon known as solar wind. The sun also 
emits electromagnetic radiation across a variety of wavelengths including radio, 
infrared, visible light, ultraviolet, and X-rays. Changes in the intensity of these 
emissions result in the variety of effects known as space weather events, including:
• Sunspots, which can lead to increased emission of solar wind. A 
geomagnetic storm results, which in mild cases leads to the aurorae 
borealis and australis, and in more severe cases can overload 
electrical systems.
• Coronal mass ejections, which correlate with increased numbers of 
electrically charged particles being ejected into the solar wind, and 
which have effects similar to those of sunspots.
• Coronal holes, which also cause increased solar wind activity.
• Solar flares, which result in high-concentration bursts of radiation. 
Outside of the aurorae, space weather affects are generally not visible to the naked 
eye. For the most part, the Earth’s natural magnetic field protects the planet from 
the general solar and radiation environment. However, when space weather events 
occur, they can have deleterious impacts on spacecraft operations that operators 
need to be aware of. These include:
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• Higher levels than normal of charged particles, which might degrade 
satellite components and equipment;
• Interference with electrical signals, including those of high-frequency and 
ultra-high-frequency communications satellites and global navigation 
satellite systems (GNSS);
• Interference with radar and/or space tracking systems looking in sunward 
or poleward directions;
• Increased drag for satellites operating in low Earth orbit; and
• The potential for increased radiation exposure for humans in orbit.
Strong space weather events can also impact vulnerable systems on Earth’s 
surface, including electrical power grids and aviation systems.
Space weather is typically correlated with an 11-year cycle of solar maximum and 
minimum, although notable events can occur at any point in the cycle. Government 
agencies, including the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's 
Space Weather Prediction Center (NOAA SWPC) and the US Air Force, provide 
space weather forecast services, including offering watches, warnings, and alerts. 
Depending on the type of space weather event, warnings, watches, and alerts can 
be issued with between 10 minutes and 72 hours of advance notice. Space weather 
events are rated by a published scale to describe their expected severity. Operators 
and other interested parties can subscribe to the forecast service via NOAA’s 
Space Weather Prediction Center.
Satellite Anomaly Recognition, Response, and Recovery 
Anomalies in spacecraft operations come in many forms and result from a variety 
of causes, but are generally described as off-nominal behavior of an individual 
unit, a subsystem, or the system as a whole. Exact causes of anomalies can cover a 
broad range of sources, such as the space environment (e.g., high-energy particles 
from coronal mass ejections, micrometeoroid strikes, spacecraft charging), poor 
design (e.g., thermal runaway caused by insufficient thermal insulation, divide-
by-zero cases within flight software), faulty parts or manufacturing techniques 
(e.g., debris in bearing races, switch failure), and even procedural or human 
error during operations (e.g., incorrect sequence of steps for unit power-on, 
accidentally transmitting unintended commands, unintentional ground- or space-
based radiofrequency interference). 
At one end of the spectrum, an anomaly may be benign—to the extent that it 
goes unnoticed for days, weeks, months, or even years. At the other extreme, an 
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anomaly may end a mission. Properly and thoroughly preparing for, responding 
to, and learning from anomalies can make the difference between exceeding life 
expectancies for a mission and experiencing a potentially avoidable mission-
ending event.
Anomaly Recognition
Several steps can be taken to improve an operator’s ability to quickly detect 
anomalies during spacecraft operations. The most important element is having 
useful, accurate telemetry. All telemetry access points need clear definition of 
nominal and off-nominal states or operating ranges. Defining operating ranges 
generally takes several iterations: the first is the predicted range from unit 
designers, the second is based on unit test and integration data, and the third is 
based on initial on-orbit characterization data.
As insight into the inner workings of a system is only as good as the data available, 
telemetry format composition should not be overlooked. Not all parameters should 
be telemetered at the same rate. For example, power failure signatures have very 
short durations (milliseconds), while thermal signatures generally take time to 
manifest (seconds to tens of seconds, if not longer). Therefore, power-related data 
should be telemetered more frequently than thermistor.
Software components are inherently susceptible to single-event effects (SEEs) 
caused by energetic particles in the space environment. There is ample literature 
available on SEEs and methods for designing to account for and respond to 
them. As a starting point, integrating an error detection and correction (EDAC) 
capability will help reduce the impact of single-event upsets (SEUs), a type of 
SEE, but will not fully eliminate the risk of SEUs affecting system performance. 
Establishing a mechanism to routinely monitor and correct the overall state of data 
in on-board memory can help catch and correct issues before they manifest. In 
addition, telemetering the status of autonomous corrective actions (quantity, date/
time, location in memory) can provide great insight into the space environment 
encountered as well as the health of a memory unit itself. For example, repeated 
attempts to correct the same memory address can provide an indication of a failed 
or stuck bit.
Anomaly Response
Prior to launch, operational procedures should be written, tested, and trained on in 
order for operators to be adequately prepared to not only perform daily operations 
but also respond to on-orbit failures. When developing operational procedures 
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for anomaly response, it is helpful to define strategic decision points in the 
flow of steps. Consider which steps operators are authorized to execute without 
supervisory authority and which steps require stakeholder direction (corporate/
government/customer) to perform. In defining decision points, also consider what 
information is necessary to choose the path forward and clearly articulate this 
information in objective terms. In addition, modularity in procedure design can be 
useful, as can expected entry/exit states and anticipated duration for the execution 
of each module.
For LEO systems, if manual intervention is required to respond to an anomalous 
condition, it must take place during one of the brief in-view periods; therefore, 
planning quick and concise steps with clear break-points is vital. Prior to the 
vehicle going out of view, it must be configured to a safe state—a state in which 
there is little to no risk of further damage or loss of mission until the next in-view 
period. Similarly, upcoming orbital events in all regimes must be considered. 
For response to a power system anomaly, for instance, it is important to have 
heightened awareness of an upcoming eclipse for which the system must be 
properly charged and configured. If a sufficient state of charge is not possible, a 
typical response would be to power off non-critical units to allow for safe transit 
during the eclipse period.
Once all of the above factors have been considered, a system has been built and 
launched, and on-orbit operations are underway, failures will inevitably happen. 
In a perfect world, all failure scenarios have been well-thought-out and detailed 
operational procedures established along with appropriate responses. In the real 
world, however, unforeseen and undocumented failures will happen. 
When a failure occurs, anomaly response protocol takes effect. The first step in the 
protocol is an immediate response: any operator action or reliance on autonomous 
fault sequence required to configure the vehicle to a “safe” state. The second step 
is to initiate a call-in procedure to alert and request assistance and support from 
management and system or subsystem experts, based on observed signature. The 
third step is establishing authority for action: defining who is in charge of response 
and recovery actions, which may be the operational crew, factory experts, the 
owner of the system, or others. The final step is communicating the impact of the 
anomaly: determining what the immediate effect is on the mission, the duration of 
the projected outage/impact, and who needs to be informed. 
Once a vehicle has been “safed” (configured in a known state it can stay in more 
or less indefinitely without concern, disregarding a second, unrelated anomaly), 
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operators can begin compiling information about the failure while system experts 
arrive. Useful information includes a detailed timeline of events leading up to 
the anomaly, detailed state of all systems on the vehicle before and after the 
fault, and a timeline of upcoming events such as out-of-view periods, an eclipse, 
or conjunctions.
Anomaly Recovery and Analysis
An anomaly response team should consist of general vehicle system engineers 
familiar with the detailed workings of the system as a whole, subsystem and unit 
specialists educated on specific hardware and software intricacies of the various 
units, and representatives of the stakeholders or customers. While all satellite 
operations groups have their own processes for anomaly response, recovery, and 
investigation, an anomaly recovery usually begins with vehicle system engineers 
piecing together details of the scenario and working with individual subsystem 
specialists to identify abnormal behavior in all aspects of a system, both prior to 
and following the fault. Due to the complexity of space systems and wide variety 
of potential causes, a specific root cause many times cannot be attributed on the 
day of an anomaly. Rather, suspect units are isolated and kept offline until further 
investigation can take place. In cases where redundant units are available, full 
operations may be re-established by performing a controlled swap to a redundant 
unit, if not already performed by on-board fault management.
In general, there are two main severities of anomalies: critical and payload-related. 
Critical health and safety anomalies affect communications, power, and thermal or 
attitude control subsystems, and payload-related anomalies may affect execution 
of the intended mission but do not necessarily affect the ability of the vehicle to 
control its subsystems. For vehicle health and safety anomalies, autonomous fault 
management response should be designed and tested to quickly establish safe 
control of the affected systems. In these cases, the anomaly response team should 
focus initial efforts on confirming that autonomous commanding successfully 
identified the fault, executed the proper response sequence, and isolated the 
suspect unit(s). For non-critical but mission-impacting anomalies, the anomaly 
team should focus efforts on isolating the fault and investigating the best path 
forward to re-establishing mission throughput, perhaps on redundant units or in a 
degraded state if redundant units are not available.
At a point in the anomaly response and recovery process, a full root cause analysis 
should take place. However, in practice, it is very rarely possible to determine 
a single definitive root cause. More often, the diagram and paths are narrowed 
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to several “probable root causes” and several “unlikely root causes,” and the 
remainder are “exonerated.” Due to the challenges associated with remotely 
identifying component-level failures from hundreds to millions of miles away 
with limited insight, many root cause investigations remain open, documented 
with probable but not definitive causes.
Fishbone Diagrams
Fishbone diagrams provide a clear and concise way to visually track investigations 
that have a multitude of potential root causes (Figure 9). “Bones” on the fishbone 
diagram typically include, at minimum:
 
• Environmental causes (e.g., space weather, debris, etc.), 
• Design/parts/manufacturing causes (down to each piece-part within the 
failure path), and 
• Human/operator causes. As aspects are vetted and eliminated, bones on 
the fishbone chart can be exonerated. The goal of a deep-dive root cause 
analysis is to narrow a fishbone diagram down to a single bone that can 
be deemed the “determined root cause.” 
Regardless of the absolute determination of the root cause, lessons are always 
learned from anomalies, lessons which can be applied to the current mission as 
well as others in a constellation and even across the industry. For example, failure 
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Figure 9 – Fishbone Diagram
 Source: https//commons.wikimedia.org
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of the bearings in a reaction wheel on a LEO vehicle due to lube breakdown 
may provide early warning of potential trouble with control moment gyros built 
by the same vendor and used on a different vehicle in a different orbital regime. 
Therefore, documenting, cataloging, and maintaining failure information is 
paramount to the success of any space program, as is sharing lessons learned 
within the space operations community.
 
Ultimately, it is important to accept that on-orbit anomalies will happen over the 
lifetime of a space vehicle. Being adequately prepared before anomalies occur 
and applying lessons learned afterwards can drastically reduce the impacts to 
mission throughput.
END-OF-LIFE
As satellites reach their end of life and cessation of operations, it is important for 
satellite operators to dispose of satellites properly. Highly used and important 
regions of orbit are already congested, in large part due to satellites or rocket 
stages that have been left in those active regions. Increasingly, there are 
national regulatory obligations, contractual obligations, guarantees, and other 
responsibilities that need to be met during the end-of-life phase of a space mission.
Post-Mission Disposal
It is important to properly dispose of satellites and launch vehicles at the end of 
useable life. Satellites that are not properly disposed of have a chance of interfering 
with operating satellites and possibly generating additional debris in orbits that 
are useful and commonly used. To minimize this risk, the Inter-Agency Space 
Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), an international governmental forum 
of experts, has created guidelines for mission developers to use when planning 
proper disposal of spacecraft. In addition, thirteen nations are participating in an 
effort organized within the ISO to develop space systems disposal standards.
Launch Vehicle and Satellite Passivation 
To minimize the risk of satellites creating debris from accidental break-ups after 
the completion of mission operations, the IADC recommends that all the on-board 
sources of stored energy of a spacecraft or launch-vehicle orbital stage, such as 
residual propellants, batteries, high-pressure vessels, self-destructive devices, 
and flywheels and momentum wheels, should be depleted or safed when they 
are no longer required for mission operations or post-mission disposal. This is 
called passivation. 
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The importance of designing for proper passivation has been demonstrated by 
the more than 40 ullage motors flown on the Russian Proton Block DM upper 
stage that have broken up in orbit. The ullage motors, first deployed in the 1980s, 
provide the stage with three-axis control during coast, and are routinely ejected 
when the Block DM stage ignites for the final time. Depending on the mission 
profile, the ullage motors may carry up to 40 kilograms of unused propellant. 
Over time, solar heating and other factors have caused dozens of the motors to 
explode, releasing debris into orbit. Russia has made design changes to prevent 
accidental explosion of the engines on new Block DM models, but some launches 
continue to eject the units.
According to the IADC guidelines, passivation should occur as soon as the process 
can be undertaken without posing unacceptable risk to the satellite payload. 
Guidelines include the following:
• Residual propellants and other fluids, such as pressurants, should be 
depleted as thoroughly as possible, either by depletion burns or venting, 
to prevent accidental break-ups caused by over-pressurization or 
chemical reaction.
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Table 8 – International Orbital Debris Limitation Documents
IADC-02-01, Rev 1
ISO 26872, ISO 16699, ISO 16164
US Government Orbital Debris Mitigation  
Standard Practices
NPR 8715.6A, NASA-STD-8719.14
DoD Space Policy Directive, 3100.10, AFI 91-217
 
Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 415.39
JAXA JMR-003
MPM-50-00-12
European Code of Conduct for Space Debris Mitigation
Space Technology Items General Requirements on  
Mitigation of Space Debris Population
IADC
ISO
USA  
NASA
Department  
of Defense (DoD)
FAA
JAXA
CNES
European Space Agency (ESA)
Roscosmos
International Orbital Debris Limitation Documents
Entity Document
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• Batteries should be adequately designed and manufactured, both 
structurally and electrically, to prevent break-ups. Pressure increase in 
battery cells and assemblies can be prevented by mechanical measures 
unless these measures cause an excessive reduction of mission assurance. 
At the end of operations, battery charging lines should be de-activated.
• High-pressure vessels should be vented to a level guaranteeing that no 
break-ups can occur. Leak-before-burst designs are beneficial but are 
not sufficient to meet all passivation recommendations of propulsion 
and pressurization systems. Heat pipes may be left pressurized if the 
probability of rupture can be demonstrated to be very low.
• Self-destruct systems should be designed to not cause unintentional 
destruction due to inadvertent commands, thermal heating, or 
RF interference.
• Power to flywheels and momentum wheels should be terminated during 
the disposal phase.
• Other forms of stored energy should be assessed and adequate mitigation 
measures should be applied.
• Telemetry and other forms of RF from the satellite should be turned off.
• All communications should be disabled. 
 
Geosynchronous Region Disposal
The geosynchronous region is a special area of Earth orbit. This is defined as 200 
kilometers above and below the geostationary altitude of 35,786 kilometers and 
15 degrees north and south of the Equator. Maintaining a spacecraft in GEO in the 
geosynchronous region requires expenditure of fuel over time to maintain a fixed 
position in space relative to Earth. GEO satellites are disposed of by maneuvering 
the spacecraft further out into space, away from the protected geosynchrous 
region. However, the decision on when to retire a GEO satellite can be a 
difficult tradeoff. 
GEO satellites often face depletion of fuel before other satellite subsystems reach 
end-of-life. Therefore, operators often must make the difficult decision to retire a 
satellite that is generating tens of millions of dollars annually, when the only thing 
wrong with it is its low fuel. The lifespan tradeoff is made more difficult because 
satellite operators, using newly available low-cost tracking user terminals, can 
choose to conduct operations from an inclined orbit. In an inclined orbit, fuel is 
expended at a much reduced rate as the satellite is allowed to drift within a certain 
region of space, allowing it to continue to be useful. However, there is a risk 
that other satellite subsystems, operating beyond their design life, may fail during 
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inclined operations, leaving the satellite in an orbit that risks contaminating the 
protected geosynchronous region.
The IADC recommends fulfilling the two following conditions at the end of 
the disposal phase to describe an orbit that remains above the geosynchronous 
protected region:
1. A minimum increase in perigee altitude of: 
235 km + (1000 × CR × A/m)  
where CR is  the solar radiation pressure coefficient  
A/m is   the aspect area to dry mass ratio (m2kg-1) 
235 km is   the sum of the upper altitude of the GSO  
   protected region (200 km) and the maximum descent 
   of a re-orbited spacecraft due to luni-solar &   
   geopotential perturbations (35 km)
2. An eccentricity less than or equal to 0.003
To minimize the chance of debris-creation, a propulsion system should not be 
separated from a GEO spacecraft. In the event that there are unavoidable reasons 
that require separation, the propulsion system should be designed to be left in an 
orbit that is, and will remain, outside of the protected geosynchronous region. 
Regardless of whether it is separated or not, a propulsion system should be 
designed for passivation. In addition, spacecraft operators should design missions 
to avoid leaving launch vehicle orbital stages in the geosynchronous region. Most 
GEO operators require that manufacturers design for one more year than required 
for operation so that the satellite can be moved above the geostationary orbit and 
allowed to drift away into deep space. 
Passing Through LEO Disposal
Some types of launches leave rocket bodies or other fragments in orbits that pass 
through LEO. Often this is the case with launches to place a GEO satellite into a 
geostationary transfer orbit (GTO), a navigation satellite in medium Earth orbit 
(MEO), or a satellite in highly elliptical Molniya orbits. Whenever possible, 
spacecraft or orbital stages that are terminating their operational phases in 
orbits that pass through the LEO region, or have the potential to interfere with 
the LEO region, should be de-orbited (direct re-entry is preferred), or, where 
appropriate, maneuvered into an orbit with a reduced lifetime. Retrieval is also a 
disposal option. 
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According to the IADC, a spacecraft or orbital stage should be left in an orbit 
in which, using an accepted nominal projection for solar activity, atmospheric 
drag will limit the orbital lifetime after completion of operations to 25 years. If 
a spacecraft or orbital stage is to be disposed of by re-entry into the atmosphere, 
debris that survives to reach the surface of the Earth should not pose an undue 
risk to people or property. To minimize the risk of debris surviving re-entry, it is 
advisable to design a satellite in a manner that results in complete vaporization 
during re-entry. If that is not possible and there is a greater than 1 in 10,000 
chance of causing a fatality, it is necessary to perform a controlled re-entry that 
deposits surviving debris into uninhabited regions, such as broad ocean areas. 
In addition, ground environmental pollution, caused by radioactive substances, 
toxic substances, or any other environmental pollutants resulting from on-board 
articles, should be prevented or minimized in order to be accepted as permissible.
In the event of a controlled re-entry of a spacecraft or orbital stage, the operator 
of the system should inform the relevant air 
traffic and maritime traffic authorities of the 
re-entry time and trajectory and the associated 
ground area. 
Atmospheric Re-Entry and  
Risk Assessment 
Spacecraft designers must consider what will 
happen to a spacecraft at the end of its lifespan. 
For satellites operating in LEO, it is likely 
that atmospheric drag will eventually cause 
a spacecraft to re-enter Earth’s atmosphere. 
As satellites re-enter, they disintegrate, but 
some debris may survive the heat of re-
entry and could impact the ground and cause 
casualties. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to 
predict specifically where debris will impact 
as the density of the Earth’s atmosphere is 
constantly changing. It is recommended that 
satellite operators design spacecraft that will 
completely burn up during re-entry. 
If debris is expected to survive re-entry and 
cause an unacceptable risk of casualties, it is 
If debris is 
expected to 
survive re-entry 
and cause an 
unacceptable 
risk of 
casualties, it is 
necessary for 
mission planners 
to conduct 
a controlled 
re-entry that 
will spread 
debris over 
uninhabited 
areas of the 
Earth’s surface.
 |    129
necessary for mission planners to conduct a controlled re-entry that will spread 
debris over uninhabited areas of the Earth’s surface.
Re-Entry
During re-entry, friction and compression generate immense heat as a satellite 
traveling more than 29,000 kilometers per hour enters the atmosphere. That 
tremendous heat can melt and vaporize the entire spacecraft. However, if a 
satellite component’s melting temperature is not reached during re-entry then 
that object can survive re-entry and impact the ground. In addition to heat and 
pressure, a spacecraft experiences immense loads as it decelerates. These loads, 
which can exceed 10 Gs, or ten times the acceleration of gravity at the Earth’s 
surface, coupled with the immense heat, cause a spacecraft’s structure to break 
apart. The broken-up components will continue to decelerate and, depending on 
the density of the atmosphere in the region of re-entry, may reach a low ground 
speed, virtually falling straight down from the sky. The broken-up spacecraft 
should impact the ground at relatively low speeds, but it still presents a hazard 
to people and property on the ground and a satellite operator will be liable for 
damages caused by the debris.
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Disposal 
Action
25-Year 
Decay 
 
 
 
Disposal 
Orbit
 
 
 
 
 
 
Direct 
Reentry
Subsynchronous
GTO
Lower perigee 
to ~ 200 km
 
 
Between 2500 
km and GEO-
500 km. 
Launch Vehicle 
Upper Stages 
should reach 
GEO-500 km 
in less than 25 
years.
 
 
 
Broad ocean 
area impact or 
other safe zone
Supersynchronous 
GTO
Initial perigee ~ 
200 km
 
 
Not  
recommended
 
 
 
 
Not studied, but 
similar to Sub- 
synchronous  
GTO case
MEO Navigation 
Satellite Orbits
Not recommended 
due to large Delta-V 
(DV) or change in 
velocity required
TBC: 
1. Minimum long-
term perigee of 2000 
km, apogee below 
MEO. 
2. Perigee 500 km 
above MEO or nearby 
operational region 
and e < 0.003; RAAN 
and argument of 
perigee selected for 
stability 
 
Not recommended 
due to large DV 
required
Molniya
 
Not studied, but 
lowering perigee 
would require 
least DV
Set initial perigee 
of disposal orbit  
at 3000 km
 
Broad ocean area 
impact or other 
safe zone
End-of-Life Disposal Actions
Table 9  – End-of-Life Disposal Actions
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Predicting the exact area where debris will impact from a random re-entering 
satellite is difficult because drag on the object is directly proportional to 
atmospheric density, and the density of the atmosphere varies greatly at high 
altitudes and is affected—dramatically even—by solar activity. It is possible to 
predict the time a re-entry will begin within a 10 percent margin of the actual 
time. However, a minute of error in time is equivalent to hundreds of miles of area 
because of the great speeds of re-entering objects.
About 10 to 40 percent of a satellite’s mass will survive re-entry, depending on 
the size, shape, weight, and material composition. The area it will strike is called 
a footprint. It is possible to predict the size of a footprint but very difficult to 
determine specifically where the debris footprint will be located on the Earth’s 
surface. The size of the footprint is determined by estimating the breakup altitude 
of the satellite or space hardware and then modeling the mass and aerodynamic 
properties of surviving debris. Footprint lengths vary in size from approximately 
185 kilometers to 2,000 kilometers, depending on the complexity and 
characteristics of the object. The width of a footprint can be affected by winds, 
with the greatest uncertainty affecting the lightest objects. A 20- to 40-kilometer 
footprint width is typical.
Re-Entry Threat Statistics
While the impact threat to human life and property from re-entry debris is serious, 
it is interesting to note that only one person has ever claimed to have been struck 
by falling space debris, and that person was hit by a lightweight object and was 
not injured. Over the last 50 years, more than 5,400 metric tons of material are 
believed to have survived re-entry, but no casualties from the debris have been 
reported. It has even been calculated that the risk that an individual will be struck 
by re-entered debris is less than 1 in 1 trillion.
Calculating Re-Entry Risk
There is no legal international definition of “unacceptable safety risk” for re-
entry. The United Nations space debris mitigation guidelines leave the definition 
of acceptable risk to national authorities. The IADC identifies two guidelines 
to follow. First, to minimize the accumulation of orbital debris, it recommends 
satellite missions leave a satellite in an orbit that will result in re-entry within 25 
years. About 80 percent of rocket upper-stages currently comply with the rule, 
while only 60 percent of satellites are designed to lower their orbits to re-enter 
within 25 years. While compliance is not perfect, most major spacefaring nations 
support the 25-year rule and are taking steps to improve compliance.
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In addition to the 25-year rule, the IADC recommends that if a satellite has a 
1 in 10,000 chance of surviving re-entry and causing a casualty, its re-entry 
must be controlled. For a piece of debris that survives atmospheric re-entry, the 
debris casualty area is the average debris cross-sectional area plus a factor for 
the cross-section of a standing individual. The total debris casualty area for a 
re-entry event is the sum of the debris casualty areas for all debris pieces that 
survive atmospheric re-entry. The total human casualty expectation is equal to the 
total casualty debris area times the average population density for the particular 
orbit. A variety of models exist to calculate the likelihood that specific pieces of a 
satellite will survive re-entry, including NASA’s Debris Assessment Software or 
its higher-fidelity Object Re-entry Survival Analysis Tool.
Design for Demise
Design for Demise is a method of satellite design with the goal of ensuring each 
component of a satellite will be completely destroyed during the heat of re-
entry. By designing for demise, satellite operators can avoid having to conduct 
a controlled re-entry, which can lengthen the mission lifespan, lower the cost of 
development, and reduce the mission ground-support costs. Design for Demise 
is a great approach for ensuring compliance with the 1 in 10,000 risk threshold. 
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is developing standards 
(ISO 27875:2010) that can be applied at the planning, design, and review stages 
of satellite development to assess, reduce, and control the potential risk that 
spacecraft and launch-vehicle orbital stage pose during re-entry.
Re-Entry Predictions
Spacecraft re-entries are tracked by space surveillance systems around the globe. 
The US Space Surveillance Network is the largest system, and uses radar and 
optical sensors at various sites around the world to track objects in space. The 
SSN sensors can be used to determine a re-entry object’s orbit. This tracking 
information, along with data about changing atmospheric density, is used to predict 
atmospheric re-entries. USSTRATCOM shares satellite tracking information with 
other nations and the private satellite operators through its Satellite Catalogue 
and the publicly available website www.space-track.org. USSTRATCOM 
issues Tracking and Impact Prediction messages at intervals including T−4 days, 
T−3 days, T−2 days, T−1 day, T−12 hours, T−6 hours, and T−2 hours. Re-entry 
predictions must be continually updated as a satellite approaches the atmosphere.
Even predictions made within a few hours of re-entry may project a debris 
footprint that is incorrect by hundreds to thousands of kilometers. Therefore, 
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even if a significant amount of debris is expected to survive re-entry, it is not 
logistically plausible to effectively evacuate areas debris might impact.
Planning a Controlled Re-Entry
If significant portions of a satellite are expected to survive re-entry and violate the 
1 in 10,000 chance casualty threshold, it is important for a satellite designer to plan 
a controlled re-entry that will scatter any remaining debris over an unpopulated 
part of the ocean. A controlled re-entry requires a satellite maneuvering strategy 
that avoids possible collision with space debris or other satellites. Adequate fuel 
must be left in a satellite’s tanks to perform the final orbit-changing burns. Ground 
support teams must be available to coordinate, perform, and monitor the final 
satellite maneuvers.
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A
active debris removal (ADR), 35,37
anomalies, 94, 100, 119-120, 122-124
fishbone diagram, 123
links between testing and, 100
mitigation, 100
recognition, response, and recovery, 119
arbitration, 30, 82-83
Argentina, 72-73
Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum 
(APRSAF), 62
Asia-Pacific Satellite Communications 
Council (APSCC), 50
asteroid mining, see space resources 
astronauts, 41
Astronaut Agreement, 6, 7, 42
envoys of mankind, 41
atmospheric re-entry, see re-entry 
Australia, 73, 74, 75
Austria, 49, 73
B 
batch processor, 110-111
Belarus, 73
Belgium, 73
Bogotá Declaration, 39
Bolivia, 62
boundary between airspace and outer space,
see delimitation
Brazil, 73, 74, 75
C 
Canada, 73, 76
Remote Sensing Space Systems Act, 85
Catapult, see United Kingdom (UK), Case Study
- Satellite Applications Catapult 
Chile, 73, 86
space policy, 62
China, 24, 49, 62, 73, 77, 114
Tansat, 114
CNES, see France, space agency
Colombia, 39 
Commercial Spaceflight Federation (CSF), 50
Copernicus, see European Space Agency (ESA),
Copernicus
COSPAR, see International Committee on Space
Research (COSPAR) 
Conference on Disarmament, 
see United Nations (UN), 
Conference on Disarmament (CD)
Conjunction Assessment (CA), 111-116
risk assessment, 116-119
Consultative Committee for 
Space Data Systems (CCSDS), 24, 116
contract types, 82
cost reimbursement, 82
fixed price, 82
time and materials, 82
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space (COPUOS), see United Nations 
(UN), Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space 
coronal holes, see space weather
Coronal Mass Ejection (CME), 
see space weather
COSPAR, see Committee on 
Space Research (COSPAR)
cost reimbursement, see contract types
Czech Republic, 73
D 
debris mitigation, see space debris
delimitation, 38-40
functionalist approach, 39
Kármán line, 39
spatialist approach, 39 
design for demise, 131
dispute settlement, 29, 81-83
Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, see
United States, Directorate of Defense Trade 
Controls (DDTC) 
DLR, see Germany, Aerospace Center
E 
Earth environment, 31
Earth observation, 21-22, 74, 61, 84, 87, 114,
see also remote sensing
INDEX
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electromagnetic spectrum, 17-21, 47
end-of-life operations, 112, 124-132
geosynchronous region disposal, 126-127
passivation, 124-126
re-entry, 127-132
environmental issues, 31-38
EUMETSAT, see European Organization for
the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites 
(EUMETSAT) 
European Association of Remote Sensing
Companies (EARSC), 50-51
European Organization for the Exploitation of
Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT),  
16, 72
European Space Agency (ESA), 16, 72, 125
Copernicus, 88
Sentinel 1-A, 114
European Union (EU), 24
Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and 
Restriction of Chemicals (EU REACH), 103
European, Middle-East, and Africa Satellite
Operators Association (ESOA), 51
export control and technology transfer, 25-26,
63, 76
Case Study: Export Controls in the United 
States, 77-78
International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
(ITAR), 26, 77
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), 
26
Wassenaar Arrangement, 25
F 
Federal Aviation Administration, see United
States of America (US), Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA)
Federal Communications Commission,
see United States of America (US), Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC)
fixed price, see contract types 
fishbone diagram, see anomalies
flight safety, 104-107
analysis, 105-106
plan, 92,107
termination plan, 106
force majeure, 98
France, 73, 74, 75, 80, 95
space agency (CNES), 73, 116, 125
freedom of exploration and use, 3-4
frequencies, see International
Telecommunications Union (ITU)
frequency licensing, see licensing 
functionalist approach, see delimitation
G 
Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO), 
17, 39, 93, 115, 117, 126-127
geosynchronous (GSO) region, 34, 126, 127
Germany, 49, 72, 73, 80-81, 87
Aerospace Center (DLR), 81
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), 24,
47, 119
Global Positioning System (GPS), 108
government contracting, 81
Greece, 73
ground safety plan, 106
Group on Earth Observations (GEO), 22, 47, 61
H 
Hague Code of Conduct, 26
High Accuracy Catalog (HAC), 116
hosted 
bus, 95
payloads, 95
I 
India, 24, 73, 74
Science, Technology and Innovation policy 
(STI), 60
Remote Sensing Data Policy, 87
insurance, 71, 74, 90, 92,  94, 97-98
       broker, 94
intellectual property, 68
Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination
Committee (IADC) Debris Mitigation 
Guidelines, 35, 37, 47, 78, 81, 124-125, 127, 
128, 130-131 see also United Nations (UN), 
debris mitigation guidelines
International Amateur Radio Union (IARU), 51
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International Astronautical Federation (IAF),
51-52
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 33
International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), 41
International Committee on Global Navigation
Satellite Systems (ICG), 24, 47, 49
International Committee on Space Research
(COSPAR), 13, 14, 43-44
back contamination, 32
international cooperation, 5, 50, 61-63
International Court of Justice (ICJ), 30, 48
International Institute of Space Law (IISL),
51-52
international liability, see liability
International Organization for Standardization
(ISO), 23, 24, 52, 105, 124-125, 131
international registration, 7, 10-11, 17, 28, 92
international standards, 22-24
International Telecommunication Union (ITU),
17-20, 39, 47-48, 61, 74, 90, 93
administrative regions, 17-18
frequency allocation, 17-18 
primary services, 18
Radiocommunication Sector (ITU-R), 20, 24
Radio Regulations, 17-20, 21
secondary services, 18
Telecommunications Standards Sector
(ITU-T), 23-24
World Radiocommunication Conference
(WRC), 20, 47-48
Iridium, 95
Italy, 72, 73, 95
J 
Japan, 24, 57, 69, 73, 74, 75, 80, 103
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency 
(JAXA), 125
jurisdiction, 12, 16, 22, 28, 30, 32, 69-72, 
82, 83
K 
Kalman filter, 111
Kármán line, see delimitation
Kazakhstan, 73
Kessler Syndrome, see space debris 
 
L 
laser communications, 20-21
launch, 101-107
launching state, 11, 12, 27-32, 69
licenses, see licensing 
mission assurance, 101
preflight operations, 107
rideshare, 95-96
service provider, 50, 94
services agreement, 96-100
vehicle, 93-94
Liability Convention, 6, 7, 27-29, 31, 32
Dispute settlement, 29-30
claims resolution under, 27-29
liability 
international liability, 27-30, 39, 70
domestic/municipal liability, 74, 75, 97-98 
licensing, 71, 89
frequency, 90-91
launch, 91-92
re-entry, 91-92
remote sensing, 91
variance, 74, 79
waivers, 74, 79
low Earth orbit (LEO), 34, 109, 115, 127-128
M 
Malaysia, 61
Master International Frequency Register 
(MIFR), 17
mediation, 30
medium Earth orbit (MEO), 115, 127-128
Mexico, 60, 61, 73
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),
see export control
mission assurance, 101
Molniya orbit, 127-128
Mongolia, 18
Moon Agreement, 6, 7
moon mining, see space resources
N 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), see United States of America (US)
National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, see United States of 
America (US)
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national registration of space objects, 10-16 
58, 71-73
national space policy, see space policy, 
national policy
Netherlands, 30, 72, 73
nodal period, 11, 13
North Korea, 73
Norway, 73
Notices to Airmen (NOTAM), 104
nuclear power sources, 32-33
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 8
O 
on-orbit activities, 107-124
Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC), 25, 52
Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes
Relation to Outer Space Activities, 30, 82-83
orbit determination,
see space situational awareness (SSA)
orbit propagation, 
see space situational awareness (SSA) 
orbital parameters, 11, 13-14, 33, 85
Outer Space Treaty, 3-17
Article I, 4-6, 10
Article II, 38, 45-47, 69-70, 72
Article III, 7, 8-9, 32, 70
Article IV, 8, see also export control and
technology transfer
Article V, 41-42
Article VI, 9-10, 27-28, 32
Article VII, 27-28, 29, 31, 32 
Article VIII, 12, 16, 71
Article IX, 29, 31-32, 42-45
envoys of mankind, 41-42
interpreting, 5-6
liability, see liability
preamble, 5
province of all mankind, 5, 45
state responsibility, 3, 9-10
states parties to, 6-7, 73
P 
Pakistan, 73
payload testing, 98-100
peaceful purposes, 8-9
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), 30, 82
Peru, 73
planetary protection, see Committee on Space
Research (COSPAR) 
preflight operations, see launch
primary data, see remote sensing
primary services, see International
Telecommunication Union (ITU)
private sector, 56, 59, 63, 64-68, 79
processed data, see remote sensing
Proton Block DM, see Russia, Proton 
Block DM  
province of all mankind, see Outer 
Space Treaty
public-private partnership, 65-66
Q 
R 
Radio Regulations, see International
Telecommunication Union (ITU)
radioisotope heat unit (RHU), 32
radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG),
32
range safety, 104-105, 106
raw data, see remote sensing
re-entry, 127-132
atmospheric, 128
cataloging risks, 130-131 
defined, 128-130
design for demise, 131
licenses, 91-92
planning a controlled, 132
predictions, 131-132
threat statistics, 130 
Registration Convention, 71-73
Article I, 27
Article III, 11
Article IV, 11
international registration, 7, 13-16
national registries, 71-73
states parties to, 7, 11, 71-73
REACH, see European Union (EU), Registration,
Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of 
Chemicals (REACH)
remote sensing, 21-22 IN
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policy, 83-87
primary data, 21-22
processed data, 21-22
licensing, see licensing
raw data, 21 
research and development (R&D), 60
restricted Earth return, 32
rideshare, see launch
risk assessment, 116-118, 128
Russia, 24, 32, 57, 69, 80, 95
national registry, 73
Proton Block DM, 125
Roscosmos, 73, 125
S 
Safety Framework for Nuclear Power
Applications in Space, 33
Satellite Industry Association (SIA), 52
Science, Technology, and Innovation (STI)
Policy, 60
secondary services, 18
Sentinel 1-A, 114
Slovakia, 73
solar flare, see space weather
South Africa, 73
South Korea, 73, 74, 75
sovereignty, 12, 21, 38, 45, 69
Space Angels Network, 68
Space Data Association (SDA), 41, 112, 116
space debris, 
description of, 33-34
Kessler Syndrome, 34-35
mitigation, 35
mitigation guidelines, see Inter-Agency
Space Debris Coordination Committee 
(IADC), Debris Mitigation Guidelines, 
and see United Nations (UN), Debris 
Mitigation Guidelines
US policy, 78-81
removal of, 37-38
Space Frequency Coordination Group (SFCG),
20, 53
space policy, 55-70
export controls in the United States, 77-78
space debris policy and administration in 
the US, 78-79
national policy, 55-70
rationales and methods to create, 56-58
relationship between space and science,
technology and innovation policy, 60-61
remote sensing policy and administration,
83-87
role of international cooperation, 61-63
UK Satellite Applications Catapult, 67-68
United Arab Emirates (UAE) Mars Mission,
57-58
space resources, 45-47, 69-70
space situational awareness (SSA), 40, 80-81,
108-118
conjunction assessment, 111-118
orbit determination, 108
orbit propagation, 109-110
Space Surveillance Network (SSN), 117, 131
space traffic management (STM), 35, 40-41, 80
space weather, 118-119
coronal holes, 118
coronal mass ejection (CME), 118 
solar flare, 118
sunspot, 118
Space Weather Prediction Center, see United
States of America (US)
spaceports, 102, 104, 105
Spain, 73
spatialist approach, see delimitation
spectrum, see electromagnetic spectrum
state responsibility, 9-10, see also liability 
suborbital launches, 16
sunspot, see space weather
Switzerland, 47, 49, 52
T  
TanSat, see China 
technology transfer, see export controls and
technology transfer 
Telecommunications Standards Sector (ITU-T),
see International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU)
Thales Alenia Space, 95
time and materials, see contract types
transparency and confidence building measure
(TCBM), 10-12, 26
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U 
UAE, see United Arab Emirates
Ukraine, 73
UNCITRAL, see United Nations (UN),
Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) 
uninhabited aircraft systems (UAS), 87
United Arab Emirates (UAE)
Mars mission, 57-58 
United Kingdom (UK), 67-68, 73, 74, 75, 90
Case Study - Satellite Applications Catapult, 
67-68 
United Kingdom Space Agency (UKSA), 67
United Nations (UN), 6
Charter, 7, 8, 48
Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL), 82-83
Committee of Experts on Global Geospatial 
Information Management (UN-GGIM), 
25, 49
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space (COPUOS), 6-7, 33, 37, 48-49, 52 
61-62
Conference on Disarmament (CD), 49
debris mitigation guidelines, 35-37, 130 
see also Inter-Agency Space Debris 
Coordination Committee (IADC) Debris 
Mitigation Guidelines
Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), 44-45
First Committee, 48
Fourth Committee, 48-49
General Assembly (UNGA), 7, 16, 48
UNGA Resolution 1721 (XVI), 10-12,
13-14
UNGA Resolution 41/65, 21-22
UNGA Resolution 47/68, 32-33
UNGA Resolution 62/101, 12, 14-15, 69
International Court of Justice (ICJ), 30, 48
Office for Outer Space Affairs (OOSA), 
11-12, 49
registry of space objects, 13-15
Secretary-General, 11, 33,41, 49, 72
United States of America (US), 58, 71, 72, 73,
74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 85, 102
Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness
Act of 2015, 69
Department of Commerce, 70, 77-79
Department of Defense (DoD), 125
Directorate of Defense Trade Controls
(DDTC), 26, 77
Department of State, 70, 73, 77
Department of Treasury, 77
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 70,
79, 105, 106, 125
Federal Communications Commission (FCC),
70, 74-76, 78-79
Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC), 109,
114, 116-117 
Munitions List (USML), 26, 77-78
National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), 34, 84, 116, 
125, 131
National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), 70, 79,84, 
85, 119
Space Weather Prediction Center, 119
national space policy, 55-87
National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA), 74
Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices,
78, 125
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), 
112-114, 131
  
V  
variance, 74, see also licensing
Venezuela, 62
W 
waivers, see licensing
Wassenaar Arrangement, see export controls
and technology transfer
World Meteorological Organization (WMO),
22, 50, 86
World Radiocommunication Conferences
(WRC), 20, 47-48
World Telecommunication Standardization
Assembly (WTSA), 24
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ADR  Active Debris Removal
AEB  Brazilian Space Agency
APRSAF  Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum
APSCC  Asia-Pacific Satellite Communications Council
ASI  Italian Space Agency
BELSPO  Belgian Science Policy Office
BSS  Broadcasting Satellite Services
CA  Conjunction Assessment
CCL  Commercial Control List (USA)
CCSDS  Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems
CD  Conference on Disarmament (UN)
CDM  Conjunction Data Message
CFR  Code of Federal Regulations (USA)
CNES    National Center for Space Studies (France)
CNSA   China National Space Administration
CONAE  National Commission on Space Activities of Argentina
CONIDA  National Aerospace Research and Development Center (Peru)
COPUOS  Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN)
CSA  Canadian Space Agency
CSF  Commercial Spaceflight Federation
COSPAR  International Committee on Space Research
DDTC   Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (USA) 
DLR  German Aerospace Center
DoD  Department of Defense (USA)
DV  Change in Velocity
EARSC  European Association of Remote Sensing Companies
EDAC  Error Detection and Connection
ESA  European Space Agency
ESOA  European, Middle East, and Africa Satellite Operators Association
EU  European Union
EUMETSAT European Organisation for the Exploitation  
       of Meteorological Satellites
FAA  Federal Aviation Administration (USA)
FCC  Federal Communications Commission (USA)
FMEA  Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
FSS  Fixed Satellite Services
GEO  Geostationary Earth Orbit
GEO  Group on Earth Observations
GNSS  Global Navigation Satellite Systems
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
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GPS  Global Positioning System
GTO  Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit
HAC  High Accuracy Catalog
HEO  High Earth Orbit
I&T  Integration and Test
IAC  International Astronautical Congress
IADC  Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee
IAF  International Astronautical Federation
IARU  International Amateur Radio Union
ICAO  International Civil Aviation Organization
ICG  International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems
ICJ  International Court of Justice
IISL  International Institute of Space Law
IOT  Internet of Things
ISO  International Organization for Standardization
ITAR  International Traffic in Arms Regulations (USA)
ITU  International Telecommunication Union
ITU-R  International  Telecommunication Union Radiocommunication
ITU-T  International Telecommunication Union Telecommunication   
       Standardization Sector
JAXA  Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency
JSpOC  Joint Space Operations Center (USA)
KazCosmos Ministry for Investment and Development–Aerospace Committee   
       (Kazakhstan)
LBA  Federal Aviation Office (Germany)
LEO  Low Earth Orbit
LSC  Legal Subcomittee (COPUOS, UN)
MEO  Medium Earth Orbit
MEXT  Ministry of Education, Sports, Culture, Science and Technology (Japan)
MIFR  Master International Frequency Register
MSIP  Ministry of Science, Information and Communications Technology,  
       and Future Planning (South Korea)
MSS  Mobile Satellite Services
MTCR  Missile Technology Control Regime
NASA  National Aeronautics and Space Administration (USA)
NASB  National Academy of Sciences (Belarus)
NGO  Non-governmental Organization
NOAA  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (USA)
NOTAMs  Notices to Airmen
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NSAU  National Space Agency of Ukraine
NSC  Norwegian Space Center
NTIA  National  Telecommunications  and Information Administration
OD  Orbit Determination
Ofcom  Office of Communications (UK)
OGC  Open Geospatial Consortium
OOSA  Office for Outer Space Affairs (UN)
OST  Outer Space Treaty
PAROS  Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space
Pc  Probability of Collision  
PCA  Permanent Court of Arbitration
PNG  Position, Navigation, Timing
R&D  Research and Development
RAAN  Right Ascension of the Ascending Node
REACH  Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and  
       Restriction of Chemicals (EU)
RF  Radiofrequency
REG  Registration Convention
RHUs  Radioisotope Heat Units
Roscosmos State Space Corporation (Russia)
RTGs  Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators
SDA  Space Data Association
SEEs  Single Event Effects
SEUs  Single Event Upsets
SFCG  Space Frequency Coordination Group
SIA  Satellite Industry Association
SLR  Satellite Laser Ranging
SME  Small and Medium Sized
SSA  Space Situational Awareness
SSN  Space Surveillance Network (USA)
STEM  Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics
STI  Science, Technology, and Innovation
STM  Space Traffic Management
STSC  Scientific and Technical Subcommittee (COPUOS, UN)
SUPARCO  Pakistan Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission
SWPC  Space Weather Prediction Center (NOAA, USA)
TBC  To Be Considered
TBD  To Be Determined
TCBM  Transparency and Confidence-Building Measure
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TRL  Technology Readiness Level
UAE  United Arab Emirates
UAS  Uninhabited Aircraft Systems
UK  United Kingdom
UKSA  UK Space Agency
UN  United Nations
UNCITRAL United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
UNESCO  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNGA  United Nations General Assembly
UN-GGIM United Nations Committee of Experts on  
       Global Geospatial Information Management
UN-SPIDER United Nations Platform for Space-based Information for Disaster   
       Management and Emergency Response
US  United States
USGS  United States Geological Survey
USML  United States Munitions List
USSR  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command
UTC  Coordinated Universal Time 
WMO  World Meteorological Organization
WRC  World Radiocommunication Conference
WTSA  World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly
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